Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
4-20-2011 12:00 AM

Heuristics, Concepts, and Cognitive Architecture: Toward
Understanding How The Mind Works
Sheldon J. Chow, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Dr. Christopher Viger, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Philosophy
© Sheldon J. Chow 2011

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons

Recommended Citation
Chow, Sheldon J., "Heuristics, Concepts, and Cognitive Architecture: Toward Understanding How The
Mind Works" (2011). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 128.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/128

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

HEURISTICS, CONCEPTS, AND COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE:
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING HOW THE MIND WORKS
(Spine title: Heuristics, Concepts, and Cognitive Architecture)
(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Sheldon Chow

Graduate Program in Philosophy

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

c Sheldon Joseph Chow 2011

THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION

Examiners:
Supervisor:

.....................
Dr. John Nicholas

.....................
Dr. Christopher Viger
Supervisory Committee:

.....................
Dr. Benjamin Hill

.....................
Dr. Robert Stainton

.....................
Dr. Bertram Gawronski

.....................
Dr. Richard Samuels

The thesis by
Sheldon Joseph Chow
entitled:
Heuristics, Concepts, and Cognitive Architecture: Toward Understanding How The
Mind Works
is accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
...............
Date

..............................
Chair of the Thesis Examination Board

ii

Abstract
Heuristics are often invoked in the philosophical, psychological, and cognitive science literatures to describe or explain methodological techniques or “shortcut” mental operations that
help in inference, decision-making, and problem-solving. Yet there has been surprisingly little
philosophical work done on the nature of heuristics and heuristic reasoning, and a close inspection of the way(s) in which “heuristic” is used throughout the literature reveals a vagueness
and uncertainty with respect to what heuristics are and their role in cognition. This dissertation
seeks to remedy this situation by motivating philosophical inquiry into heuristics and heuristic
reasoning, and then advancing a theory of how heuristics operate in cognition. I develop a
positive working characterization of heuristics that is coherent and robust enough to account
for a broad range of phenomena in reasoning and inference, and makes sense of empirical
data in a systematic way. I then illustrate the work this characterization does by considering
the sorts of problems that many philosophers believe heuristics solve, namely those resulting
from the so-called frame problem. Considering the frame problem motivates the need to gain a
better understanding of how heuristics work and the cognitive structures over which they operate. I develop a general theory of cognition which I argue underwrites the heuristic operations
that concern this dissertation. I argue that heuristics operate over highly organized systems of
knowledge, and I offer a cognitive architecture to accommodate this view. I then provide an
account of the systems of knowledge that heuristics are supposed to operate over, in which I
suggest that such systems of knowledge are concepts. The upshot, then, is that heuristics operate over concepts. I argue, however, that heuristics do not operate over conceptual content, but
over metainformational relations between activated and primed concepts and their contents. Finally, to show that my thesis is empirically adequate, I consider empirical evidence on heuristic
reasoning and argue that my account of heuristics explains the data.

Keywords: Heuristics; concepts; mental representation; cognition; cognitive architecture;
relevance; the frame problem; reasoning; inference
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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1

3

Dissertation outline

As its subtitle suggests, this dissertation is an investigation into how the mind works. However, its goal is not as lofty as attempting to describe how the mind works in toto. Rather, this
dissertation investigates only a specific aspect of how the mind works, namely how heuristics
operate in cognition. Heuristics are generally understood as effective shortcut rules or procedures that require little cognitive resources to be deployed. In this dissertation, I argue that
heuristics are ways to exploit the organization of mental concepts, and it is this that makes
heuristics powerful shortcut procedures. More specifically, I do four things in this dissertation:
(i) I motivate philosophical inquiry into heuristic reasoning and develop a characterization of
“heuristic” that serves the practical interests of philosophy and cognitive science; (ii) I describe
a cognitive architecture that I argue facilitates heuristic operations; (iii) I draw implications for
a related and important philosophical problem, namely the so-called frame problem; and (iv) I
illustrate how my thesis is empirically adequate.
Chapter 2 is solely devoted to task (i). Interest in heuristics in cognitive science exploded in
the advent of the computational theory of mind, which encouraged a specific understanding of
what is required of computational cognition: Feasible computation requires computationally
tractable operations, and heuristics appear to be the perfect candidates to provide them. Yet,
a survey of contemporary philosophical and cognitive science literatures reveals that different
authors employ “heuristic” in ways that deviate from one another, and are sometimes inconsistent with one another. Given its widespread use in cognitive science, it is striking that there
does not appear to be a consensus on what phenomena “heuristics” or “heuristic processes”
refer to. In response, this dissertation considers a number of accounts found in the literature.
The most common accounts of “heuristic” assert something to the effect that “heuristics are
processes that do not guarantee correct outcomes”, or “heuristics are operations that do not optimize”. These accounts, however, are merely perfunctory, and I find them to be unsatisfactory
since the contexts in which there exist processes or operations that guarantee correct outcomes
or that optimize are not typical of real-world situations. I go on to consider some positive
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accounts of “heuristic”, including the influential accounts of George Pólya (1957), Herbert
Simon (e.g., Simon, 1957; Simon & Newell, 1958; Simon, Newell, Minsky, & Feigenbaum,
1967), Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982a),
and Gerd Gigerenzer (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). These researchers are not univocal with respect to how they characterize “heuristic”, but considering
them allows me to draw a number of distinctions between different kinds of heuristics. Specifically, I distinguish between computational, perceptual, and cognitive heuristics; and between
methodological and inferential heuristics. These distinctions allow me to hone in on a cluster
of notions that is consistent with the influential positive accounts found in the literature, and
which puts me in a position to develop a working characterization of “heuristic” of my own:
Heuristics are cognitive procedures that satisfice (i.e., set a reachable aspiration level relative to the goals of the agent), and that require little cognitive resources for their recruitment
and execution; they operate by exploiting informational structures. This working definition is
developed with the aim of being coherent and robust enough to account for a broad range of
phenomena in reasoning and inference. To the extent that my account is successful, we will
better understand how the mind works and how heuristics fit within the conceptual structure of
cognitive science.
Chapter 3 addresses tasks (ii) and (iii). Having a working definition of heuristics, I illustrate
the work it does for us. I begin by considering a problem that many philosophers believe
heuristics solve, namely the frame problem. However, in order to appreciate the role heuristics
are supposed to have in solving the frame problem, we must gain an understanding of how
heuristics work in cognition and the structures they operate over.
Generally understood, the frame problem is the problem of determining which of a potentially infinite number of beliefs are relevant to the task at hand. However, the frame problem
actually constitutes a set of closely related problems. I expound various aspects of the frame
problem and discuss their bearing on this dissertation. We will see that the controversy has to
do with the idea that the frame problem poses a tractability problem for computational cogni-
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tion.
Jerry Fodor (1983, 1987, 2000) believes that the frame problem (generally understood) is
intractable, and therefore detrimental to computational cognitive science. Yet, since heuristics are generally understood to ensure computational tractability, heuristics are often invoked
to circumvent the frame problem. Philosophers such as Peter Carruthers (2006a, 2006c) and
Richard Samuels (2005, forthcoming) suggest that heuristics can serve as techniques that pick
out computationally feasible subsets of information to be brought to bear on cognitive tasks. I
contend, however, that merely pointing to heuristics to circumvent the frame problem reveals
a misunderstanding of the problem. For the frame problem is not only a problem of explaining how computationally feasible subsets of information can be brought to bear on cognitive
tasks, it is also a problem of explaining the reasonable levels of success that humans enjoy in
determining what information is relevant to cognitive tasks; circumscribing what information
is to be considered in a computationally tractable way does not necessarily ensure that what
gets considered is in fact relevant.
I then proceed to investigate the kind of cognitive architecture that is able to facilitate
heuristic processes. I argue that heuristics operate within domain-general cognition by exploiting informationally rich, specialized systems of knowledge. Heuristics can thus be fast and
frugal processes in virtue of these epistemic structures (what I call k-systems), since the latter shoulder much of the informational burden of computational cognition. If it turns out that
the assumptions about cognitive architecture which underlie my account of heuristics help in
solving, or otherwise circumventing, the frame problem, that is reason to suppose that those
assumptions are plausible.
In chapter 4, I continue with task (iii). An analysis reveals that concepts are the cognitive
structures that fulfill the role of k-systems. Nevertheless, the understanding of the nature of
concepts I adopt is unlike many of the common philosophical theories. Rather, it is an adaptation of a theory envisioned by psychologist Lawrence Barsalou (1999, 2008b, 2009). Barsalou’s account is unlike many of the leading philosophical accounts insofar as it is grounded
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in perception rather than nonperceptual cognition or a “language of thought” hypothesis. The
language of thought hypothesis claims that thought consists of the tokening of representations
in a mental language (“Mentalese”), which possesses a productive and combinatorial syntax
(as well as a semantics) to which cognitive operations are sensitive. Thus, following Alan Turing’s (1936-7) idea of computation, the language of thought hypothesis postulates that thinking
consists in syntactic operations defined over Mentalese representations. Barsalou, on the other
hand, departs from this hypothesis by claiming that concepts are not amodal, formal representations, but are partly constituted by collections of neural patterns in the perceptual centres of
the brain that were originally activated upon perceiving instances of referents picked out by the
concepts.
I show how Barsalou’s theory of concepts is closely related to a view that many philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists have converged on, namely the file model of
cognition. According to the file model, concepts are mental “files” that contain collections of
information about the entities in their extension. Barsalou’s theory of concepts may be understood as a psychologically and biologically plausible account of how concepts exhibit the kind
of structure and organization envisioned by the file model. As I show, however, Barsalou’s
theory is not wholly compatible with the file model. I therefore offer a critical assessment of
each account, which leads to certain modifications and qualifications. The result is a reconciled
and more robust theory of concepts: Concepts are highly organized collections of linguistically
coded and perceptual information. This theory of concepts will not be fully defended, for it is
beyond the scope of this dissertation to offer such a defense. However, since my proposed cognitive architecture enables us to model heuristic cognition, my reliance on Barsalou’s model
is justified insofar as we are able to explain a wide range of phenomena (which, again, is a
general aim of this dissertation).
What my theory of concepts and cognitive architecture implies for heuristic cognition is that
the informational content of our concepts is organized in such a way that there exist patterns of
relations among our activated and primed concepts. I contend that these informational relations
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guide and constrain heuristic operations. More precisely, I argue that heuristics do not operate
over conceptual content; rather, they operate over the higher-order structural relations that exist
between activated and primed concepts and their content. Such higher-order structural relations
embody metainformation about the concepts in question, and this is what enables heuristics to
be computationally frugal.
In chapter 5 I turn to task (iv). I illustrate how the account of heuristics developed to this
point explains some of the empirical data in the psychological literature. Although the literature
on heuristic reasoning is vast, I take up some of the evidence provided by the leaders in this kind
of research, namely that provided by Kahneman and Tversky, and Gigerenzer. Specifically, I
discuss two of Kahneman and Tversky’s most developed heuristics (Representativeness and
Availability) and two of Gigerenzer’s most developed heuristics (the Recognition heuristic and
Take the Best). I illustrate that the empirical data for each of these purported heuristics can
be understood as arising from cognitive operations over inherent relations within and between
one’s concepts and their content. This serves as additional support for my thesis. In addition,
this suggests that further empirical investigation can reveal the extent to which my thesis is
correct: Once the content of and relations between one’s concepts is determined, we can make
predictions about what heuristics one will employ and what inferences or judgments one will
thereby make.
Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter in which I return to an aspect of task (iii) that I have
left unaddressed, namely how relevance is determined in cognition. In addressing this matter,
I discuss what relevance is, and expound an influential theory developed by Daniel Sperber
and Deirdre Wilson (1982, 1986/1995). I offer a reinterpretation of Sperber and Wilson’s
theory within the framework of cognition developed in this dissertation. This enables me to
assess the role of heuristics in making determinations of relevance, as well as to explain the
reasonable levels of success exhibited by humans in judging what is and is not relevant in their
cognitive tasks. I then argue that our conceptual wherewithal predetermines what I call de
facto relevance (cf. Gabbay & Woods, 2003). De facto relevance, as I explain, arises from
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the extant relations between activated and primed concepts and their content. I conclude that
humans do not actually solve the problem of determining relevance; and so heuristic solutions
as traditionally conceived to this problem ipso facto are empty. However, I go on to suggest that
my thesis offers a more substantial understanding of how we pick out what is relevant in our
cognitive tasks: de facto relevance happens to reflect, in robust but fallible ways, what really
is relevant to the task at hand. Heuristics, operating over the informational relations among
concepts, thus bring to bear an appropriate subset of (mostly) relevant beliefs on our cognitive
tasks.

1.2

Computational cognition

I should take the time here to point out that throughout this dissertation I will be assuming,
minimally, that the mind is an information processor. More specifically, I will be assuming
that the mind is a computer, though I do not commit to classical computationalism. Indeed, the
theory of concepts I advance in this dissertation runs contrary to the classical computationalism
of the language of thought hypothesis. Nevertheless, I intend to leave open the matter of
whether and the extent to which classical computationalism holds for cognition generally.
I will be advancing a central systems view of cognition which understands the mind to
possess a holistic system, wherein there is free flow of conceptual information and wherein
any conceptual information can bear on any other (to be discussed in chapter 3). Although I
will not be arguing the matter here, I assume that the massive modularity hypothesis—i.e., the
hypothesis that the mind is largely or completely composed of a large collection of individual, domain-specific computational systems (modules)—is incompatible with my thesis (and
moreover, that it is in fact wrong). However, my thesis is amenable to Fodor’s (1983) view that
the mind is comprised of a central system in addition to a number of domain-specific, informationally encapsulated, input-output modules dedicated to peripheral functions, such as vision
and language comprehension.
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Philosophy in cognitive science

Some philosophers might consider some of the work done in this dissertation as not falling
under the heading of philosophy. Of course, I do not believe that I am guilty of not doing
philosophy. I do, however, believe that the kind of work undertaken in this dissertation may
be mistakenly thought of as not being philosophy because the role of philosophy vis-à-vis
cognitive science is not well understood. The confusion about the role of philosophy vis-à-vis
cognitive science is no doubt partly attributable to cognitive science being a relatively young
field of study, still without a standard doctrine. Yet it seems that philosophy has always had a
rather uncertain role as a discipline of cognitive science (Bechtel, 2010; Brook, 2004).
To clarify the role of philosophy vis-à-vis cognitive science, Andrew Brook (2004) distinguishes philosophy in cognitive science from philosophy of cognitive science. According to
Brook, philosophy of cognitive science is a branch of philosophy of science proper, as it seeks
to investigate how scientists do cognitive science. As such, philosophy of cognitive science is
better understood (by philosophers and cognitive scientists) than philosophy in cognitive science. Philosophy in cognitive science, on the other hand, is the philosophical investigation of
issues concerning human cognition, such as mind and language, which are also studied empirically by psychology, linguistics, and other sciences. It is thus philosophy in cognitive science
that is poorly understood.
However, William Bechtel (2010) has identified two ways in which philosophers have contributed to (and continue to contribute to) what Brook calls philosophy in cognitive science:
Philosophers have informed and advanced work on the mind-body problem, or in its most contemporary incarnation, the problem of consciousness; and philosophers have offered philosophical treatments of mental representation, in terms of intentionality as well as representational
function. In the present dissertation, I believe I have contributed to philosophy in cognitive
science in the latter respect. Although I largely ignore issues pertaining to intentionality (although see chapter 4, section 4.2.2.1), I discuss the nature of concepts and representations in
order to underwrite my theory of how heuristics work. Nevertheless, I believe that this disser-
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tation contributes to philosophy in cognitive science in more ways than that. The work I do in
this dissertation is philosophy, and so does not aim to offer new data, but it is an empirically
informed philosophy, drawing on work from empirical disciplines in cognitive science (especially psychology, but also research from artificial intelligence and computer programming, as
well as some from evolutionary anthropology). And I believe that this is how philosophy in
cognitive science must be undertaken. So-called “armchair” philosophy is now found to be
inadequate in many respects. We are at a time in which there are plenty of new and exciting
advances in the brain sciences. If anything, empirical data must be understood to constrain
philosophical inquiry. Indeed, what is found empirically to be the case should take precedence
over conceptual consistency argued from the armchair. But a more positive consequence is that
the constraining-relation can guide philosophical investigations. In this latter respect, however,
there is potential for a mutual constraining-relation—as empirical work guides philosophical
investigation, philosophical investigation can in turn potentially constrain empirical investigation. This, according to Daniel Dennett (2009), is how cognitive science can progress.
In light of these considerations, one might say that in this dissertation I adopt a naturalized
philosophy of mind, which in many ways departs from the traditional approach to the philosophy of mind. Philosophers of mind have always discussed the nature of the mind and its
functions, but as the special sciences of cognition developed (psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, etc.), the topics that were/are of interest to philosophers were/are seen by scientists to
bear little relevance to their empirical investigations. Indeed, “classic” philosophical problems
about the mind are often met today with a dismissive attitude (Bechtel, 2010; Brook, 2004;
Dennett, 2009). For example, philosophers of mind have often appealed to drawn out thought
experiments to argue for substantive conclusions about our concepts. Yet as Bechtel (2010) remarks, “In the context of cognitive science, with its ingenious research programs challenging
the notion of fixed concepts, the ensuing philosophical arguments often seem beside the point”
(p. 358).
Nevertheless, a naturalized philosophy of mind offers a way for philosophy to be accepted
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and have a central role in cognitive science. The approach that a naturalized philosophy of
mind takes is inspired by W. V. O. Quine’s (1969) idea of a naturalized epistemology. Quine’s
proposal was to situate epistemology within the empirical program of psychology, while still
addressing fundamental questions about knowledge and how it is acquired. In his own words
from a widely quoted passage: “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a
chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. . . . But a conspicuous difference between
old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that
we can now make free use of empirical psychology” (pp. 82-83).
Quine’s view that we should replace traditional epistemology with psychology is not widely
accepted by contemporary epistemologists,1 and even Quine’s (1990) later views were more
moderate (R. Feldman, 2008). Nevertheless, there is at least a kernel of wisdom in Quine’s
naturalized epistemology that can be applied to how we approach the philosophy of mind. A
naturalized philosophy of mind benefits from the empirical research undertaken by the special
sciences by aiming to offer conclusions that have a direct bearing on the practice of cognitive
science. As Bechtel (2010) puts it,
a naturalized philosophy of mind would become the philosophy of cognitive science and draw upon results in cognitive science as well as its own inquiries to
probe the nature of mental phenomena. . . . One might recognize philosophical
discussions conducted in a naturalistic manner not as arcane intellectual exercises,
but as theoretical and methodological contributions to cognitive science. As a
bonus, unlike other sciences subjected to philosophical inquiry, cognitive science
offers a two-way street: Its theoretical frameworks and findings are a resource
philosophers can draw upon to add nuance and techniques to their own subsequent
inquiries. (pp. 358-359)2
In this light, philosophy can contribute to and advance cognitive science by developing
theoretical frameworks for investigating and explaining specific cognitive phenomena. This is
1

In his famous criticism of Quine, for instance, Jaegwon Kim (1988) points out that to adopt Quine’s naturalized epistemology would be to abandon traditional epistemology altogether. For, as Kim argues, traditional
epistemology is interested in the epistemic support between our sensory experiences (our basic evidence) and our
beliefs about the world, and this involves questions pertaining to rationality, justification, and knowledge. What
Quine recommends, however, is to ignore such matters of epistemic support and investigate instead the causal
connections between our sensory experiences and our beliefs.
2
We should take Bechtel’s use of “philosophy of cognitive science” as referring to “philosophy in cognitive
science” in Brook’s sense.
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what I aimed to achieve through this dissertation, as I offer a theoretical framework concerning
the architecture of cognition and the nature of concepts in order to explain how heuristics
work. In this way, I take Dennett’s advice: “If philosophers aren’t to do the sort of refutation
by counter-example and reductio ad absurdum that their training prepares them for, what is the
alternative? To take on the burden of working out an implication or two that is actually testable,
if not today, in the near future” (Dennett, 2009, p. 233).
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A quick survey of contemporary philosophical and cognitive science literatures reveals that
“heuristic” and its cognates are often used to label certain methods or procedures that guide inference and judgment in problem-solving and decision-making. In more specific terms, heuristics are commonly understood to be shortcut procedures that lead to results that may not be
optimal but are in some sense “good enough”. However, taking shortcuts carries risks. Though
heuristics are understood to generally produce satisfactory outcomes, they are not failsafe procedures, and thus they can result in errors or mistakes. But it is a trade-off: heuristics forego
optimal outcomes in favour of computational economy. Procedures that ensure correct or optimal outcomes are typically complex and difficult to carry out, whereas heuristics offer a way
to avoid such a computational burden—they are, after all, supposed to be shortcuts.
Since heuristics are believed to economize, and since heuristics generally produce satisfactory outcomes, it is received wisdom that heuristics are a stock commodity in human cognition.
Yet a close inspection of the literature reveals that different authors employ “heuristic” in ways
that deviate from one another, and are sometimes inconsistent with one another. Given its
widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science, it is striking to see that there does not
appear to be a consensus on what phenomena “heuristics” or “heuristic processes” refer to. At
the same time, however, defining precisely what heuristics are is a difficult task; as Jonathan
St.B.T. Evans (2009) remarks, “The term ‘heuristic’ is deeply ambiguous” (p. 36). Since the
term is used in diverse ways in different disciplines, and its meaning has evolved over the years
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), it is hard to pinpoint what “heuristic” exactly refers to. Indeed,
it may very well not express a single, unified concept. Nevertheless, we might settle for a
characterization broad enough to satisfy most of its uses, or at least some of the interesting
ones.
In this chapter, we will be introduced to a number of different meanings assigned to “heuristic”. I will examine these meanings with an aim to develop a working characterization of my
own. I begin, in section 1, by briefly motivating the need for an appropriate understanding
of “heuristic”. In section 2, I discuss some negative characterizations that are often found in
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the literature. It is important that we begin by considering these negative characterizations,
since many authors often appear to place too much emphasis on what heuristics fail to do. The
most common definitions assert something to the effect of “heuristics are processes that do not
guarantee correct outcomes” or “heuristics are operations that do not optimize”. These types of
definitions tell us what heuristics do not do, but they do not really tell us anything about what
heuristics do do for us; in fact, as I shall argue, in certain contexts these definitions do not tell
us anything interesting at all. By analyzing these negative definitions, my aim is to get clear
on why we need a positive characterization of heuristics, as well as what an adequate, positive
characterization needs to be in order to get a decent grasp on what heuristics are and their role
in cognition.
Before offering my own positive characterization, however, I discuss some influential accounts of heuristics in section 3. In particular, I discuss those offered by George Pólya, Herbert
Simon, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and Gerd Gigerenzer. These authors are not
univocal with respect to how they characterize “heuristic”, but considering their accounts will
allow me to hone in on the positive elements offered by them. In section 4, I synthesize these
positive contributions. I draw a number of distinctions between different kinds of heuristics,
and then develop my working definition of the sorts of heuristics that are believed to be employed in human cognition. My goal is to offer an account of heuristics that is coherent and
robust enough to account for a broad range of phenomena in reasoning and inference,1 and thus
makes sense of empirical data in a systematic way.2 As we work through this chapter, it will
become obvious that the other accounts I survey—both positive and negative—do not provide
these benefits.

1

In light of certain ambiguities with the terms “coherent” and “robust”, it should be understood that when I
employ these terms throughout this dissertation I mean them, as I say, in the sense of consistently accounting for,
or being applicable to, a broad range of phenomena.
2
In chapter 5, I illustrate how the account of heuristics developed in this chapter, and elaborated upon in
following chapters, accounts for empirical data.
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Why we need an appropriate characterization of “heuristic”

Given its widespread use within (and without) philosophy and cognitive science, it is intriguing
that there is little concern for a fully developed characterization of “heuristic”. The lack of a
developed characterization of the notion is disconcerting in two ways. First, since heuristics
have rapidly made their way as central tenets in theories in cognitive science, we might expect
something that approaches a refined and robust explication of what is meant by “heuristic”.
But, as far as I can tell, no one has produced such an explication. If cognitive science is indeed a science, then careful consideration should be taken to delimit heuristics qua entities of
scientific theories. To put it another way, if cognitive science is in the business of discovering
and studying the kinds within its domain, pains should be taken to appropriately characterize
these kinds (Carruthers, 2006a; Pylyshyn, 1999), among which heuristics are included. For
example, the dual-processes theory of cognition, which lately has been gaining popularity (and
to be briefly discussed below), invokes heuristics to explain certain kinds of cognitive processes, namely what is known as “type 1” processes (see e.g., Wason & Evans, 1975; J. Evans
& Over, 1996; J. Evans, 2009). Other psychological theories, such as that propounded by
the heuristics and biases program (also to be discussed below), are based on the presumption
that many of our judgments follow from a small set of basic heuristics (e.g., Kahneman et al.,
1982a). Furthermore, heuristics are sometimes invoked to suggest ways to circumvent problems of determining what, of all the available information, should be considered in a cognitive
task (Carruthers, 2006a, 2006c; Samuels, 2005, forthcoming)—a problem known as the frame
problem (to be discussed in chapter 3). Being clear on what phenomena are picked out by
“heuristic” should be of concern to both scientists and philosophers who wish to make sense
of, and even adopt, such theories of cognition.
Secondly, many arguments—descriptive and normative—are made on the premise that
heuristics are ubiquitous in human cognition. Such arguments try to decide the extent to which
humans rely on heuristics, what heuristics people employ in what circumstances, and whether
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it is rational to do so. But vagueness (or, in the best case, ambiguity) in the concepts employed
by a theory will be inherited by any arguments based on the theory. Unclarity in what heuristics are in the first place therefore impedes progress on matters involving the purported uses
and abuses of heuristics in judgment, inference, and decision-making. In the face of vagueness
(or ambiguity) in concepts, the arguments concerning human reasoning may very well lack a
sufficient basis to be decisive. For instance, both the heuristics and biases research program
and the fast and frugal heuristics research program (again, to be discussed below) assert that
heuristics are pervasive in human cognition and have a substantial role in our judgment and
decision-making. But if we do not know what cognitive processes “heuristics” refer to, then it
is unclear whether and to what extent purported heuristics have a role in our cognitive lives. Indeed, it is sometimes hard to understand what claims are exactly being made by these research
programs (cf. Samuels, Stich, & Faucher, 2004). Furthermore, there has been a long-standing
debate between those who believe that heuristic strategies are or can be rational, and those
who believe that rationality resides in the dictates of some normative theory which heuristic
strategies do not meet (see e.g., Simon, 1957; Gigerenzer, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996;
Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2002). But once again, if it is unclear what either party means by
“heuristic” or “heuristic process”, then it is equally unclear what the force of the arguments
from either side of the debate is, or precisely what is being claimed.3
These two problems act as barriers that inhibit the advancement of research on cognition.
To overcome these barriers, we need an account of heuristics that is coherent and robust enough
to plausibly fit a natural kind,4 on the one hand, as well as to provide clarity in the objects of
3

It is instructive to note that Samuels et al. (2002) argue that the debate—which they dub the “rationality
wars”—is not really much of a debate at all, since upon close inspection both parties actually agree: heuristics
can sometime produce good outcomes, but can also lead to systematic errors, depending on the context. Thus, it
must be recognized, I think, that much of the debate may very well stem from both sides not being clear on what
heuristics are in the first place.
4
The way in which “natural kind” is construed can vary quite widely. For the purposes of this dissertation,
I follow Richard Samuels (2009) in adopting Richard Boyd’s (1991) notion of “homeostatic property clusters”.
As Samuels explains, on this account a kind is natural if (i) it is associated with a range of particular characteristics which tend to be co-instantiated by instances of the kind (though these characteristics are not necessary
conditions); (ii) there is some underlying causal mechanisms and constraints whose operations explain the coinstantiation of the characteristics of (i); and (iii) it is not the characteristics of (i) that define the kind, but the
underlying causal mechanisms and constraints of (ii). For the remainder of this dissertation, I should be taken to
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study, on the other. To the extent that an account of heuristics is successful with respect to
these tasks, we will better understand how the mind works and how heuristics fit within the
conceptual structure of cognitive science. As we shall see, the working definition of “heuristic”
offered in this chapter will be developed such that these conditions are satisfied.

2.2

Abuses of “heuristic”

Some authors attempt to make clear their intended meaning of the word “heuristic”. Other
researchers, however, do not even bother to provide a simple definition, taking its meaning
to be intuitive or obvious, when in fact it is not (cf. Simon’s remarks below). Indeed, it is
not uncommon for a book to be missing “heuristic” from its index, despite of the fact that
the term was mentioned throughout.5 Nevertheless, those authors who do provide definitions
almost always offer simple, merely perfunctory definitions, without any concern for whether
the implicated concept is coherent or robust. What I intend to do now is critically assess these
definitions of “heuristic”. My target will be negative definitions that characterize heuristics in
terms of what they fail to do, while ignoring any detailed explication of their positive aspects.
I will argue that such negative definitions do not provide an adequate understanding of what
heuristics are, especially within the context of practical, real-world problems—problems that
are of interest to cognitive science. More specifically, I will show that the definitions do not
apply sensibly to a range of important cases. Considering these negative definitions will thus
motivate the need for a positive characterization of heuristics. We will also get a clearer idea
of what an adequate, positive characterization needs to be if heuristics are to be interesting and
meaningful kinds within our theories of cognition.
refer to this view when I speak of natural kinds. According to Samuels, this is the most plausible view of natural
kinds, and the view that comports best with cognitive science research on cognitive architecture, and I tend to
agree (at least with the last part).
5
One example is Michalewicz and Fogel’s (2000) book How to Solve It. Michalewicz and Fogel’s lack of concern for a clear understanding of what heuristics are is especially alarming; the subtitle of their book is “Modern
Heuristics”!
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Heuristics vs. guaranteed correct outcomes

A common feature among almost all perfunctory accounts of heuristics is that they are negatively defined (cf. Fodor, 2008, p. 116). A heuristic is thus understood to be deficient or
inadequate in some respect. Indeed, it is not uncommon to happen upon a definition that states
that heuristics are procedures that can produce good outcomes but do not guarantee correct solutions (e.g., Dunbar, 1998) or do not always work (e.g., Fodor, 2008). At other times one finds
heuristics contrasted with algorithms (e.g., Richardson, 1998). Algorithm here is not meant as
a “procedure determined by a set of instructions that specify, at each moment, precisely what
is to be done next” (Simon et al., 1967, p. 18). If the latter were the case then the heuristicalgorithm distinction6 would be meaningless for computer programming and artificial intelligence (AI) research, as well as for human cognition provided that one subscribes to a version
of the computational theory of mind (CTM). Rather, in this context, algorithms are understood
as procedures that, when applied properly, invariably produce correct outcomes; hence, heuristics are conceived simply as procedures that do not invariably produce correct outcomes. In
one textbook on cognition, it is claimed that a “hallmark” of a heuristic approach to solving a
problem is that “It will work part of the time or for part of the answer, but it is very unlikely to
furnish the complete, accurate answer” (Ashcraft, 2002, p. 465). Thus, in these sorts of definitions we find a distinction between heuristic processes and processes that are guaranteed to
produce correct answers or outcomes. I will refer to these latter as guaranteed-correct-outcome
(GCO) procedures.
Consider an example. In The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor (1975) observes that a
failsafe method of understanding the message of a given utterance is to compute the grammatical relations exhibited by the sentence expressed by the utterance. He observes, however,
that although people presumably can infer messages in this way, they demonstrably often do
not. “What apparently happens,” Fodor claims, “is that grammatical relations are computed
only when all else fails. There exist heuristic procedures for sentence recognition which, in
6

See Simon et al. (1967) for an informative discussion on the heuristic-algorithm distinction.
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effect, ignore grammatical relations and infer messages directly from lexical content, accepting, thereby, the penalties of fallibility” (pp. 167-168). He asks us to consider sentences with
self-embeddings, such as “The boy the girl the man knew wanted to marry left in a huff”. With
enough time, patience, and insight into its grammatical structure, one is able to work out the
meaning of this sentence: The girl, whom the man knew, wanted to marry the boy who left in
a huff. We might notice, however, that this meaning is not easy to come to. Yet if we compare
“The boy the girl the man knew wanted to marry left in a huff” with the similarly structured
sentence “The boat the sailor the dog bit built sank”, we find the meaning of latter sentence
more transparent. According to Fodor, what seems to be going on is that the message intended
by “The boat the sailor the dog bit built sank” is inferred from background knowledge considerations, such as that boats typically sink (but not dogs or sailors), that sailors typically build
boats (but not dogs), that it is more common to hear about dogs biting (as opposed to sailors),
and that it is more likely that a sailor would be bitten than a boat. This kind of analysis suggests the plausibility of assigning a meaning to a sentence (like the one in question) without
engaging a syntactic structural description.
What Fodor’s remarks illustrate is a distinction between the sorts of mechanical computations that guarantee right answers (i.e., GCO procedures) from the sorts of shortcut procedures
(i.e., heuristics) that avoid having to undertake those mechanical computations.
In short, the computational load associated with the solution of a class of problems
can sometimes be reduced by opting for problem-solving procedures that work
only most of the time. Reliability is wagered for efficiency in such cases, but
there are usually ways of hedging the bet. Typically, heuristic procedures are tried
first; relatively slower, but relatively algorithmic, procedures are ‘called’ when
the heuristics fail. The way of marshaling the available computational resources
can often provide the optimal trade-off between the speed of computation and the
probability of getting the right results. (pp. 166-167)
This sort of characterization of heuristics is not surprising in light of the fact that there is
typically a risk of suffering negative consequences for cutting corners or taking shortcuts. As
Fodor remarks, “one can often get away with less than strict compliance with such requirements
[that guarantee a correct solution] so long as one is willing to tolerate occasional mistakes” (p.
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166). Yet it is not the intended purpose of heuristics to make mistakes, but rather to offer
a method of solving a problem that achieves computational economy. As Fodor understands
them, heuristics avoid certain computations within the representational or conceptual structures
of cognition (at least with respect to understanding sentences). In later chapters, we shall see
how important it is for heuristics to avoid computations within conceptual structures. The
present point, however, is that heuristics offer a way to cut down on the computations needed
to arrive at a desired outcome. In addition, as intimated by Fodor and as it is often claimed,
heuristics are able to deliver reasonable answers or solutions by exploiting the right information
in the right circumstances.
Acknowledging the benefits afforded by heuristic procedures is very important in understanding the nature of heuristics. For we would hesitate to call a procedure that invariably
leads to disaster a heuristic procedure; nor would we want to call a procedure that is irrelevant
to the task at hand a heuristic procedure. Yet such procedures very certainly would not guarantee correct outcomes. Therefore, what heuristics fail to achieve (viz. reliably getting the right
results) should rightly be thought of as a corollary of a definition of “heuristic”, rather than
made to be an essential feature.
Nevertheless, notice from Fodor’s remarks that the benefits offered by heuristics are always
contrasted with associated “penalties” or risks—whatever good heuristics do, they do not always get things right. In this way, Fodor provides a particularly clear example of the attitude
toward heuristics that typically leads to negatively characterizing them in terms of what they
fail to do, or what they do not achieve. This type of definition can be summed up as follows.
H1 Although heuristics can provide certain benefits, they are procedures that do
not guarantee correct outcomes.
I will discuss how heuristics “can provide certain benefits” in more detail when I offer my
positive characterization below. For now, however, I will focus on the “do not guarantee correct
outcomes” part of this definition. In particular, I shall address the extent to which the claim that
heuristics are procedures that do not guarantee correct outcomes does useful work for us as a
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central part of a definition of heuristics. My argument will be that such a claim, by itself, does
not do the work that we ought to expect from a definition of heuristics, hence affirming the
comment recently made that what heuristics fail to achieve should be understood as a corollary
of our definition rather than as an essential feature.
GCO procedures are essentially formal operations. This is exhibited, for instance, by the
grammatical computations that generate the meaning of sentences. But the paradigm of GCO
procedures are the formal operations of mathematics or logic. For example, applying the rules
of division will guarantee that you will arrive at the correct answer to a given division problem of arithmetic; constructing truth-tables will guarantee a correct determination of whether
a given set of propositions is consistent; applying the basic axioms of probability theory to a
given chance set-up will guarantee a correct determination of chances or objective probabilities.7 In general, GCO procedures necessitate the right answers, when applied correctly. Again,
in contrast to these GCO procedures, heuristics are supposed to be procedures that efficiently
produce outcomes or answers that may be good enough for one’s purposes, and that may very
well be correct, but will not guarantee that they will be correct. For example, randomly selecting a limited subset of a set of propositions and simply looking at its members to see if any
contradicts any other is a heuristic process to check the consistency of the superset of propositions; another heuristic process is to roughly estimate probabilities based on remembered past
experiences.
GCO procedures exist for problem tasks other than those proposed in logic or mathematics,
as we saw with respect to Fodor’s example. But there are other problem tasks in addition to
these that admit GCO procedures. Suppose your lamp does not light when you switch it on, and
you want to determine whether it needs to be replaced. Here is an algorithm that will guarantee
a correct determination: First, (i) check to see if the lamp is plugged in; if so, then (ii) check to
see if the bulb needs replacing (e.g., by testing it in another lamp that is known to be working);
7

I say in each of these examples “a given ...” because certain initial conditions have to be met if the procedure
is to produce a correct outcome: the numbers in the division problem must belong to the set of rational numbers;
one must have the right initial probability assignments in the chance set-up problem.
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if not, then (iii) ensure that the power outlet is working properly; if so, then (iv) infer that the
lamp needs to be replaced. Of course, it might be easier and less time consuming to simply rely
on a heuristic that assumes that the lamp needs replacing if it is plugged in but does not light
when switched on. There are even algorithms for playing tic-tac-toe which guarantee either a
win or draw (Crowley & Siegler, 1993). Yet most people do not know of these GCO tic-tactoe algorithms, and use instead certain heuristics, such as “Always start in the centre square”
(Dunbar, 1998).
So far we have considered a small number of contexts in which there exist GCO algorithms, as well as procedures that do not guarantee correct outcomes but may approximate
good outcomes, or at least produce satisfactory outcomes insofar as certain goals are met (e.g.,
computational efficiency); and these latter procedures we are calling “heuristic”. Within these
contexts H1 makes perfect sense. However, these contexts do not represent all possible, or
indeed common, circumstances. Of concern is the extent to which H1 is usefully applicable
within contexts that are of practical interest to cognitive science, namely typical real-world
contexts.
As we have observed, H1 is applicable in the paradigm case when there exists a known,
possible, feasible GCO procedure for a given problem. But H1 is also applicable when there
exists a known, possible GCO procedure that is not feasible, as when the GCO procedure
cannot be practically performed by a human (or even machine) because it is too complex, or
too time-consuming, or too taxing on cognitive (computational) resources. In this situation,
there can very well be procedures that do not guarantee correct outcomes, but can lead to good
or useful outcomes, and we might call such procedures heuristic. H1 can remain applicable
even when there is not a known GCO procedure for a given problem task, so long as there can
exist a GCO procedure in principle. This is the case for more complex tasks such as making a
good move in chess. Chess is a finite game and has a finite number of possible positions, and
there will be in principle a GCO procedure to determine the best move(s) at a given point in a
game. But there are far too many possibilities to compute for there to exist a known algorithm
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that would guarantee the best outcome. Heuristics are therefore the only viable procedures for
chess (Richardson, 1998). Again, these heuristics do not guarantee the best outcome, or even
a good outcome—one may lose the game in the end—but they are believed to generally result
in good outcomes.
Notice, however, that the problems for which H1 is usefully applicable are all well-defined
problems. Well-defined problems are problems that have discrete states and goals that are,
or can be in principle, known and understood. In other words, well-defined problems have
well-defined problem-spaces.8 Chess, tic-tac-toe, and problems in math and logic, all have
well-defined problem-spaces. This feature is especially conducive to generating algorithms
that guarantee correct outcomes. For not only are the goals of these problems understood and
known to be correct outcomes—that is, we know precisely what a correct outcome is—but
one can identify definite and discrete steps by which to navigate the problem space, getting
from one state to the next, so as to ultimately reach the goal state. This is what is meant by
a problem’s having a GCO procedure in principle—if the states and goals of a problem are
well-defined, then there will exist some procedure that will guarantee a correct outcome, even
if this requires exhaustive search of the problem-space.9
Nevertheless, even when we are engaged in solving well-defined problems, it is almost
always the case that the only alternative for us is to use heuristics in the sense of H1 . The
reasons are epistemological: cognitive limitations or time constraints prevent us from carrying
out a GCO procedure, or there is just no known correct solution or no known GCO procedure
(notwithstanding that these may exist in principle, which is an ontological issue). Indeed,
the well-defined problems for which there are known GCO procedures are very few as it is
(Richardson, 1998). In this light, then, we can understand heuristics as procedures that do not
8

A problem-space is an abstract representation of a problem consisting of discrete states, a goal state, and can
include operators that determine how to get from one state to another. See below for further discussion.
9
Of course, the goal must be possible. For example, if in a game of chess there is no possibility for black to
win, then ipso facto there cannot be a correct outcome with respect to black winning the game. In these sorts of
situations, the goal may be shifted from winning the game to, perhaps, forcing a stalemate. If a stalemate is also
not possible, then there very well may not be a procedure that will guarantee a correct outcome for black. Indeed,
it is uncertain what is meant by “correct outcome” in this situation.
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guarantee correct solutions, but it seems to allow too much in. It is sort of like defining terminal
velocity as “A velocity slower than that of light”. Everything of interest with respect to terminal
velocities (i.e., macro-sized objects) travels slower than the speed of light. Similarly, (nearly)
everything of interest with respect to heuristic procedures (i.e., real-world cognition) does not
guarantee correct solutions. Thus, on this reading, we come to an important problem for H1 :
the widespread claim that much of human cognition is heuristic appears uninteresting if not
trivially true, since much of our cognition cannot be anything but heuristic. I will call this the
triviality problem.
What makes matters worse, real-world problems are rarely well-defined. Instead, we usually find ill-defined problems in the real-world, which have undefined or indeterminate states
and/or goals; the problem-spaces for ill-defined problems therefore cannot be completely, or
sometimes even adequately, known, understood, or characterized. Ill-defined problems include
problems such as deciding whether to take a job offer, coming up with a feasible policy to
reduce carbon emissions, and solving a murder case. Because of their very nature, ill-defined
problems preclude the possibility of GCO procedures: The goals of these problems are often
sufficiently undefined such that it is unknown what a “correct” outcome would be, and this ipso
facto makes it impossible to generate any kind of process that would guarantee a correct outcome. Moreover, even if an ill-defined problem has a sufficiently defined goal, such as finding
the murderer in a murder case, the means by which one would proceed to achieve this goal
would still be uncertain since the mediating states can still remain indeterminate, or we would
be unable to evaluate the steps taken. Solving a murder case thus has an ill-defined solution
space since it is often difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether the work one does on the case
brings one closer to or further from solving the case. It is important to note here that the matter
is not epistemological like the concerns mentioned above of not knowing or not being able to
perform GCO procedures. Rather, the matter here is ontological—there simply does not exist
a GCO for many ill-defined problems.
Since it does not make much sense to speak of correct outcomes for many ill-defined prob-
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lems, much less processes that guarantee correct outcomes, what sense can be made of the
claim made by H1 , viz. that heuristics are procedures that do not guarantee a correct solution? If ill-defined problems do not allow for the evaluation of intermediate steps toward a
goal, and therefore in principle cannot have GCO procedures, then any and all procedures for
ill-defined problems are heuristic by definition. This is just another version of the triviality
problem identified above. The situation would not be so bad if it were not the case that the majority of real-world problems humans face are ill-defined and characteristically lack certainty.
However, we do not live in a tic-tac-toe world—for most of our problems, it is impossible to
determine what would count as steps toward a correct outcome, and nothing is guaranteed to
produce any given outcome. The strategies we employ when dealing with these real-world, illdefined problems will necessarily be heuristic. And, in fact, the situation appears to be worse.
For if there is no way to evaluate intermediate steps toward a goal, then no sense can be made
of heuristics being satisfactory, reasonable, or “good enough” solutions. That is, we would
not know what would make a heuristic solution satisfactory, reasonable, or “good enough” in
ill-defined contexts.
A possibility worth considering is that a deeper functional analysis of heuristics might
have it such that certain heuristics represent ill-defined problems as well-defined ones. That
is, a heuristic process might simplify a complex, ill-defined problem to a manageable and
well-defined problem. If this is the case, then it would make sense to claim that heuristics
are processes that do not guarantee correct outcomes, for they would be working within the
confines of well-defined problems for which there are in principle GCO procedures. This is
certainly a possibility, and many contemporary decision researchers agree that much of human
reasoning involves search and manipulation of problem-spaces (Dunbar, 1998).10 However,
problems with this functional analysis arise when we consider the fact that there are no such
things as correct outcomes, and ipso facto no GCO procedures, for simplifying ill-defined
problems or representing them as well-defined problems. Again, this is a fact about ill-defined
10

Such contemporary research is inspired by Herbert Simon who understood heuristic processes for problemsolving as procedures that reduce the complexity of the problem. I discuss Simon’s work in more detail below.
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problems generally. That is, representing an ill-defined problem as a well-defined problem
is itself an ill-defined problem. Thus, the H1 definition is rendered effectively useless with
respect to this functional analysis since there is no GCO algorithm with which to contrast
heuristic procedures.
I suppose that it may be possible that some independent, non-heuristic process is responsible for representing ill-defined problems as well-defined problems, and then heuristics are
employed within these well-defined problems (hence, maintaining the useful applicability of
H1 ). But the problem of simplifying ill-defined problems goes deeper. Given the detail and
complexity of ill-defined problems, there will be any number of ways to carve them up into
problem-spaces consisting of discrete states and goals. Consider, for instance, a simple, though
ill-defined, problem of deciding whether to go for a picnic. What states should the problemspace consist of, and what would be the goal state? Should there only be two states, (i) go for
a picnic and (ii) not go for a picnic? Or should the problem-space consist of (i) go for a picnic,
(ii) not go for a picnic, but go to a restaurant instead, and (iii) not go for a picnic, but stay
in instead? I need not belabour the issue here of how difficult it is to formulate an ill-defined
problem as a well-defined one.11 The point is that the difficulties in representing ill-defined
problems as well-defined problems suggest that there is not a clear-cut case for simplifying
ill-defined problems. This is not to say that we never simplify ill-defined problems; in fact,
we probably do this often with certain circumscribed ill-defined problems. Of course, whether
and to what extent people actually represent ill-defined problems as well-defined problems is
an empirical issue. But unless evidence would show that representing ill-defined problems as
well-defined ones is universal, or nearly so, there is still a large class of problems for which
it makes it trivial to speak of heuristics as processes that do not guarantee correct outcomes.
However, as I want to maintain and as certain researchers demonstrate, heuristics are interesting strategies within this large class of problems. Thus, the issue here is not really the triviality
11

This is similar to the what is known as “the problem of small worlds”, introduced by Savage (1954); see also
Shafer (1986). The problem of small worlds has to do with whether expected utility assignments will maintain
the same structure, and therefore dictate the same decisions, upon refinements of a decision-problem.
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problem, but what I will call a range problem—H1 does not apply sensibly to an interesting
range of cases.
The range problem indicates that we must seek a different understanding of heuristics than
what is given by H1 . This is not to say, however, that heuristics are not procedures that do not
guarantee correct outcomes. As we shall see, there is a cogent understanding of “heuristic”
from which this follows (i.e., as a corollary). But an adequate and robust characterization of
“heuristic” must offer more than a negative definition with respect to GCO algorithms, and
indeed more than what H1 provides.

2.2.2

Heuristics vs. optimization

There is another negative definition of “heuristic” that is not as explicitly stated in the literature as H1 , but is implicitly suggested by some authors (e.g., Carruthers, 2006a; Fodor, 2008;
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1957). It is this:
H2 Although heuristics can provide certain benefits, they are procedures that do
not optimize/maximize.
Most of what I said against defining heuristics as H1 can be applied mutatis mutandis to defining
heuristics as H2 . But some further remarks are in order.12
The idea that heuristics are to be contradistinguished from procedures that optimize/maximize
(herein simply as optimize) is associated with the rational decision theory that was developed
in the mid-twentieth century by economists and other theorists such as John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern (1944), and L. Jimmie Savage (1954). According to this theory, a rational
agent will optimize, that is find and perform the best act available. The “best” act here traditionally refers to that which maximizes expected utility. If an agent is faced with a problem for
12

It is important to keep in mind here a distinction between optimal strategies and optimization strategies. A
heuristic may very well be an optimal strategy, given certain constraints. That is, a heuristic strategy may be
optimal in the sense that it is the best that a system can do, given certain constraints (cf. Samuels et al., 2002); for
example, maximizing the cost-benefit ratio of a process. An optimization strategy, on the other hand, specifies a
procedure to be followed in order to fully optimize or maximize some unit of desire (typically expected utility; see
below) regardless of constraints. Although a heuristic can arrive at an optimal outcome in the right circumstances,
on the foregoing definition it cannot be an optimization strategy since under different constraints it will not be the
best strategy to adopt.
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which there is a GCO, optimizing will just be carrying out the GCO procedure.13 And this will
be the case even if there is no known GCO procedure (though there exists one in principle) or
it is impossible to perform the GCO procedure. This is because the rational decision theory
idealizes decision problems and agents, and as such real-life human agents are either believed
to strive to act as an ideal agent, or nonetheless placed under normative demands to do so.
What makes defining heuristics as procedures that do not optimize different from defining
them as procedures that do not guarantee correct outcomes—what makes H2 different from
H1 —has to do with the procedures from which they are being negatively contradistinguished.
Optimization procedures do not aim at guaranteeing correct outcomes, but at maximizing some
value, traditionally utility. Optimization procedures take into account problems for which there
are in principle no GCOs or GCO procedures, and thereby provide richer decision methods. For
problems that do not afford correct solutions, there may nonetheless be some unit of desire that
one wants to optimize, and so there may be an optimization strategy that can be applied. The
upshot, then, is that if it is only maintained that heuristics are procedures that do not guarantee
correct outcomes (H1 ), then an optimizing procedure can qualify as heuristic, so long as this is
not a GCO procedure. But this possibility is blocked by H2 .
Understanding heuristics to be procedures that do not optimize is a view inspired by Herbert
Simon’s notion of satisficing. Satisficing procedures are procedures that do not aim to meet
the standards of rational decision theory (or any theory of rationality that is governed by the
dictates of logic and probability theory), but instead aim to meet some aspiration level that is
in some sense “good enough” relative to the desires, interests, and goals of the agent. (More on
this below.) As Simon initially made apparent, satisficing procedures reduce problem-spaces
and make decisions or choices without complicated computations. Thus, as procedures that
do not optimize, heuristics are supposed to pick out a more general class of procedures. More
specifically, the class of procedures picked out is supposed to consist of those that generally
conserve time and cognitive resources at the expense of an optimized outcome. As we saw
13

This comes close to what Savage (1954) called “The Sure Thing Principle”.
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above, this is typically understood as a good trade-off—foregoing an optimized outcome is not
despaired since what is saved in terms of time and cognitive resources make up for it, and one
typically gets an outcome that is “good enough”. Thus, H2 essentially takes heuristics to be
just satisficing procedures.
It is empirically well-established that humans generally do not optimize in their decisionmaking (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Simon, 1956, 1990). Rather, humans are essentially satisficers by nature. There are, of course, evolutionary explanations for this: survival requires that
decisions be made in an efficient and timely manner at the expense of optimizing. But more
than this, optimizing places far too many demands on our computational resources to feasibly
arrive at solutions, even if we are at leisure to devote time and cognition to making a decision.
This point was made by Simon. Depending on the manner in which one tries to optimize, one
might have to carry out a number of calculations such as those involved in subjective expected
utility, multiple regression, and other weighted linear models. Not only are these calculations
often very complex—too complex for the lone person to compute—but they may also be aggregately far too many to perform within reasonable time frames. Consider, for instance, a
problem of buying a car. Optimizing may entail computing expected utility for every possible
consequence of buying any car under consideration. This is quite a cumbersome task that cannot possibly be completed within a lifetime. One may try to ensure that only a manageably few
calculations are required to be carried out by abstracting away from the details of the problem,
so to speak, and stipulating that only certain consequences are relevant and worth computing
utilities for. However, similar to the problem discussed above with respect to GCO procedures,
it is often difficult to determine which consequences are indeed relevant and to what degree,
and whether the decision based on what few consequences are believed relevant does in fact recapitulate in abstracto a decision based on the consideration of all consequences, as the theory
demands.14 What is more, optimizing would require that the costs associated with determining
which consequences are relevant be themselves subject to a cost-benefit analysis. And this is
14

This is Savage’s “small worlds” problem. See footnote 11 above.
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just the beginning of an infinite regress of calculations.
There are further reasons why optimization procedures are not generally used by humans.
For example, there are notorious problems having to do with assigning probabilities and utilities to events. Humans do not have the cognitive wherewithal to form precise degrees of belief
(i.e., subjective probabilities) as required to carry out many of the calculations for optimizing.
It is also difficult to assign numerical utilities to objects or events. What is the numerical utility
for buying a car? Or for getting married? Or for having your favourite cereal in the morning? And this leads to problems of comparisons. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999), for instance,
argue that there are no common grounds—no “common currency”—by which we might judge
and compare many of our objects of desire. They claim that love, friendship, and PhDs, for
example, are “priceless”, and therefore cannot be compared to the value of items for sale in
a shopping mall (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). Gigerenzer and Todd therefore throw into doubt
the very idea of expected utilities. Regardless of whether they are right about this, however,
assigning numerical utilities is certainly a cognitively taxing task, if not impossible altogether.
Suffice it to say that humans typically do not employ optimizing strategies in their judgments and decision-making. But if this is the case, then the triviality problem cited against H1
applies to H2 —defining heuristics as procedures that do not optimize trivializes the fact that
much of our cognition is guided by heuristics. My general point is that H2 , like H1 , makes
our general reliance on heuristics uninteresting, since all too often the only alternative is to
use heuristics. To put it another way, H2 , like H1 , does not provide a contrast class that interestingly distinguishes heuristics from other types of inferential or problem-solving procedures
in most situations. Certainly, there are situations in which such characterizations are usefully
applicable, such as in certain economic or mathematical situations where there are known feasible optimizing strategies (or GCO procedures); heuristics can here be sensibly understood as
procedures that do not optimize (or do not guarantee correct outcomes), but can be beneficial
and lead to good or useful outcomes. However, it is not the norm for there to be optimizing (or
GCO) procedures, and so the decision-problems of mathematics and economics do not repre-
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sent the problems typically confronted in general cognition. And again, since general cognition
is what we are interested in here, we therefore need a more robust understanding of heuristics
for the general case.

2.2.3

Inherent normativity?

The characterizations that I have been considering are negative characterizations. However,
what heuristics are defined not to be are what are (or were) believed to be normative procedures
of reason. Both GCO and optimization procedures are supposed to be prescriptions for how to
reason best, which are believed to ensure that either the correct or optimizing solution would be
arrived at. Thus, characterized as a procedure that does not guarantee a correct outcome or that
does not optimize, as according to H1 and H2 respectively, “heuristic” appears to be inherently
normative.
To be sure, it seems perfectly fine to describe a procedure as heuristic without asserting
anything normative (I will return to this point below). And we can even speak of procedures
that do not guarantee correct outcomes or that do not optimize without asserting anything
normative. Nevertheless, GCO and optimization procedures have a theory of rationality built
in, as they pick out a class of procedures that is normatively appropriate.
GCO or optimization procedures are, of course, ideals. Ideals are not always meant to
be achieved, but can serve simply as things to aim at or aspire to. And, as discussed, there
are many instances where GCO or optimization procedures are not practically possible for
humans (or sometimes even computers). Nevertheless, ideals are still normative, whether in
the capacity of requirements to be fulfilled or in the capacity of things to aspire to. If heuristics
are procedures that do not guarantee a correct outcome or do not optimize, they will neither
fulfill the given normative requirements nor aspire to do so. Thus, H1 and H2 overtly cast
heuristics as normatively inappropriate procedures, notwithstanding that some heuristic will
often be the only alternative.
Contradistinguishing heuristics from GCO or optimization procedures may be a symptom
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of the hangover from taking algorithmic rules to dictate the normatively appropriate way to
reason. Algorithmic rules are proven to necessitate the right answers, when applied correctly.
Moreover, algorithmic rules are meant to be universal in the sense that they are domain-general
and apply to every person in every situation. According to the traditional theory of rationality,
these two features—necessity and universality—are believed to dictate the normativity of reasoning procedures (Brown, 1988). It is because algorithmic rules are necessary and universal
that they are traditionally considered to constitute rationality. Heuristics, on the other hand,
neither necessitate right answers nor are universal in the said sense. Instead, the success of
heuristics is variable and depends on a number of contextual factors. Thus, heuristics do not
embody the key features of rationality, and therefore they cannot be normatively appropriate
procedures.

Yet there is something wrong with the idea that “heuristic” is inherently normative. Certainly there is a normative dimension to heuristics and their deployment. We can, for instance,
evaluate whether a given heuristic should have been used, or whether it was used in the right
way. But “heuristic” is not a normative concept per se. The normative appropriateness of employing a given heuristic is an issue that may be addressed only in concert with a normative
account of reasoning and decision-making—i.e., a theory of rationality. In the absence of a
theory of rationality, however, we can still discuss and analyze heuristics and their deployment
in a descriptive manner. I therefore take this as motivation to divorce “heuristic” from the
inherent normativity implied by the characterizations of H1 and H2 . In effect, I believe that
this is further reason to reject the negative characterizations of heuristics as procedures that do
not guarantee correct outcomes or as procedures that do not optimize, or more generally, as
procedures that do not meet some normative standard. “Heuristic” is not an inherently normative concept, and need not be characterized negatively. Positively characterizing “heuristic” as
a kind of procedure used in reasoning, judgment, inference, and decision-making will be my
next task.
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Uses of “heuristic”

What has been discussed so far should not be taken to imply that no one in the literature ever
gives some definition of “heuristic” as they intend to employ the term beyond perfunctory
remarks. Some authors attempt to define what they take “heuristic” to mean, while others
include discussion from which we might infer their intended meaning. These characterizations
differ from those considered so far in that they are positive definitions, unlike the negative
definitions of H1 and H2 . There are some key researchers who have offered various positive
characterizations of “heuristic”, from which we can gain an initial grasp of the term. I will
review these here.
Let us begin by briefly considering one example of an attempt at positively defining “heuristic”, which illustrates the difficulty of capturing the nature of heuristics. In a book entitled
Heuristics, Judea Pearl (1984) expounds and discusses several heuristics used in computation
and computer science. Throughout the entire book, however, there are only two brief passages
in which he attempts to characterize heuristics:
This book is about heuristics, popularly known as rules of thumb, educated guesses,
intuitive judgments or simply common sense. In more precise terms, heuristics
stand for strategies using readily accessible though loosely applicable information
to control problem-solving processes in human beings and machine[s]. (p. vii)
Heuristics are criteria, methods, or principles for deciding which among several
alternative courses of action promises to be the most effective in order to achieve
some goal. They represent compromises between two requirements: the need to
make such criteria simple and, at the same time, the desire to see them discriminate
between good and bad choices. (p. 3)
There are a few problems with these characterizations. First, pointing out synonyms provides
little insight if the synonyms themselves are just as vague. Claiming that heuristics are “rules of
thumb, educated guesses, intuitive judgments or simply common sense” gives no clarification
since each of these terms is likewise undefined and unclear (although we will see below how
“rules of thumb” can offer insight into the nature of heuristics when closely analyzed). It is
also unclear what “readily accessible though loosely applicable information” means, or what
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“to control problem-solving processes” entails. Pearl does not comment on these remarks at
any other point in his book. Finally, with respect to the second passage, although heuristics can
sometimes be employed to make decisions “among several alternative courses of action”, there
are certainly heuristics that perform other functions, such as making inferences (examples of
which we shall see below). It therefore seems as if Pearl does not fully or adequately capture
the nature of heuristics. This is made apparent by Pearl’s example of a heuristic that can be
used in common life:
(1) To choose a ripe cantaloupe, press the spot on the candidate cantaloupe where
it was attached to the plant and smell it; if the spot smells like the inside of a
cantaloupe, it’s probably ripe. (p. 3)
In terms of alternative courses of action, however, it would seem that the “most effective”, and
perhaps most “simple”, way of choosing a ripe cantaloupe is to cut it open, and perhaps taste
it. Of course this is not a practical or realistic solution when purchasing a cantaloupe from a
grocery store. Maybe there will be trade-offs and compromises between what is desired and
what is practical, which may very well be a crucial aspect of heuristic strategies, but Pearl does
not mention these; he only mentions the compromise heuristics represent between simplicity
and success.
Pearl’s attempt at defining heuristics illustrates not only the difficulty in capturing the nature
of heuristics, but also a common lack of concern among researchers to adequately characterize
heuristic processes. Many instead rely on intuitive understandings. This may serve us well for
empirical study of the kinds of processes humans engage in, but it will not do for the philosophical project of developing a positive characterization that is coherent and robust enough
to account for a wide range of phenomena, as well as to find its place within the conceptual
structure of cognitive science (see section 2.1 above).
I will now proceed to present other, more influential characterizations through a short semihistorical account of the meaning of “heuristic”. I trace its meaning by focusing mainly on
four research programs. As we shall see, the way in which “heuristic” is used varies between
programs and researchers, and yet there are some basic connections between them all. After
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expounding these disparate but connected accounts of “heuristic”, I will explain some of the
connections between them as I develop a more precise conception which is meant to apply to
general cognition, and which will figure in the rest of this dissertation.

2.3.1

Processes of discovery: Pólya

The term “heuristic” has its roots in the Greek word heuriskein, which means “to find” or “to
discover” (Moustakas, 1990). Throughout history, however, different meanings and connotations have been attributed to the word. George Pólya (1957) was perhaps the first to attempt to
develop a coherent account of “heuristic”.15 His interest was in the methods and strategies in
solving mathematical problems, although he indicated a wider applicability of and interest in
heuristic16 to include other areas of study such as education, logic, psychology, and philosophy.
In the same vein of the word’s etymology, Pólya claimed that “The aim of heuristic is to study
the methods and rules of discovery and invention” (p. 112). At the same time, however, he
believed that a proper notion of “heuristic” is really concerned with the process of problemsolving, and so Pólya maintained that heuristic seeks to investigate the psychological processes
of discovery and invention. Pólya therefore defined what he called “modern heuristic” as the
endeavour to understand “the mental operations typically useful in solving problems” (p. 130,
emphasis added).
It is important to notice here what might be considered nowadays to be an idiosyncratic
use of “heuristic”. Pólya employs the term to refer to a branch of study or a kind of research
program, rather than to the (mental) processes or operations themselves that are to be studied;
that is, rather than the means by which problems are solved. This understanding of “heuristic”
is distinct from its common use as an adjective to describe certain kinds of (mental) processes
or operations. To be sure, Pólya spoke of “heuristic reasoning” which is supposed to refer
to merely provisional, though plausible, reasoning, as opposed to rigorous proof that is both
15

Though see Pólya’s remarks about Bernard Bolzano (pp. 57-58).
Notice here Pólya’s special use of the word “heuristic”: he uses the term in the singular to describe a research
program. More on this below.
16
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certain and final. Yet heuristic reasoning is not what Pólya had in mind when he spoke of
“heuristic” simpliciter. These observations will be useful for the discussion below.
In any event, Pólya devised a number of techniques to aid in problem-solving, many of
which may be characterized in contemporary parlance as heuristics qua means by which problems are solved. Indeed, many contemporary authors refer to just such techniques when discussing heuristics (e.g., Michalewicz & Fogel, 2000). Some of Pólya’s techniques include:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

2.3.2

Draw a diagram when trying to solve a problem.
If you can’t solve a problem right away, try an indirect proof.
Try to restate the problem in different terms.
Assume you have a solution and work backwards.
Find a related problem that has been solved before, and try to use its result or
method.

Information processing theory: Simon

Interestingly, around the same time Pólya published his account of heuristic, a different but
very influential notion began to emerge. It was then that research in computer programming
was quickly advancing, and a task that occupied many researchers was programming a computer to simulate human intelligence—this was the birth of information-processing theory and
the research program of AI. Of course, optimization strategies such as exhaustive search and
maximizing utility, though theoretically sound, were for the most part impractically burdensome in terms of time and other computational resources. If the chief interest in AI is actual
rather than in principle or theoretical computing, then it may very well be irrelevant to employ
optimizing strategies, or to investigate whether such strategies even exist (Simon et al., 1967).
Thus, what was needed were strategies that would cut down on the computational burden that
come with optimization strategies, but that would also perform relatively well by finding satisfactory solutions, although perhaps not providing the best solutions as optimization strategies
do. What was needed, in other words, were heuristic strategies.
Perhaps the most notable of pioneers of early AI is Herbert Simon (although his thencolleague, Allen Newell, may be as famous). Simon exalted the employment of heuristics in

Chapter 2. Characterizing “Heuristic”

38

computing. He believed that the ability of heuristics to find solutions rapidly with relatively
little computational costs not only made their use indispensable to computer programming, but
made most of them better than optimizing strategies, even when the latter are available and
practicable. In fact, Simon formulated the term “heuristic power” as a relative measure of a
computer program’s capacity to find solutions in “reasonable” computation times (Simon et
al., 1967). More importantly, however, he believed that “we can use this theory [of heuristic
computational problem solving] both to understand human heuristic processes and to simulate
such processes with digital computers” (Simon & Newell, 1958, p. 6). That is, Simon observed
that there are mutual ramifications of practical computing or AI on the one hand, and human
decision-making, or cognition more generally, on the other.
Arguably, the most important contribution Simon made to the study of human decisionmaking was his notion of bounded rationality. Simon despaired of the formal model of rationality of his time which prescribed optimization strategies, including maximizing expected
utility and abiding by the basic axioms of probability. Just as with the demands it puts on computation systems, optimization, as he made clear, requires agents to know more than a human
can ever know (e.g., all the possible states of a problem and possible outcomes) and do more
than a human can ever do (e.g., perform numerous calculations over the sets of possibilities and
outcomes). Bounded rationality, however, takes into account empirical limits on human cognition, and offers a more plausible and psychologically realistic notion of rationality. According
to Simon (1957), what is fundamental to bounded rationality are special simplifications of complex problems in order to render them realistically solvable by humans. Rather than maximize
or optimize, agents can employ procedures that exploit the simplifications to solve the problem
in a manner that is in some sense “good enough”, or satisficing (pp. 204-205). As the lessons
from computer programming indicate, satisficing procedures are commonly understood to be
heuristics.
Simon endeavoured to clarify the term “heuristic”, since he thought that, as it is commonly
used, it “denotes an intuitive notion usually misunderstood when oversimplified” (Simon et al.,
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1967, p. 10). And yet the notion to which the term refers can be quite complicated (p. 18).
He explicitly rejects the characterization of a heuristic as “a technique that yields improved
overall performance at the expense of failure on some problems”, claiming that “the usage of
‘heuristic’ does not in itself imply any necessity of failure on some problems” (p. 11, emphasis
in original; cf. my remarks in section 2.2.1 of the present chapter). Simon goes on to note that
many heuristics merely adjust the way a problem-space is searched thereby making it easier
to find a solution, or by eliminating possibilities that are guaranteed not to be solutions. He
offers instead the following as a definition: “Any component of a program that contributes to its
heuristic power we may call a heuristic process, or a heuristic” (p. 17), where heuristic power
is as characterized above, viz. the capacity to find solutions within certain time-frames.17
However, it is important to note that, although Simon defines “heuristic” squarely from the
perspective of computation, he expressly intended heuristics to play a central role in discovery
(Kulkarni & Simon, 1988; Langley, Bradshaw, Simon, & Zytgow, 1987; Simon, 1973, 1977).
That is, he did not disavow “heuristic” of its etymological roots. Indeed, since Simon vehemently believed that human psychological processes can be modeled by computers, heuristics
take centre-stage in accounting for how humans discover (scientific) theories or, more generally, discover solutions to problems. Hence, he comments, “if ‘heuristic’ is to be used as
a noun, it is best employed as a synonym for ‘heuristic process’—a process that aids in the
discovery of a problem solution” (Simon et al., 1967, p. 17). As processes for discovery, the
following are examples of heuristics given by Simon:
(7) If S 1 is your current state, S 2 is your goal state, d a difference between S 1
and S 2 , and O an operator that, in past experience, affects differences of the
type to which d belongs, try to apply O to transform S 1 . (Simon et al., 1967,
p. 17)
(8) If the problem is to prove that two triangles are equal, and you are given information about the equality of angles, search for a theorem whose premises
refer to equality of angles and whose conclusion refers to the equality of
triangles. (ibid.)
17

More precisely, “A heuristic is an addition, rearrangement, or other modification to a program that yields an
improvement in its heuristic power” (Simon et al., 1967, p. 18). Simon offers this alternative formulation since he
notes that it is usually difficult to identify which parts of a program contribute to its heuristic power. But for our
purposes, the simplified formulation given in the main text will suffice.
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(9) In chess, consider first those moves that remove or protect pieces under attack. (ibid.)
(10) To detect regularities in numerical data, if the values of two numerical terms
increase together, then consider their ratio. (Langley et al., 1987, p. 66)18

2.3.3

Heuristics and biases: Kahneman and Tversky

Simon’s work had a significant influence on psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982b). In the 1970s, Kahneman
and Tversky began studying people’s judgments under uncertainty, and thereby established a
research program that has come to be known as “heuristics and biases”. Though Simon had
rejected the formal model of rationality as psychologically unrealistic due to the computational
demands it imposes, Kahneman and Tversky were interested in the extent to which people follow the elementary rules of probability in their reasoning, and the psychological implications
that follow. Through their research they discovered that people tend to rely on a limited number
of “heuristics that generally govern judgment and inference” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p.
313). Furthermore, they demonstrate that these heuristics are generally “quite useful” (ibid.)
and “sometimes yield reasonable judgments” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973b, p. 237), notwithstanding that they can lead to judgments that depart from the basic axioms of probability and
result in systematic, predictable biases.
Although the heuristics and biases program has had considerable influence in contemporary
psychological research, precisely defining the cognitive processes of interest—i.e., precisely
defining “heuristic”—has evaded Kahneman and Tversky, as well as those who follow them.
They do, however, offer brief definitions. In their initial work they claim, “heuristic principles . . . reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler
judgmental operations” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). Almost ten years later, they
asserted, “The term judgmental heuristic refers to a strategy—whether deliberate or not—that
relies on a natural assessment to produce an estimation or a prediction” (Tversky & Kahne18

This heuristic purportedly aided Simon and Newell’s computer program in the “discovery” of Kepler’s Third
Law.
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man, 1983, p. 294). Unsurprisingly, Kahneman and Tversky are not entirely clear on what
they mean by “natural assessment”; they offer only the following: “natural assessments . . . are
routinely carried out as part of the perception of events and the comprehension of messages.
Such natural assessments include computations of similarity and representativeness, attributions of causality, and evaluations of the availability of associations and exemplars” (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1983, p. 294). Throughout the body of written work produced by the heuristics and biases program, the term “heuristic” is used as a noun referring vaguely to the said
principles or strategies (although the reliance on natural assessments seem to have been largely
neglected; Gilovich & Griffin, 2002).
We might note here three things. First, Kahneman and Tversky’s characterization of heuristics (or heuristic processes; I will be using these terms interchangeably) moves away from
Pólya’s account and from the word’s etymology more generally. It seems Kahneman and Tversky are not strictly interested in the processes of discovery. Rather, they are interested more
specifically in certain specific processes of judgment, inference, and prediction, and a part of
their research program is to specify the conditions under which such processes depart from the
basic axioms of probability theory.19
The second thing to note is that Kahneman and Tversky’s characterization agrees with
Simon’s definition of “heuristic” insofar as both indicate that heuristics simplify complex tasks
to enable simpler operations. And although Kahneman and Tversky are not explicit about
computational implications, simplifying complex tasks to enable simpler operations reduces
computational burden, and this is precisely Simon’s central feature of heuristic processes.
However, the third thing to note is that, unlike Simon, Kahneman and Tversky are not
concerned about heuristics qua computational operations. Instead, the heuristics they are interested in are restricted to humans. Although these heuristics are proclaimed to be cognitive
processes, Kahneman and Tversky make their claims in the absence of a theory of mind, and
19

In the words of Gilovich and Griffin (2002), the heuristics and biases research program has two agendas, one
positive and one negative. The positive agenda is to elucidate the processes that people rely on to make intuitive
judgments; the negative agenda is to elucidate the conditions under which intuitive judgments will likely disagree
with the rules of probability.
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are therefore not committed to the position that cognition is computation in the sense of CTM.
Hence, their account of heuristics (and natural assessments) are not, and need not be, specified
as classical computations.
Kahneman and Tversky’s work initiated a deluge of research devoted to investigating the
inferential and judgmental processes employed by humans. Subsequent work in the heuristics
and biases tradition has established the pervasiveness of the heuristics hypothesized by Kahneman and Tversky. Indeed, it has been convincingly shown that people generally are guided by
such heuristics regardless of incentive or motivation, and regardless of increased attention and
effort by devoting their full cognitive resources to the task (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002).20 The
three heuristics most studied by Kahneman and Tversky are:
(11) Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness (resemblance) the higher the probability estimation. (Representativeness)
(12) The frequency of a class or the probability of an event is assessed according
to the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind.
(Availability)
(13) Estimates are made by starting with an initial value (the “anchor”) and making adjustments to it; the anchor can be influenced arbitrarily through suggestive techniques. (Anchoring and Adjustment) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)

2.3.4

Fast and frugal heuristics: Gigerenzer

Gerd Gigerenzer has also been influenced by Simon’s seminal works, and Gigerenzer also propounds the ubiquity of heuristics in human cognition. However, Gigerenzer accuses Kahneman
and Tversky of offering “nebulous”, “one-word explanations” to be passed off as heuristics
(Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Gigerenzer argues furthermore that Kahneman
and Tversky’s proposed heuristics at once account for everything and nothing: they explain
everything because they are so vague that any one of them “can be fit to almost any empirical
result post hoc” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 28); they explain nothing because Kahneman
20

This is not to say that anyone in the heuristics and biases tradition has suggested that people always rely on
heuristics and never abide by the rules of probability. Rather, what has been shown is that, motivation, attention,
effort, etc., can decrease the reliance on heuristics, and thereby decrease biasing effects. But such biasing effects
never completely disappear.
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and Tversky do not specify any underlying cognitive processes.21 In return, Gigerenzer offers a more refined and synthesized account of “heuristic”. He takes his cue from the word’s
etymology as processes for discovery, where “heuristic” refers to “useful, even indispensable
cognitive processes for solving problems that cannot be handled by logic and probability theory” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 25). But Gigerenzer is also inspired by Simon and Newell’s
models of heuristic processes for guiding search through problem-spaces. In this respect, the
term refers to “a useful shortcut, an approximation, or a rule of thumb for guiding search” (p.
26), and of which precise computational models can be made. Building upon these traditions,
Gigerenzer (and his colleagues) established the “fast and frugal heuristics” research program.
Gigerenzer explains that a fast and frugal heuristic is generally a rule according to which an
organism reasons and acts (Gigerenzer, 2004, 2006, 2008b); they are fast and frugal because
they operate quickly and with little information. But such a rule is not a heuristic unless it
embodies two fundamental features: First, heuristics must exploit the evolved capacities of an
organism, such as those of perception or memory (cf. Kahneman and Tversky’s notion of natural assessments).22 Gigerenzer believes that it is this feature that allows heuristics to be simple,
and that simplicity results in “fast, frugal, transparent, and robust judgments” (Gigerenzer,
2004, p. 64). Second, heuristics must exploit structures of environments.23 What is meant
by structures of environments is the structures of information found in environments. The
idea is that the success of heuristics partially lies in the way information in the environment
is structured, and how heuristics use such structures to their advantage. This might consist
21

Kahneman and Tversky have replied by claiming that “This objection misses the point that [our heuristics]
can be assessed experimentally; hence it need not be defined a priori” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996, p. 585). I
believe that this is an important point, since heuristics are not the kind of thing that should be defined or analyzed a
priori. Rather a more sensible, and interesting, approach is to give an empirically informed account of heuristics—
to see what processes are actually employed in human cognition, and then determining which of them we want to
call heuristic. This is the approach that I attempt below.
22
In more recent works, Gigerenzer expresses his belief that heuristics also exploit learned capacities. He
states, for instance, that “a heuristic exploits hard-wired or learned cognitive and motor processes” (2006, p. 121;
2008b, p. 23; my emphasis). This is a more encompassing view, but I believe that it leads to a trivial account of
how heuristics operate. For if a heuristic is conceived to exploit evolved or learned capacities—whether they be
cognitive or motor processes—there would seem to be nothing left to distinguish capacities that heuristics exploit
from those they do not, for it appears as if evolved or learned capacities exhaust the possibilities.
23
Gigerenzer (2008a) refers to exploiting evolved or learned capacities and exploiting environmental structures
as embodiment and situatedness, respectively.
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in recognizing how certain information is distributed in the environment, or seeing how certain information is correlated with other information. Heuristics attuned to such structures will
therefore make good predictions. Exploiting environmental structures contributes to the robustness of heuristics, since different environments can share a similar informational structure, and
a heuristic that can exploit such a structure can therefore be successful in either environment.
The fast and frugal heuristics program takes both descriptive and normative analyses of
heuristics as essential. The program adopts a normative “analysis of heuristic accuracy, speed,
and frugality in real-world environments” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 29). It may be observed that this is similar to, and appears to be an adaptation of, Simon’s (descriptive) notion
of heuristic power. The normative analysis given by the fast and frugal heuristics program
consists in what Gigerenzer calls ecological rationality.24 According to Gigerenzer, ecological rationality eschews the standard normative assumption “that formal axioms and rules of
choice can define rational behavior without referring to factors external to choice behavior”
(Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 202). Hence, Gigerenzer attacks the interest of the heuristics and biases approach in studying how the use of heuristics yields judgments that disagree with the
basic rules of probability and lead to biases. What is of better interest, according to ecological
rationality, is studying the environments in which given heuristics will succeed or fail. What
follows is that one cannot speak of a given heuristic being universally ecologically rational:
“Ecological rationality implies that a heuristic is not good or bad, rational or irrational per se,
but only relative to an environment” (Gigerenzer, 2006, p. 121). Given this characterization,
Gigerenzer argues that once we find the environments in which given heuristics perform well,
employing heuristics constitutes good reasoning and that their use is justified because they
result in adaptively useful outcomes.
For a descriptive analysis, the fast and frugal heuristics program aims to “specify the function and role of fast and frugal heuristics more precisely than has been done in the past, by
building computational models with specific principles of information search, stopping, and
24

The notion of ecological rationality is inspired by the ideas of both Simon and Egon Brunswik.
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decision making” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 29). Such computational modeling makes
transparent the mechanics of heuristics and the ways in which information (in the environment) is used. This facilitates the investigation of ecological rationality. The computational
modeling is made apparent by looking at the heuristics that Gigerenzer commonly discusses:
(14) (i) Search among alternatives; (ii) stop search when one alternative is recognized; (iii) choose the recognized object. (Recognition Heuristic)
(15) (i) Search among alternatives; (ii) stop search when one alternative scores
higher on some predetermined criterion; (iii) choose the object identified in
step ii. (Take the Best)
(16) Use the cue that discriminated on the most recent problem to choose an object; if the cue does not discriminate use the cue that discriminated the time
before last; and so on. (Take the Last)
(17) (i) Fixate your eyes on the moving object; (ii) start running; (iii) adjust your
running speed such that the angle of your gaze remains constant. (Gaze
Heuristic)
The fast and frugal heuristics program represents probably the most earnest attempt to offer
a detailed and precise account of heuristics. However, the extent to which their account is
useful as an appropriate and adequate characterization of “heuristic” will be assessed below.
For now, let us observe that the heuristics of the fast and frugal program are not as general as
the ones Pólya and Kahneman and Tversky introduced, but at the same time they are not as
specific as the ones Simon offered. Rather, the fast and frugal heuristics are domain-specific
in the sense that they are meant to be deployed in certain circumscribed domains. As we shall
later see, this feature has important implications for cognitive architecture.

2.3.5

Other uses

In other areas of the literature, we find different and less developed accounts of heuristics.
Most of these have roots in the manner in which they are characterized by the heuristics and
biases tradition. Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983), for instance, raise some concerns
similar to those raised by Gigerenzer. They accept Kahneman and Tversky’s position that the
employment of heuristics can lead to judgments that depart from the basic rules of probability.
However, they also argue that people often use heuristics that produce intuitions that agree
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with probability theory. Nisbett et al. therefore label the heuristics of the heuristics and biases
tradition “nonstatistical heuristics”, and distinguish them from “statistical heuristics”, which
are “intuitive, rule-of-thumb inferential procedures that resemble formal statistical procedures”
(p. 345). Other than this sentence, however, Nisbett et al. provide no fuller characterization of
statistical heuristics.
Another use of the term “heuristic” worth mentioning is Jonathan St.B.T. Evans’, which
is idiosyncratic. Evans is a pioneer of the contemporary dual-process theory. Dual-process
theory hypothesizes that cognitive processes come in two kinds. On the one hand, some of our
cognition, sometimes called type 1, is unconscious or preconscious, automatic, fast, parallel,
high capacity, and operates with implicit knowledge. On the other hand, some of our cognition,
sometimes called type 2, is conscious, controlled, slow, serial, low capacity, and operates with
explicit knowledge. (For extensive discussion see J. Evans & Frankish, 2009). Evans holds
the view that type 1 processes are “heuristic processes”. What he means by this, however, is
not precisely what anyone who we have discussed so far meant by the term. According to
Evans, heuristic processes “focus our attention on selective aspects of presented information
and rapidly retrieve and apply relevant prior knowledge and belief” (J. Evans, 2006, p. 392;
cf. J. Evans & Over, 1996; J. Evans, 2009). Although such a role can be circumscribed for
some of the characterizations of “heuristic” given above, it would take some work and might
appear unnatural. Unfortunately, Evans leaves the details of such heuristic processes largely
unspecified.
Some researchers who employ the term “heuristic” are not concerned with the higher cognitive processes of thought and reason, but rather with the low-level cognition that underwrites
perception. There is a camp of perceptual psychologists, for instance, who understand and
model visual perception as an inferential process (Braunstein, 1994). The idea is that the eye
is usually presented with visual information that is either incomplete or very complex, and all
but the simplest events require that many dimensions of information be integrated to produce
a complete and coherent scene. Such an integration is too demanding of the human visual sys-

Chapter 2. Characterizing “Heuristic”

47

tem, so it has to make “judgments”, so to speak, about patterns, shapes, and so on. Since visual
perception is thus conceived as judgmental in nature, a line of argument pursued is that certain
operations of the visual system are heuristic in the sense of producing systematic outcomes
that can result in error (e.g., J. Feldman, 1999; Kaiser, 1998).25 Perceptual linguists similarly
invoke heuristics to explain various operations involved in language perception (e.g., Fodor,
Bever, & Garrett, 1974; Frazier & Fodor, 1978; Pericliev, 1990). The same reasoning of the
visual perceptual psychologists applies here. Indeed, all perceptual cognition, according to this
view, involves heuristics in one way or another. However, a deeper account of such heuristic
processes is not generally pursued.

2.4

A positive characterization

Recall that in section 2.2 I argued that the two most common perfunctory characterizations of
“heuristic” are at best trivial or uninteresting, and at worst inapplicable in the face of real-world
problems and the characteristics of actual human cognition. It should not come as news that
there are not too many real-world problems that admit GCO or optimization procedures. In
fact, this is a rather boring truth. But calling strategies “heuristic” just because they do not
generate correct or optimal solutions does not make the situation any more interesting. Since
every problem-solving or inferential procedure is heuristic in real-world contexts, there seems
to be no point at all in invoking the term “heuristic” to refer to these procedures, for any and
all of them just are, simply and plainly, cognitive procedures applied in the real-world. It
thereby becomes trivially true that we rely on heuristics, and it is empirically vacuous to state
as much. These problems are what I have called the range problem and the triviality problem,
25

Perceptual psychologists often assume that the perceptual system attempts to maintain veridical representations of the world; and so those who sit in the perceptual heuristics camp believe that heuristics approximate, as
close as they can, veridicality. However, there is a compelling case for the position that the aim of perception is not
always to provide accurate representations. According to Christopher Viger (2006b), “The aim of perception is
to help guide action via planning and directly responding to a dynamic and often hostile environment; sometimes
that requires accurate representations and . . . sometimes it does not” (p. 275). In cases when our perceptions are
inaccurate, “our perceptual systems [can] make salient important environmental differences, thereby sacrificing
accuracy for usefulness” (p. 279). If this is right, then perceptual heuristics do not necessarily approximate reality
or veridicality, but can serve as economical processes for making important environmental differences salient.
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respectively. Moreover, I have suggested that contradistinguishing heuristics from GCO or
optimizing procedures implies an inherent normativity that should be resisted, and that the
negative characterization of heuristics as procedures that do not guarantee correct outcomes, or
as procedures that do not optimize, should be rejected. If we are to have a robust and usefully
applicable notion of “heuristic”, and a notion that applies to general cognition, we are going to
have to say more about what heuristics are, as opposed to what they are not.
Now that we have surveyed a range of uses of “heuristic”, we are in a position to characterize more precisely the nature of the concept. There are certainly many other instances than
what I have given here where “heuristic” is invoked to describe some aspect of cognition. But I
believe that this initial exposition gives a sufficient feel for the various and disparate ways that
the term has been and is employed.
Before we get started, let us briefly look at some of the heuristics to which we have been
introduced. If we examine some of them, we find that it can be very difficult to identify common
characteristics. Consider for instance
(4)

Try to restate the problem in different terms,

and
(14)

(i) Search among alternatives; (ii) stop search when one alternative is recognized;
(iii) choose the recognized object.

(4) commands someone to do something rather vague and uncertain—how or in what other
terms is one to restate the problem? And even after one has done as (4) commands, it is still
uncertain whether one will have a favourable outcome, or indeed whether one will be able to
solve the problem at all in such other terms. On the other hand, (14) lays out what is to be
done in definite and discrete steps—no doubt an artefact of its being a computational model.
Moreover, a definite outcome is guaranteed by (14), so long as one comes across an alternative
that is recognized. And whereas (4) can be applied to just about any problem whatsoever, (14)
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can be applied only when the problem consists in choosing an object among alternatives. Thus,
these examples of heuristics do not appear to be of a piece. Even considering Gigerenzer’s
heuristics on their own, they do not seem to pick out a natural kind—(14)-(16) appear to be
cognitive heuristics while (17) appears to be a heuristic for perception and motor function. It
therefore remains to be seen what properties, if any, are shared by the given examples that
make them heuristics.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to drawing out some fundamental similarities and differences among the various accounts of heuristics we have thus far considered. In
undertaking this project, I will make a number of distinctions. These distinctions will serve
to classify different kinds of heuristics. They will also serve to hone in on a cluster of properties from which we might establish a sensible and robust characterization of “heuristic”, and
thereby better understand the cognitive processes that are of concern to this dissertation.

2.4.1

Some distinctions

2.4.1.1 Stimulus-response vs. heuristics
The first distinction I will draw is between stimulus-response behaviour and heuristic-produced
behaviour.26 By stimulus-response behaviour I do not intend to refer to the behaviourist idea
that takes the mind to be a black box to remain unanalyzed. Rather, I mean to refer to some
unspecified theory that takes a stimulus to be the sole cause, in a course-grained way, of a
response. By heuristic-produced behaviour I mean behaviour (including cognitive behaviour)
that is brought about or caused by the operation of some heuristic. For example, consider any
of the proposed heuristics mentioned above, such as:
26

It may also be worthwhile to distinguish between stimulus-response (SR) and stimulus-stimulus (SS) theories
of classical conditioning. According to SR, classical conditioning occurs via association and without conceptualization. According to SS, conditioning involves a conceptualization of the object of association. On the SS
model, Pavolv’s dog salivates because the bell evokes the concept food. On the SR model, no such conceptualization occurs—salivating is simply associated with the ringing of the bell. Whether the SR or SS theory is correct
is still debated. I suspect that both may be true, depending on the context and organism in question. To avoid
complications, however, my remarks can be understood to refer to the SR theory.

Chapter 2. Characterizing “Heuristic”
(9)
(11)

50

In chess, consider first those moves that remove or protect pieces under attack.
Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is
representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness
(resemblance) the higher the probability estimation.

These heuristics are not mere stimulus-response operations. Rather, they are relatively more
complex operations involving conceptual information. In contrast, stimulus-response behaviour
does not implicate any conceptual information, since the stimulus, not anything having to do
with concepts, is supposed to be the cause of the response. As a paradigm example, we might
take a case of shuttering upon hearing an unexpected loud noise—the loud noise is not conceptualized, and thus concepts have no role in producing the shutter response; it is simply a brute
reaction or reflex.
The distinction between heuristic-produced and stimulus-response behaviour may seem
obvious. It is an important distinction nonetheless, especially given some recent work of
Gigerenzer’s. Gigerenzer (2007, 2008c) has speculated that some nonhuman animal behaviour
can be understood in terms of heuristics. According to Hutchinson and Gigerenzer (2005),
behavioural biologists have studied “rules of thumb” since the middle of the twentieth century. Rules of thumb describe some animal behaviour through simple rules which appear to be
largely innate. So, for instance, the manner in which the wasp Polistes dominulus constructs
its nest dictates that there are a possible 155 different hexagonal arrangements. However, only
18 arrangements are ever observed. And the 18 arrangements appear to follow a rule of thumb
“in which the wasp places each cell at the site where the sum of the ages of the existing walls
is greatest” (p. 103). Similarly, if there are two light sources in a copepod’s environment,
it will follow “a trajectory as if it were pulled toward each source with a force proportional
to

source intensity
distance2

” (ibid.). Yet behavioural biologists explain this seemingly complex behaviour

by a simple rule of thumb that says that the copepod “adjusts its orientation so as to maximise the amount of light falling on [its] flat eye” (ibid.). Hutchinson and Gigerenzer claim
that such rules of thumb “correspond roughly” (p. 98) to heuristics, though Gigerenzer (2007,
2008c) appears to make the stronger claim that “rule of thumb” is synonymous with “heuristic”.
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Gigerenzer (2007) goes on to explain that many other animal behaviours can be understood as
being the result of following rules of thumb or heuristics.27
However, given the distinction made here between stimulus-response and heuristic-produced
behaviour, Gigerenzer’s belief that such animal behaviours are the result of following heuristics
may be misguided. This certainly appears to be the case with respect to the copepod example—
it is more likely that copepods are guided by stimulus-response mechanisms rather than heuristics; it is doubtful that they have the wherewithal to possess or develop any concepts.28 It
seems, rather, that stimulus-response behaviour is best characterized as merely satisfying a
rule, or conforming behaviour to a rule. As Gigerenzer’s examples illustrate, satisfying a rule
may give the appearance that the behaviour is produced by a heuristic, but such stimulusresponse behaviours do not involve involve a rule as a causal ingredient. We might say that
merely satisfying a rule is not sufficient for heuristic-produced behaviour. (More on satisfying
rules below.)
To avoid mere rule-satisfying behaviour as being considered heuristic-produced behaviour,
I will offer the following constraint on what heuristics are supposed to be:
C: Heuristics (in some way) utilize conceptual information.29
I do not wish to put any stronger constraints on what heuristics are supposed to be at the moment. Nevertheless, with this weak constraint we can rule out stimulus-response behaviour as
being heuristic-produced insofar as the former is an instance of merely satisfying a rule, where
rule-satisfying behaviour does not implicate the involvement of any conceptual information.
As we shall see presently, however, condition C has a bigger role to play in developing a robust
characterization of heuristics.
27

For example, Gigerenzer believes that birds of paradise mate selection behaviour can be explained as the
females following the heuristic Look over a sample of males, and go for the one with the longest tail; Gigerenzer also claims that aggressor-assessment of deer stags follow a pattern of sequential reasoning, which can be
described by a heuristic to the effect of Use deepness of roar to estimate the size of rival first; use appearance
afterward.
28
Many of Gigerenzer’s other assertions about animals following heuristics (see previous footnote) are likewise
thrown into doubt, for the behaviour in question is probably the result of stimulus-response.
29
I hedge by saying “in some way” because, as we shall see in chapter 4, heuristics do not directly utilize
conceptual information but metainformation embodied by relations within and between conceptual content.

Chapter 2. Characterizing “Heuristic”

52

2.4.1.2 Computational vs. cognitive heuristics
Some may object to condition C, stating that it is not necessary that heuristics utilize conceptual
information. Many heuristics developed by computer scientists, for instance, operate within
systems that (arguably) do not possess, and (arguably) are not capable of possessing, concepts.
A case in point are heuristics, with varying complexities, that facilitate economical search
within decision-trees. Nevertheless, such heuristics are not the same kind of heuristics that
are of interest to this dissertation. Let me therefore draw a further distinction between what
I will call computational heuristics and cognitive heuristics. It is the latter that concerns this
dissertation.
Although cognitive heuristics may very well be computational in nature insofar as CTM
holds, the way I am using the term “computational” here is to refer simply to non-conceptual
processes that do not invoke a conceptual cognitive architecture. It is an open matter whether
and to what extent conceptual, non-heuristic cognitive processes involve computational heuristics. However, cognitive heuristics, as I propose to understand them, are processes that utilize
conceptual information. Thus, condition C holds for cognitive heuristics but not computational
heuristics. To maintain generality, we might claim that heuristics involve relatively complex
integrations of information. But since cognitive heuristics are the interest of this dissertation, I
will keep the formulation of the condition given by C; it will have a role to play in the following
chapters as I advance my thesis on how cognitive heuristics work.
2.4.1.3 Perceptual vs. cognitive heuristics
Another important distinction is between perceptual heuristics and cognitive heuristics. As
mentioned above, perceptual psychologists who subscribe to the perceptual heuristics approach
to vision or speech perception believe the human perceptual system to be too deficient to fully
compute perceptual information coming in from the environment. And so, it is claimed, the
human perceptual system relies on heuristics to make approximations. An important aspect
of this view is that perception is understood to be computational in nature. However, what
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perceptual heuristics compute over is not conceptual information, but perceptual information.
Thus, in a way, perceptual heuristics are akin to computational heuristics insofar as both are
concerned with non-cognitive—that is, non-conceptual—computation. At least this is the feature that is important for present purposes. It is also important to note that perceptual heuristics
and cognitive heuristics are instantiated within two different, functionally distinct systems, the
perceptual system and the conceptual system respectively.
An example of a visual perceptual heuristic is:
(18) If a repetitive texture gradually and uniformly changes scale, then interpret
the scale change as a depth change. (J. Feldman, 1999, p. 215)
Although such perceptual heuristics are often expressed in conceptual terms, they are computational and non-conceptual in operation. And, as I had discussed with respect to computational
heuristics, condition C does not hold.
In a certain sense, Gigerenzer’s Gaze Heuristic,

(17)

(i) Fixate your eyes on the moving object; (ii) start running; (iii) adjust your
running speed such that the angle of your gaze remains constant,

is not so much a cognitive heuristic as it is a perceptual heuristic. We might characterize the
Gaze Heuristic more precisely as a percept-motor heuristic, since it also involves online adjustments to bodily motion. In any case, as a heuristic for object tracking, no conceptualization
is required. So, at the very least, we can safely assert that the Gaze Heuristic is not a cognitive heuristic. Given the interests of this dissertation, this particular heuristic, along with other
perceptual and percept-motor heuristics, will not be a subject of inquiry and will be left to one
side.
2.4.1.4 Methodological vs. inferential heuristics
Finally, I make a distinction between what I will call methodological heuristics and inferential
heuristics. This distinction falls within the category of cognitive heuristics. We saw that the
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etymological understanding of the term “heuristic” has to do with methods of discovery. It
was in this sense that Pólya employed the term to refer to the endeavour to study the strategies
and processes typically useful for solving problems. Using the term as a noun, heuristics in
this tradition are methodological devices for learning and problem-solving. It is in this sense
that the use of models and analogy are heuristic devices to help us learn or understand something about our world, and the techniques offered by Pólya, such as those given in (2)-(6), are
heuristic aids in solving problems. This is what I intend to refer to by methodological heuristics. Methodological heuristics are what concern philosophers of science who are interested in
creative thought, the logic of discovery, and the construction and improvement of theories in
science (e.g., Lakatos, 1963-64; Popper, 1959).
However, a different meaning of “heuristic” emerged in the psychology literature, inspired
(perhaps christened?) by the work of Kahneman and Tversky. As I had described above, the
heuristics studied by Kahneman and Tversky (and others such as Gigerenzer, and Simon to
some extent) are not precisely the methods of discovery and invention intimated by the term’s
etymology. The important distinction to recognize here is between the respective domains of
use, and their respective functions in our cognitive lives. As tools or devices for discovery
and problem-solving, methodological heuristics are aids to learning and understanding. In
contrast, the heuristics that are of interest to Kahneman and Tversky (and other psychologists)
are principles that guide judgment and inference. Thus, these latter are what I call inferential
heuristics. Inferential heuristics are not about learning or understanding per se, but serve to
facilitate judgments, inferences, and decision-making.
In a certain sense, inferential heuristics may be understood as special cases of methodological heuristics. This is suggested by Simon’s remarks given above regarding using the term
“heuristic” as a noun; in this sense, inferential heuristics aid in the discovery of a solution
to a problem by providing the appropriate judgments and inferences. Nevertheless, inferential heuristics remain distinct in kind from methodological heuristics insofar as either serves
distinct cognitive functions.
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Moreover, we can distinguish inferential heuristics from methodological heuristics by making some generalizations. Inferential heuristics are often epistemically opaque—people often
employ these heuristics without knowing that they do so, and without knowing the nature of
these heuristics (that is, absent of a psychologist informing one of such things). Methodological
heuristics, on the other hand, are generally epistemically transparent—these methods are more
or less easily identified; we often consciously and deliberately employ them; their usefulness
is usually known; and, because of this, an individual is able to compare and manipulate them
(and all this without a psychologist informing one of such things). Moreover, methodological heuristics are typically cultivated from experience and therefore vary between individuals,
whereas inferential heuristics can be to some extent immune to experience and very common
among everyone, and some may even be innate.30 For example,

(6)

Find a related problem that has been solved before, and try to use its result or
method,

is a technique that one acquires by working through many problems and drawing abstract
principles, whereas
(11)

Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is
representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness
(resemblance) the higher the probability estimation.

(12)

The frequency of a class or the probability of an event is assessed according to the
ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind.

and

are pervasive, as those in the heuristics and biases tradition have shown, and are not cultivated
or developed through experience.
30

I use the qualifiers “often” and “generally” and “typically” because there will undoubtedly be exceptions.
The exceptions, I suppose, can contribute to our understanding of the natures of methodological and inferential
heuristics.
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Since methodological and inferential heuristics are both kinds of cognitive heuristics, condition C applies to both. The epistemic opaqueness of inferential heuristics and the epistemic
transparency of methodological heuristics may be owed to the kind of process each heuristic is
and the kinds of information each operates over. In terms of dual-processes theory (Wason &
Evans, 1975; J. Evans & Over, 1996; Frankish & Evans, 2009), it may be said that inferential
heuristics are type 1 processes, and that methodological heuristics are type 2 processes. But
this is just speculation.
Alternatively, this might be cashed out in terms of what representational information figures into the operations of either type of process. As strategies that help us to understand
or learn something about our world, methodological heuristics must involve deep conceptual
processing. At the very least, the problems that methodological heuristics are recruited to
solve (learning about or understanding our world) are problems that appear to require the use
and manipulation of conceptual content. This may be a factor in what makes us consciously
aware of such problems, and allows us to consciously and deliberately apply methodological
heuristics in solving them. On the other hand, inferential heuristics may not have to engage
in deep conceptual processing to guide inference and judgment, at least not to the same extent
as methodological heuristics. In chapter 4, we shall see that, according to my account of how
heuristics work in cognition, it is a feature of inferential heuristics that they do not operate over
conceptual content but over conceptual relations. I will briefly return to this matter below, but
I save substantial discussion for chapter 4. For now, I will simply speculate that not generally
engaging and manipulating conceptual content may contribute to the epistemic opaqueness of
inferential heuristics. Admittedly, these are empirical issues that can be confirmed or falsified
with the appropriate evidence.
This is not to say that inferential heuristics cannot be instantiated in higher-order cognition.
For instance, it is possible that one can learn and consciously employ the Availability heuristic,
or Take the Best. Moreover, it may not always be clear whether a given heuristic falls in the
methodological or inference category. That there are fuzzy cases, however, does not bear nega-
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tively on the methodological-inferential distinction drawn here. Indeed, fuzzy cases should not
come as a surprise since it is not uncommon for us to learn something about the world while we
make inferences, nor is it uncommon that the very act of making a judgment solves a problem.
Nevertheless, the functional distinction between methodological and inferential heuristics can
be maintained so long as the functional role of the heuristic can be determined.31
To sum up, heuristics are to be distinguished from stimulus-response behaviour. Moreover,
there are many kinds of heuristics, including (though perhaps not exhausted by) computational,
perceptual, and cognitive. And cognitive heuristics can be subdivided into methodological
heuristics and inferential heuristics. This is represented, with examples, in Figure 2.1. (The
branch representing cognitive heuristics is highlighted since these will be the main focus from
here on in.)

2.4.2

Characterizing cognitive heuristics

Now that I have distinguished between different kinds of heuristics and disambiguated the term,
I will sketch a characterization of the cognitive heuristics that are of interest to this dissertation,
and, as I believe, to philosophy and cognitive science generally. Although my concern will be
for cognitive heuristics in general, the characterization I will give will be most applicable to
inferential heuristics. This will become apparent quite quickly, and at the end the characterization I offer is exclusive to inferential heuristics. However, as I proceed I will comment on how
the characterization of inferential heuristics I develop relates to methodological heuristics, as
well as to computational and perceptual heuristics. In the remainder of this section, I will refer
31

A question may arise here regarding whether the dual-process theory can allow for such fuzzy cases, since
type 1 and type 2 processes are disparate processes. However, as I hope is obvious by now, the methodologicalinferential distinction is a distinction primarily of function, whereas type 1 and type 2 processes are best conceived
in terms of being distinct cognitive types or kinds (Samuels, 2009). Understood in this way, a heuristic which is
fuzzy with respect to its being methodological or inferential can be either a type 1 or type 2 process depending on
what kinds of cognitive system(s) is (are) instantiating it. It also follows that it is possible for a methodological
heuristic to be a type 1 process that is unconscious, automatic, etc. This should not be too surprising since
enough practice at honing a skill generally results in a lot of behaviours that are unconscious, automatic, etc. (i.e.,
best characterized as type 1), and I do not see why some of these behaviours should not engage methodological
heuristics.

Example:
· Decision-tree search.

Example:
· Draw a diagram when trying to solve a
problem; in chess, consider first those
moves that remove or protect pieces under attack.

Methodological heuristics

Figure 2.1: Classifying heuristics

Examples:
· If a repetitive texture gradually and uniformly
changes scale, then interpret the scale change as
a depth change.
· Gaze Heuristic: (i) Fixate your eyes on the
moving object; (ii) start running; (iii) adjust your
running speed such that the angle of your gaze
remains constant.

Inferential heuristics
Examples:
· Availability: the frequency of a class or the probability of an event is assessed according to the ease
with which instances or occurrences can be brought
to mind.
· Take the Best: (i) search among alternatives; (ii)
stop search when one alternative scores higher on
some predetermined criterion; (iii) choose the object
identified in step (ii).

Cognitive heuristics

Heuristics
Computational heuristics

Perceptual heuristics

Example:
· For a copepod: adjust orientation so as to maximise
the amount of light falling on the eye.

Stimulus-response behaviour

Chapter 2. Characterizing “Heuristic”
58

Chapter 2. Characterizing “Heuristic”

59

to cognitive heuristics simply by “heuristics” unless otherwise specified.
2.4.2.1 Heuristics as rules of thumb
As might be obvious from the remarks at the beginning of this chapter, heuristics are almost
invariably characterized as “rules of thumb”. So common is this characterization that one may
even take “rule of thumb” to be synonymous with “heuristic” (as we saw Gigerenzer to do).
Though I do not want to commit to wholly endorsing this synonymity (see below), such a ruleof-thumb-definition illuminates several central qualities of heuristics. One is that heuristics
are rules of some sort. Notice however that as rules, heuristics need not (and perhaps should
not) be understood to be normative.32 Rather, as rules, heuristics are procedures that can be
specified and applied in a given situation. That is, “rule”, as it is being used here, refers not to a
prescriptive guide for conduct, but to a procedure that (non-prescriptively) regulates or governs
some process, or describes a method for performing some operation.33
It would be useful here to make some distinctions with respect to the roles rules can play
in governing action or behaviour. It is common to differentiate between satisfying a rule and
following a rule (cf. Searle, 1980; Wittgenstein, 1953, §§185-242). To satisfy a rule is simply
to behave in such a way that fits the description of the rule—to merely conform behaviour
to the rule. It is in this sense that the motion of the planets satisfy the rules embodied by
classical physics. On the other hand, following a rule implies a causal link between the rule
and some behaviour, and moreover that the rule is an intentional object in cognition. As Fodor
(2008) puts it, “following [a rule] R requires that one’s behavior have a certain kind of etiology;
roughly, that one’s intention that one’s behavior conform with R explains (or partly explains)
why it does conform to R” (pp. 37-38). Thus, merely satisfying a rule is not sufficient for
following the rule.
32

Kahneman and Tversky oppose heuristics to rules (see e.g., their 1982, 1996). But they are contrasting
normative rules with heuristics, the latter which I take here to be characterized as descriptive rules.
33
Of course, there are normative matters with respect to the application of certain heuristics in certain situations.
These are matters in which Gigerenzer and his followers are intensely engaged. However, to address them, one
must appeal to certain independent normative principles that inform us of the (in)appropriateness of the (ab)use of
the (descriptive) heuristic rules in question. Gigerenzer is generally uninterested in specifying such independently
justified normative principles. But this is a different issue that must be considered some other time.
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Our concern with respect to cognitive heuristics is not so much about behaviour as it is
about reasoning or thinking (just “reasoning” for short).34 Let us therefore say that to satisfy a
rule in reasoning is to reason in such a way that merely conforms to or fits a description of the
rule, whereas to follow a rule in reasoning implies a causal role for the rule in reasoning by its
being cognitively represented. I suppose that in both these ways a rule can (non-prescriptively)
regulate, govern, or describe a reasoning process.
We saw above that stimulus-response behaviour is best characterized as satisfying a rule;
and since rule-satisfying behaviour does not implicate the involvement of any conceptual information, stimulus-response behaviour is distinguished from heuristic-produced behaviour. In
terms recently stated, merely satisfying a rule is not sufficient for heuristic-produced behaviour.
I believe we can likewise observe that satisfying a rule in reasoning is not sufficient for heuristic reasoning, though not because satisfying a rule in reasoning does not involve conceptual
information (indeed, I am not sure how much sense can be made of nonconceptual reasoning).
Rather, satisfying a rule in reasoning is not sufficient for heuristic reasoning because some
heuristic must have a causal role in heuristic reasoning processes, otherwise we would not be
able to say that the reasoning process was in fact heuristic. To paraphrase Fodor, heuristic
reasoning requires that it have a certain kind of etiology. Nevertheless, I do not think that
heuristics are necessarily rules that are followed in reasoning, for I do not think that heuristics are necessarily represented in cognition. Fodor (1975, 2000, 2008) argues that reasoning
requires representing the rules according to which one reasons.35 But this does not seem to
be a necessary requirement of reasoning, especially with respect to heuristics. As we saw,
inferential heuristics are often epistemically opaque, and they are pretty much automatic and
to a certain extent impervious to improvement. Moreover, Simon emphasizes that inferential
34

Reasoning might be construed as a special case of behaviour—cognitive behaviour, as it were—in which case
there is not much substance to this distinction. But the point to the present discussion will be preserved either
way.
35
More specifically, Fodor believes that acting (intentional acting, that is, as opposed to reflex or thrashing
about) requires planning, which requires deciding on a plan, which requires representing plans; on the other
hand, he believes that belief fixation requires hypothesis formation and confirmation, which requires representing
hypotheses.
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heuristics are computationally cheap procedures, and assuming that representing uses computational resources, inferential heuristics would be less computationally cheap if they were
required to be represented and consulted before they were employed. In any case, I see no
reason why heuristics (generally) must be intentional objects in cognition. It seems entirely
plausible that they can be procedures that are programmed into cognition, but are not consulted
nor represented when employed; or perhaps they are built into the cognitive architecture of the
reasoner as a sort of primitive process. It is certainly not impossible for computational procedures to be executed without being represented; even Fodor (2008, p. 37) admits that there
must be at least some rules that are not represented in computations, e.g., those that instruct a
Turing machine to move along the tape. Thus, my claim is that heuristics are plausible candidates to be unrepresented procedures in cognition, and hence that heuristics are employed,
having a causal role in reasoning, but without being followed.
In light of these considerations, let me make a further distinction between, on the one hand,
satisfying a rule and following a rule, and on the other hand, acting in accordance with a rule.
Acting in accordance with a rule is sometimes meant in the same sense as satisfying a rule, but I
will propose a special way to understand it here. By acting in accordance with a rule, I propose
to mean that a rule is guiding one’s behaviour and that there is a causal link between the rule
and the behaviour—in Fodor’s terms, the rule is implicated in the etiology of the behaviour
that accords with the rule—but the rule is not an intentional object in cognition. In terms
of reasoning, reasoning in accordance with a rule means that the rule has a causal role in the
reasoning process, but is not represented. Notice that in this way a rule still (non-prescriptively)
regulates, governs, or describes a reasoning process.
My suggestion, then, is that heuristics can be rules that one reasons in accordance with in
the sense I just outlined. (Henceforth, whenever I speak of reasoning in accordance with a rule,
I mean it in my special sense.) For heuristics certainly have a causal role in reasoning, but
it does not appear that they must be intentional objects in cognition. I am inclined to believe
that inferential heuristics generally are rules that one reasons in accordance with, whereas
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methodological heuristics are usually (though perhaps not always) followed. Whether this is
true, however, does not bear on the present point, which is that heuristics (generally) do not
have to be represented when employed. Let us therefore observe that:
H3 Heuristics are cognitive procedures that can be expressed as rules that one
reasons in accordance with.
H3 will serve as our initial, basic understanding of heuristics. However, to keep things simple,
I will omit expressly stating that heuristics can be expressed as rules that one reasons in accordance with. Throughout the remainder of the discussion, whenever I state that heuristics are
cognitive procedures in all subsequent definitions, this should be taken as shorthand for all that
is expressed by H3 .
Another quality of heuristics illuminated by the rule-of-thumb-definition is that a rule of
thumb is so called because a thumb can be used as a device for roughly estimating measurements. We might take this to imply that heuristics are imprecise cognitive tools. But this is too
broad of a claim. For there are many imprecise inferential procedures that we would hesitate to
call heuristic. For instance, procedures that are irrelevant to the task at hand, or that invariantly
result in disaster, are (in some sense) imprecise, but such procedures are by no means heuristic
(cf. discussion in section 2.2.1 above). Moreover, Gigerenzer has shown that heuristics can
sometimes outperform complex operations on certain decision-tasks. For example, in choosing which of two cities is larger, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996, 1999) show that (14), the
Recognition heuristic, is more accurate than weighted linear models and multiple regression.
Such results throw into doubt the claim that heuristics are imprecise.
If we are to maintain the analogy between heuristic and rule of thumb, perhaps it is better
that we focus on the fact that rules of thumb provide rough estimations, or in other words,
approximations. Hence, we might say that:
H4 Heuristics are cognitive procedures that provide approximations.
Understanding heuristics as providing approximations helps our characterization in a number
of ways. First, it does justice to the evidence that heuristics can sometimes result in good
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inferences, since approximation techniques can sometimes hit the mark, and also since what
is considered “good” can very well be close to what is ideal. But this is also the sense in
which computational heuristics are generally understood in computer programming and AI
research—heuristics approximate some presumed normative ideal (such as a correct or an optimized outcome), and some heuristics are considered better than others if they result in better
approximations (Horgan & Tienson, 1998). Furthermore, H4 is roughly the sense in which
perceptual heuristics are conceived as providing approximations.
Moreover, although approximations are deficient in the sense that they do not meet some
standard, understanding heuristics as providing approximations offers a positive account of
what heuristics can do rather than just stating what they cannot or do not do (as for instance
the H1 and H2 definitions provide). This speaks to the suggestion that heuristics are useful
devices for inference and deliberation. But if a procedure fails to approximate entirely—if it
produces random results, or results that are completely off the mark—it is utterly useless, and
thus should not be considered heuristic.
Nevertheless, “approximates” is a two-place predicate. If heuristics provide approximations, then they must approximate something. This suggests that there must be some norm to
which heuristics approximate. I have already discussed the norms of guaranteeing correct outcomes and optimization, and rejected the characterization of “heuristic” as contradistinguished
from these norms. There are heated debates over what norms should be or are approximated by
heuristics, which subsequently spur the “rationality wars” (Samuels et al., 2002). But perhaps
it is inaccurate to say that heuristics provide approximations. For as I have argued, although
there are problems for which there are, or in principle can be, norms to which heuristics can
provide approximations, there exists an entire class of problems for which it is difficult to identify what is or should be approximated. As outlined above, the problems that readily admit
norms are the well-defined problems exemplified by probability and logic, while the problems
for which norms are hard to identify are the ill-defined problems typified by most real-life situations, such as choosing whether to buy a Mac or PC. To what would heuristics approximate
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with respect to ill-defined problems?
Rather than further belabour the issue, a natural way around it is to invoke Simon’s notion of satisficing. Simon originally conceived of satisficing to refer to computational search
processes—a program’s search is stopped once a certain, flexible goal is met, i.e., satisfied. The
term has since been co-opted to apply to more general (computational) cognitive procedures
(e.g., Carruthers, 2006c; Samuels, 2005). Understood in contemporary terms, a satisficing procedure is one that sets an aspiration level and attempts to meet this goal. Rather than rigidly
attempting to meet some theoretical ideal, the aspiration level is in some sense “good enough”
relative to the desires, interests, and goals of the agent. It is possible for a satisficing procedure to set its aspiration level commensurate with an ideal, if one exists. However, the point
of satisficing is that the bar is flexibly positioned according to the goals and desires of the
satisficer.
Understanding heuristics as procedures that do not aspire to meet some ideal implies that
heuristics are essentially satisficing procedures. Consider two examples of inferential heuristics. The first is Gigerenzer’s Take the Last,
(16)

Use the cue that discriminated on the most recent problem to choose an object; if
the cue does not discriminate use the cue that discriminated the time before last;
and so on.

This may not appear at first sight to be a satisficing procedure. However, if we take determining
a choice method to be an initial goal in a problem of choice, a certain aspiration level might be
set with respect to this goal, and using the method that was used to solve the previous problem
would satisfice. Or consider Kahneman and Tversky’s Availability heuristic,
(12)

The frequency of a class or the probability of an event is assessed according to the
ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind.

Again, this may not appear to be a satisficing procedure, but upon closer examination we see
that this heuristic opts not to determine the actual frequency or probability of an event via complex calculations, but instead sets an aspiration level relative to the ease with which instances
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come to mind; thus, availability of instances is a “good enough” indicator of frequency.
Methodological heuristics do not appear on the surface to be readily amenable to being
characterized as satisficing procedures. For example, it is difficult to see how (2)-(6) are in fact
satisficing strategies:
(2) Draw a diagram when trying to solve a problem.
(3) If you can’t solve a problem right away, try an indirect proof.
(4) Try to restate the problem in different terms.
(5) Assume you have a solution and work backwards.
(6) Find a related problem that has been solved before, and try to use its result or
method.
However, methodological heuristics are strategies that aim to learn or understand things in the
world, not by reverting to some standard operations such as formal proofs or deductive reasoning, but by using flexible, defeasible procedures. Once this is acknowledged, methodological
heuristics begin to look like strategies arising from a need to satisfice. Pólya makes such a
point:
We shall attain complete certainty when we shall have obtained the complete solution, but before obtaining certainty we must often be satisfied with a more or less
plausible guess. We may need the provisional before we attain the final. We need
heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when
we erect a building. (Pólya, 1957, p. 113)
Hence, methodological heuristics appear to be satisficing procedures that are often indispensable to attaining complete and certain solutions.
Notice that satisficing does not require or imply established norms. Satisficing therefore
makes perfect sense with respect to ill-defined problems, whose states and goals are often not
adequately known or understood, and therefore whose norms are generally unspecified. At
the same time, satisficing procedures can be applied to well-defined problems, and they can
be normatively assessed according to the established norms in those situations. Understanding
heuristics as satisficing procedures also recovers the notions of computational and perceptual
heuristics. For a procedure that approximates is essentially one that satisfices, though a procedure that satisfices does not necessarily approximate. In addition, by appealing to satisficing
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we are able to account for special cases of heuristics. Some influential accounts claim that
heuristics may not produce an outcome at all (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2001; Richardson, 1998; cf.
Simon, 1957). An example of the latter may be a procedure that instructs an agent to give up
on a problem if it is not solved within a certain time-frame. This kind of special case cannot be sensibly said to approximate anything. Yet a satisficing strategy may naturally have
built-in instructions to capitulate if the set aspiration level is not met in conjunction with some
independent parameter.
Thus, understanding heuristics to satisfice rather than to provide approximations gives us
a more robust notion. And, in fact, satisficing appears to be absolutely essential to heuristic
processing. Let us therefore amend our characterization:
H5 Heuristics are cognitive procedures that satisfice.
There are further essential features of heuristics that the rule-of-thumb-definition illustrates.
For what a rule of thumb lacks in precision is made up for by its convenience and reliability.
A thumb is not as accurate for measurement as markings on a rigid stick, but it is readily
accessible, easily deployed, and dependable. The same can be said of heuristics. A heuristic
is dependable because it can be counted on to produce a satisficing solution. This is in part
why heuristics are powerful inference devices, and may in part explain why heuristics are so
ubiquitous in human reasoning and inference (Gigerenzer, 2000). Yet it is not by chance or
happenstance that a heuristic succeeds or fails. Rather, heuristics process specific kinds of
information in predictable ways. This accounts for why they work so well in certain domains,
but fail miserably in others. According to some researchers, such as Gigerenzer, heuristics
are attuned to specific domains that exhibit stable informational structures, and this is what
enables a heuristic to be successful in that domain. However, if the heuristic is applied in
another domain in which the same informational structures do not obtain, then the heuristic
will fail, and biases will ensue (Gigerenzer, 2000, 2006).36
36

Evolutionary stories can be told here about how heuristics get attuned to one domain or another. Gigerenzer
(2000) provides such an evolutionary account. One can also interpolate Sperber’s (1994, 1996) evolutionary
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Heuristics are readily accessible because little cognitive resources are required to engage
them. We rarely, if ever, have to invest much time and processing in thinking over whether we
will employ one inferential heuristic or another (or some other procedure). On the contrary,
the empirical evidence shows that inferential heuristics are typically available for use without the need for reflection. In fact, many psychologists agree that some inferential heuristics
are hardwired mechanisms that are essentially automatic.37 (This corroborates my position
that heuristics are cognitive procedures that can be expressed as rules that one reasons in accordance with, as given by H3 .) In a similar vein, heuristics are also easily deployed. This
means that comparatively little cognitive resources are needed in their processing. This is done
by processing only readily available or easily accessible information (in the environment or
within the mind). Many researchers—Gigerenzer in particular—take this to mean that heuristics only process very little information. But as we shall see in later chapters, many heuristics
are informationally demanding processes, though no less easily deployed. For now, however,
note that the importance of heuristics being readily accessible and easily deployed resides in
allowing other cognitive resources—including time—to be spared, not only with respect to
processing, but also with respect to search (among information as well as procedure alternatives). This enables swift, on-the-fly inferences, and frees up precious cognitive resources for
other tasks—virtues upon which survival generally depends. Thus, we have it that:
H6 Heuristics are cognitive procedures that satisfice, and that require little cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution.
Notice, however, that H6 appears to preclude methodological heuristics. This is the point at
which the present characterization of heuristic processes departs with methodological heuristics. Indeed, we often take our time in deciding which, if any, methodological heuristic to use
in a given case of problem-solving. Moreover, methodological heuristics can require much
cognitive resources to be recruited and executed, and as such their deployment may not be so
account of the etymology of representations—his distinction between actual domains and proper domains in
particular—to apply to the origins and functions of heuristics (see e.g., Samuels et al., 2002).
37
This appears to be why Wason and Evans (1975) contrast heuristic reasoning with analytic reasoning.
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easy. The reason for this, it seems, is that methodological heuristics demand that much more
conceptual information be integrated than what is demanded of inferential heuristics. As I
suggested above, inferential heuristics do not involve deep conceptual processing, at least to
the same extent as methodological heuristics. And it may be the case that the extent to which
a heuristic engages conceptual information has to do with its respective function in cognition,
and subsequently the kinds of information operated over. This is not to say that methodological
heuristics always require excessive amounts of cognitive resources. As one develops certain
cognitive skills, such as problem-solving skills, one would surely hone the ability to call upon
and apply methodological heuristics with relative ease, and perhaps even automatically and
unconsciously.38 Nor is this to say that inferential heuristics will always require little cognitive resources. Some inferential heuristic strategies might consume quite a bit of cognitive
resources and time. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that, in general, methodological heuristics will require more cognitive resources in their deployment and processing than inferential
heuristics, since the former generally involve processing and integrating conceptual content.
But again, these are empirical matters. I am content with focusing on inferential heuristics
that require little cognitive resources for their deployment, leaving these further issues to be
explored on some other occasion.39

38

Perhaps this would be owed to repetition and practice creating and developing new representations, or representing old representations in new and different ways; and inferential heuristics operating over these new representations take over what methodological heuristics had once achieved. But this is just a thought in passing.
39
A natural inclination might be to assume that inferential heuristics are the proper operations of mental modules, whereas methodological heuristics operate within central cognition. But I think this would be wrong. Although it is likely that modules do not (cannot?) employ methodological heuristics (perhaps for reasons having to
do with the modules’ automaticity, shallow inputs-outputs, and speed; Fodor, 1983), it seems perfectly reasonable
that central cognition can and does employ inferential heuristics for given problems. In fact, the cognitive architecture that I develop in coming chapters corroborate this point. Notice, however, that whether and to what extent
modules employ methodological heuristics and central cognition employs inferential heuristics depends on what
we mean by “module”. Those who endorse the massive modularity thesis (i.e., the thesis that the mind is entirely,
or nearly entirely, composed of individuated modules) do not subscribe to Fodor’s characterization of modules.
And if those such as Sperber (1994, 2005) and Carruthers (2006b, 2006a) are right about the architecture of the
mind, then modules in some sense can and do employ methodological heuristics, even if it takes collections of
modules to pull it off. I will be making some remarks about modularity in the next chapter. However, a full
assessment of modularity of mind and massive modularity is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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2.4.2.2 Beyond rules of thumb: exploiting information
Before being satisfied with our working definition of heuristics developed thus far, let us revisit
and emphasize a key issue that has been pervasive in much of the discussion. Despite the illumination that the rule-of-thumb definition offers, heuristics are more than just rules of thumb.
The nature of heuristics qua cognitive processes involves the utilization of conceptual information. Granted I have suggested that inferential heuristics do not process conceptual content;
nonetheless, what they do process has everything to do with concepts. Inferential heuristics
may not process conceptual content, but they do utilize conceptual information. I already mentioned that I will argue in chapter 4 that inferential heuristics operate over relations between
concepts. Utilizing conceptual information is precisely what makes cognitive heuristics cognitive. This is provided by condition C, as presented above. A rule of thumb per se, on the other
hand, is merely a static, rough unit of measure, and no conceptual information is implicated in
its employment. In this vein, rules of thumb do not involve the type of information processing
that heuristics do.
To put the point another way, when one employs a heuristic, as I am characterizing it here,
it tells us something about one’s concepts—particularly about the content of one’s concepts
and the structure within which one’s concepts reside. When one employs (15) Take the Best,
for instance, certain beliefs are implied about the cue upon which the choice in question was
made. At the very least, we can infer that the said cue was believed to be the “best” upon
which to make the choice in question; but that the cue is believed to be the “best” implies
certain things about the conceptual content of the cue (as possessed by the chooser), as well as
certain things about how the cue fits within the chooser’s conceptual structure. Similarly, when
one employs (11) the Representativeness heuristic, certain beliefs are implied about what one
believes about and how one conceptualizes the objects or events under evaluation, and how
the concepts involved in the evaluation fit within one’s conceptual structure. We will see more
detail on this matter as we continue through this dissertation. The point, however, is that one’s
conceptual wherewithal has a significant role in employing heuristics.
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When one employs a rule of thumb, on the other hand, one’s conceptual wherewithal may
not play much of a role at all, and therefore the use of a rule of thumb may tell us nothing
about one’s concepts (their content or conceptual structure). “When constructing a truth tree,
decompose those formulas that use stacking rules before those that branch”; (1) “To choose a
ripe cantaloupe, press the spot on the candidate cantaloupe where it was attached to the plant
and smell it; if the spot smells like the inside of a cantaloupe, it’s probably ripe”; “Start in the
centre square when beginning a game of tic-tac-toe”; “Measure twice, cut once”. These are all
rules that can be applied willy-nilly with very little requisite conceptual content or conceptual
connections between the information processed. For example, we can imagine someone with
little experience with sentential logic being presented with the truth tree rule, say in a lecture,
and told to follow it (more on following presently). However, that this person is able to follow
the rule tells us nothing interesting about her beliefs or concepts—she is just doing what she
is instructed to do. It is in this sense that the person would be employing the rule as a rule
of thumb rather than a heuristic. It is important to understand that what distinguishes rules of
thumb from heuristics, as I am claiming here, is the manner in which the rule engages one’s
conceptual wherewithal, and not the rule itself. In other words, the distinction has to do not
with the procedure but with the information structure over which the procedure operates.

A distinction between rules of thumb and heuristics can also be found with respect to the
basic understanding of heuristics provided by H3 , namely that heuristics can be expressed as
rules that one reasons in accordance with. Let us recall here the distinction I made earlier
between following a rule in reason and reasoning in accordance with a rule. Following a
rule in reason implies a causal link between the rule and some behaviour, and that the rule
is an intentional object in cognition; reasoning in accordance with a rule likewise implies a
causal link between the rule and some behaviour, but the rule does not likewise have to be an
intentional object in cognition. Upon reflection, we can now see that, whereas heuristics do not
have to be represented, rules of thumb usually are; that is, whereas heuristics are rules that one
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reasons in accordance with, rules of thumb are typically rules that are followed.40
I therefore resist simply equating heuristics with rules of thumb. The basis for this is ultimately that heuristics require richer representational content and conceptual information over
which to operate; that is, heuristics exploit informational structures, and they are successful
because they do so. This is similar to the idea present in Gigerenzer’s conception of heuristics,
as presented above, although as we shall see in the next chapter, my understanding is richer and
goes beyond Gigerenzer’s.41 In any event, let us now draw the characterization of heuristics
that the discussion has led us to:
H7 Heuristics are cognitive procedures that satisfice, and that require little cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution; they operate by exploiting
informational structures.
Following my comments above with respect to H6 , the present characterization of “heuristic” should be understood to refer only to inferential heuristics. It captures what seems to be
important features of heuristics as they are discussed in the philosophical and cognitive science
literatures, while at the same time being precise enough to pick out a specific kind of cognitive
process. The characterization may therefore be used to help us understand a broad but distinct
range of phenomena, and thereby make sense of certain psychological theories of reasoning,
inference, and decision-making. We might thus stand to gain a clearer picture of how the mind
works. Heuristics are supposed to be ubiquitous in human cognition, and so understanding the
nature of heuristic processes significantly contributes to understanding the nature of the mind
in general.
The present characterization also enables us to see the respects in which the disparate conceptions of heuristics given by different researchers and authors overlap, as well as come apart.
40

On this account, it is possible that a rule starts out as a represented rule of thumb, and with enough experience
the rule turns into a heuristic as one’s conceptual wherewithal plays more of a role when using the rule. This I
believe to be plausible especially with respect to methodological heuristics. Cf. footnote 38 above.
41
Although more detail on the differences between my view and Gigerenzer’s will come out in the next chapter,
let us here simply note that Gigerenzer does not make the distinctions I do between kinds of heuristics, as evinced
by his confounding what I had called stimulus-response and heuristic-produced behaviour (see above). Further
and importantly, Gigerenzer does not develop an understanding of heuristics as exploiting conceptual structures
as I am presently doing.
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For example, as was indicated above, Gigerenzer’s use of the term “heuristic” to refer to (what
I am calling) stimulus-response “rules of thumb” of animals is precluded by the present characterization. Moreover, Gigerenzer often cites an algorithmic decision-tree as constituting a
heuristic (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2001, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). But according to
the proposed characterization, algorithmic decision-trees are not really heuristic since their deployment does not exploit informational structures embodied by representations or concepts in
an interesting way. Rather, such decision-trees are simply rote algorithms (albeit perhaps simplified compared to full decision trees). Other supposed heuristics will also fall by the wayside
accordingly. In addition, the proposed characterization helps us to understand more clearly
whether and to what extent the examples of heuristics given above from Simon, Kahneman
and Tversky, Gigerenzer, Pearl, and others refer to the same concept. Some heuristics, such
as those proposed by Pólya, will be seen to be essentially methodological devices to provide
insight, and are of a different species than the inferential heuristics Kahneman and Tversky
researched.

2.5

Concluding remarks

Let us briefly review what has been done so far. We started with a vague understanding of
what “heuristic” means and what heuristics are. With the motivation of clarifying the notion
of “heuristic” in order to advance research and investigations in philosophy and cognitive science, I proceeded to consider two perfunctory accounts: (H1 ) that heuristics are procedures
that do not guarantee correct outcomes, and (H2 ) that heuristics are operations that do not maximize/optimize. I argued that these perfunctory accounts are unsatisfactory, since they either
fail to sensibly apply to a range of important cases of practical cognition, or they trivialize interesting features of cognition. In this way, these negative definitions are not useful for the kinds
of phenomena that we are interested in. I then considered four influential, positive accounts
of heuristics, and by drawing a number of distinctions between different kinds of heuristics, I
narrowed in on a cluster of notions to do the work needed of them; the rule-of-thumb analogy
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proved most helpful for this purpose. The end result was a working characterization of inferential heuristics: (H7 ) Heuristics are cognitive procedures that satisfice, and that require little
cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution; they operate by exploiting informational structures. I believe this account is useful and interesting for investigating how the mind
works, and moreover that it clarifies some of the uses of the term “heuristic” in the relevant
literatures.
This chapter also serves to motivate further philosophical investigation into the nature of
cognitive heuristics, and what it is about the mind that enables heuristics to be “fast and frugal”. One matter in particular demands further attention, namely the nature of the informational
structures that heuristics exploit. As indicated above, Gigerenzer (2000, 2004, 2006) shares a
similar view; he contends that heuristics exploit informational structures in the environment.
However, Gigerenzer neglects to sufficiently describe such informational structures. I have not
sufficiently described the structures that I believe heuristics exploit either. We might observe,
nonetheless, that on the present account the informational structures do not reside in the environment, but are cognitive structures. An investigation into the cognitive structures exploited
by heuristics can yield insight not only into how heuristics work and why they can be fast and
frugal, but also into more fundamental issues concerning the architecture of cognition.
In the next chapter I will explore more fully the idea that heuristics exploit informational
structures. More specifically, I will offer an account of the kinds of cognitive structures that
heuristics exploit, and argue that they are in fact rich structures that are highly organized in
specific ways. I will develop this idea within the purview of a special class of problems related
to heuristics, namely problems of relevance.
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Now that we have a working definition of heuristics,1 we are in a position to illustrate the
work it does for us. The present chapter will do this by first considering the sorts of problems that many philosophers believe heuristics solve, namely what can be broadly described as
“problems of relevance” (Samuels, 2005, forthcoming). As we shall see, however, Fodor (e.g.,
2000) argues that heuristics do not in fact solve problems of relevance. In order to appreciate
this controversy and what is at stake, we must get a firm grasp of the role heuristics are purported to play (or fail to play) in cognition. And in order to do this, we need to gain a better
understanding of how heuristics work and the structures they operate over.
I will begin this chapter, in section 1, by discussing the problems of relevance I am referring
to. As I explain below, problems of relevance are more commonly collectively referred to as
the frame problem. The frame problem is a special problem for cognitive systems of circumscribing (read: framing) the information to be considered in their processing. But the frame
problem actually constitutes a set of closely related problems for computational cognition. I
will expound various aspects of the frame problem, labeling them as I go, and show how they
generalize in terms of relevance. Philosophically significant implications follow from computational and epistemological dimensions of the frame problem. The computational aspect will
be what guides the present chapter; the epistemological aspect will be a topic to be discussed
in the final chapter.
Expounding the problems of relevance will set the stage for me to advance a general architecture of cognition. The cognitive architecture that I put forth in section 2 will be of so-called
central systems, paradigmatically responsible for general reasoning. A widely agreed upon
feature of central systems is that they allow for the free exchange of information (this is actually partly how relevance problems arise in the first place). This is usually taken to imply
that central systems are not dedicated to computing specific information belonging to specific
domains—that is, they are not believed to be domain-specific, but domain-general. However,
some theorists—mainly evolutionary psychologists—argue that central cognition is best con1

fied.

Henceforth, I will simply use “heuristics” to refer to inferential cognitive heuristics, unless otherwise speci-
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ceived as a collection of a great many domain-specific mechanisms, or “modules”, since (so the
argument goes) a domain-general device cannot solve the specialized problems that humans
are naturally very good at solving (e.g., predicting the intentions of others). Nevertheless,
borrowing from Richard Samuels (1998, 2000), I will argue that central cognition is indeed
domain-general, but that central systems are able to draw on specialized bodies of knowledge.
In section 3, I will explain more fully what I take these specialized bodies of knowledge to
be. Samuels (2000) recognizes that it is possible for humans to possess innate, domain-specific,
non-computational modules over which a domain-general, computational, central system operates.2 My view comes close to Samuels’. However, I will argue that such non-computational
modules are better conceived as what I call “k-systems”. K-systems, as I will explain, are
highly organized, informationally rich bodies of knowledge; the information within a k-system
exhibits specific relations, and the k-systems themselves bear specific relations to one another.
This view is not intended to be understood as wholly original, but we shall see that my proposal
is novel with respect to how I envision heuristics to interact with such systems of knowledge.
Section 4 will be devoted to expounding the properties of k-systems in more detail. It will
begin to be evident how heuristics work by exploiting k-systems. I will also show how my
theory is similar to the views advanced by Gigerenzer (2000) and Kim Sterelny (2004, 2006),
but I will also identify important respects in which my view is different from each of these.
The idea of heuristics exploiting k-systems will pave the way for the next chapter in which
I provide a more specific account of what k-systems are in order to advance a more specific
account of how heuristics work. If it turns out that the assumptions about cognitive architecture which underlie my account of heuristics help in solving, or otherwise circumventing, the
frame problem (or problems of relevance), that is reason to suppose that those assumptions are
plausible.

2

In anticipation, non-computational modules are not the types of modules that Fodor (1983) envisioned, although he more recently acknowledged that one can conceive of non-computational modules (Fodor, 2000).

Chapter 3. Beginning to Understand How Heuristics Work

3.1

77

Heuristics and relevance problems

A longstanding philosophical issue related to the purported use of heuristics in human cognition has to do with determining the relevant information to consider for a given task. Determining what information is relevant to a task is not as simple as it may appear. One problem
is that no one has yet given a satisfactory account of what relevance is. This is a problem that
plagues any account of relevance-determination, and fully addressing it is beyond the scope of
this dissertation. I will therefore rely on an undefended intuitive account of relevance, as most
authors do, but I will have some more to say on the topic in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. Nevertheless, even if we possessed a refined account of relevance, determinations of
relevance are generally not computationally easy. This is because many of the problems faced
by humans can (in principle) require that generous amounts of information be surveyed. This
is where heuristics come into play—heuristics appear to be prime candidates for alleviating the
computational burden of relevance determinations. Questions that demand answers, then, are:
Do heuristics actually solve the problem of determining relevance? And if so, how do they do
it?
The problem of determining what information is relevant to a given cognitive task has its
roots in the frame problem. However, specifying what the frame problem is is a difficult task
(cf. Dennett, 1984). As it is generally understood nowadays, the frame problem actually constitutes a set of closely related problems for computational cognition. Over the years, different
authors have emphasized different aspects of the frame problem. Fodor’s (1983, 1987, 2000)
interpretation is perhaps the most popular in philosophical circles; and it has generated quite
a bit of controversy, as he declares that the frame problem is a central and insurmountable
problem for computational cognitive science. Yet Fodor’s account of the frame problem is not
always entirely clear, since he tends to gloss over some of the subtle dimensions of the problem.
To get a better idea of what the frame problem is, how it gives rise to more general problems
of relevance, how deep these problems run, and the potential role for heuristics, I will expound
various aspects of the frame problem and explain their philosophical significance to begin the
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chapter. A further aspect of the frame problem will be revealed toward the end of this chapter.

3.1.1

The many guises of the frame problem

The frame problem was first introduced by John McCarthy and Pat Hayes (1969) as a problem
faced by early logic-based AI. This was a problem of how to represent, in a logically succinct way, the ways in which properties of objects do not change when acted upon (Shanahan,
2009). For any given action, there will be many properties of many objects that remain constant throughout and after the execution of the action. When moving a ball from one location
to another, for instance, the ball’s colour does not change, nor does its shape or its size; other
objects in the room do not change; the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 does not change; and so on. If a
cognitive system is to maintain a veridical belief-set3 about the ball (and the world in general),
determinations of which properties change with which actions will have to be coded into its
program. In logic-based AI, this is done by coding what are called “frame axioms”, which
are sentence-like representations that specify a frame of reference for the action in question
(Dennett, 1984; Viger, 2006a). But the number of frame axioms can become quite cumbersome very quickly since there will in general be (number of properties) × (number of actions)
frame axioms that would have to be written into the program (Shanahan, 2009). Obviously, the
more properties or actions to account for, the more cumbersome this will be. Thus, the problem
for logic-based AI is how to most compactly represent the non-effects of actions. As such, it is
often referred to as a problem of representation. Let us call this the AI frame problem:
AI frame problem The problem of how to appropriately and succinctly represent
in a system’s program the fact that most properties are unaffected by given
actions.
The main obstacle to overcoming the AI frame problem is the monotonicity of classical
logic. As a monotonic logic, classical logic does not allow for different conclusions to be
drawn with the addition of new premises. AI researchers have since developed a number of
3

It is obviously too demanding of any system to maintain a completely veridical belief-set. What is required,
instead, is a belief-set that is suitably veridical, or reasonably accurate (cf. Samuels, forthcoming).
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nonmonotonic logics to remedy the situation. According to Shanahan (2009), the introduction of nonmonotonic logics adequately solves the AI frame problem, notwithstanding certain
technical problems.4 Whether Shanahan is correct is perhaps debatable (see e.g., Fodor, 1987,
2000), but I will not adjudicate his claim here. For the original AI frame problem and its purported solutions are not of concern to this dissertation or to philosophy more generally. Rather,
what is of philosophical interest are the philosophical and computational concerns born out of
the AI frame problem, to which I now turn.
Philosophers have interpreted the AI frame problem as a general problem of how a cognitive system updates its beliefs if it is to maintain (suitably) veridical beliefs about the world. As
Fodor observes, “Despite its provenance in speculative robotology, the frame problem doesn’t
really have anything in particular to do with action. After all, one’s standing cognitive commitments must rationally accommodate each new state of affairs, whether or not it is a state
of affairs that is consequent upon one’s own behavior” (1987, p. 27). This interpretation of
the frame problem has an obvious connection to the AI frame problem. Upon the arrival of
new information, a cognitive system will have to update its beliefs. In moving a ball from one
location to another, for instance, a cognitive system will have to update its belief regarding the
position of the ball, as well as the ball’s new spatial relations with respect to other objects in
the room. But there are arbitrarily many other beliefs that it will not have to update, such as the
colour of the ball, the sizes of the other objects in the room, the relative spatial relations of the
unmoved objects, the ambient temperature in the room, that 2 + 2 = 4, and so on. The problem,
then, is determining which of any of the system’s beliefs is to be affected in belief-update. Such
a determination cannot be made a priori. For instance, are the beliefs about the relative spatial
relations of the other objects in the room affected? That depends: was something knocked over
in the process of moving the ball? Unlike the original representational problem of logic-based
4

One technical problem that is often cited is the “Yale Shooting Problem”. In this scenario, a gun is loaded at
time t, and shooting the gun at Fred at t + 1 is expected to kill Fred. However, the formalization of nonmonotonic
logics cannot uniquely determine whether Fred is dead. This is because the logic proves that Fred indeed dies, but
the logic also proves that the gun becomes (mysteriously) unloaded and Fred lives. Yet the formalism has no way
to determine which proof to keep.
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AI, this problem is computational in nature (McDermott, 1987)—it concerns the processes a
cognitive system employs as it updates its beliefs. Let us call this problem the update problem
(cf. Samuels, forthcoming):
Update problem The problem of determining which of any of the system’s beliefs is to be affected in belief-update.
This interpretation of the frame problem can be generalized as a problem of relevance—
that is, a problem of determining what is relevant to the task at hand. This is a deep problem
especially for human reasoning since central systems—the cognitive systems that are paradigmatically responsible for general reasoning and decision-making—admittedly allow for free
exchange of information, any of which can bear on their operations. Thus, central systems are
what is often referred to as holistic (or, in Fodor’s (1983) terminology, isotropic). This is to
say that, given an appropriate set of background beliefs, any representation in principle can be
relevant to any other. Who won tonight’s football game is prima facie irrelevant to whether
there is beer in your friend’s fridge. But if you believe that your friend’s favourite football
team played tonight, and that your friend usually overindulges in beer consumption whenever
his favourite team wins, then your belief about who won tonight’s game actually is relevant to
your belief about beer in your friend’s fridge. Indeed, an itch on your left hand can be relevant
to your belief about whether you will get a job promotion, if you carry an appropriate set of
(superstitious) background beliefs. Again, there is seemingly no way a priori to circumscribe
the subset of representations that are relevant in a given occasion of reasoning or inference. I
will refer to this construal of the frame problem as the generalized relevance problem:
Generalized relevance problem The problem of determining, from all the information that can in principle bear, what is relevant to the cognitive task at
hand.
It is perplexing for cognitive science that humans have an astonishing ability for knowing
(with reasonable levels of success) what is relevant in much of their reasoning and fixating
thereon without having to spend much time deciding what is and is not relevant, or wasting
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time cogitating on irrelevant details. In terms of the generalized-relevance guise of the frame
problem, we generally know quite easily what pieces of information bear on—or lie within the
frame of—our reasoning tasks. The problem is understanding how we do it.
It is important to be clear, in light of these observations about human performance, what the
generalized relevance problem is and what it is not. The problem is not how a cognitive system
can possibly determine, from all the information that can in principle bear, everything that
is relevant to the task at hand. Humans typically do not consider everything that is relevant,
and it is normally too cognitively demanding (of human or machine) to do so. Not only is
this demonstrably the case (witness the frequency of our errors, or of surprise), but it is often
impossible to consider everything that is relevant to the task at hand. Suppose for instance that
the number of hairs on Caesar’s head on March 15, 44bce is relevant to the extent to which the
current state of the economy will improve over the next five years. Although the former piece
of information can in principle be relevant to the latter, it is impossible to know the number
of hairs on Caesar’s head on March 15, 44bce; and so it would be impossible to consider
everything that is relevant to estimating the extent to which the current state of the economy
will improve over the next five years.
The generalized relevance problem is, rather, a problem of how a cognitive system can
make determinations of what is relevant to a given task with reasonable levels of success.
The problem is for real-world cognitive systems—cognitive systems that are less-than-perfect,
and that suffer from real constraints in terms of time and cognitive resources. Therefore, the
generalized relevance problem suggests a methodological problem for a cognitive system of
making reasonably accurate determinations of relevance efficiently and in a timely fashion;
and not determining everything that is relevant to the task at hand, but enough to get the job
done. This means, among other things, that there is minimal waste of time and cognitive
resources considering what is irrelevant. The latter observation might appear to be a mundane
point, but as we shall see presently it reveals an additional deep epistemological problem.
The methodological problem has to do with the computational burden put on a system in
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determining the set of representations to be considered for a given cognitive task. Since relevance cannot be determined a priori, and since any representation held by a cognitive system
can in principle be relevant to any other (provided an appropriate set of representations or
background beliefs), determining which representations to actually consider can be computationally intractable. If a system has a sufficiently small set of beliefs to begin with, relevance
determinations can be performed without running into major computational problems: the system may simply consider all representations. But once we consider a cognitive system with
sufficiently many and/or complex beliefs—as is the case with humans, who have a wealth of
beliefs and stores of other complex representations—assessing every representation quickly
becomes infeasible. For such a strategy would entail a vast amount of computations, occupying scarce cognitive resources and taking an unreasonable amount of time. Indeed, assessments
of relevance of individual representations are computationally taxing enough, but assessments
of relevance between representations exponentially adds to the complexity (Samuels, 2005).
What is needed are computationally tractable methods to pick out, in a timely fashion, which
representations are to be brought to bear on a given cognitive task (cf. Shanahan, 2009). Let
us call this the computational relevance problem.
The computational relevance problem The problem of how a cognitive system
tractably delimits (i.e., frames) what gets considered in a given cognitive task.
It is important to notice that the computational relevance problem would not be solved or
circumvented if a cognitive system were merely to employ a method to differentiate between a
relevant representation and an irrelevant one, and then subsequently ignore the representations
that fall into the latter category. This is a divide-and-conquer strategy in which the dividing
part is too computationally taxing. For not only can such a strategy possibly entail considering
each representation held by the system, but seeing whether a given representation is relevant
means considering the representation and drawing implications. Even if this strategy does not
entail considering each of our held representations, we do not have the time to consider many
representations and their implications with respect to the task at hand. In other words, the
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system would be performing quite a lot of computations to see whether a given representation
is relevant and therefore should be brought to bear. Of course, most beliefs and other representations a system holds will be irrelevant to the cognitive task at hand, and this would then
translate to wasting quite a lot of resources on considering what is irrelevant, and performing
computations by drawing conclusions that do not need to be drawn. This is what Fodor (1987)
aptly referred to as “Hamlet’s problem: How to tell when to stop thinking” (p. 26).
The computational relevance problem is therefore a problem of how a cognitive system
can ignore most of what it knows (Dennett, 1984). More precisely, the problem qua relevance
problem is how a system ignores what is irrelevant. This brings us to the other dimension of
the generalized relevance problem hinted at above. The problem here has to do with how a
cognitive system considers only what is (mostly) relevant. This is what I take to be the “new,
deep epistemological problem” that Dennett (1984, p. 130) spoke of. Again, since relevance
cannot be determined a priori, and since any representation held by an agent can in principle be
relevant to its task (provided an appropriate set of background beliefs), how does a cognitive
system know what is relevant? I will refer to this problem as the epistemological relevance
problem.

The epistemological relevance problem The problem of how a cognitive system
considers only what is (mostly) relevant, or equivalently, how a cognitive
system knows what is relevant.

It is important to note that this epistemological problem5 does not have to do so much with the
computational costs of delimiting what gets considered in a given cognitive task (although this
remains an important aspect) as it has to do with considering the right things.6
5

What I am calling here the epistemological relevance problem does not coincide with what Shanahan (2009)
calls the epistemological frame problem. According to Shanahan, “The epistemological problem is this: How is
it possible for holistic, open-ended, context-sensitive relevance to be captured by a set of propositional, languagelike representations of the sort used in classical AI?”. It appears that what Shanahan has in mind for the epistemological problem is something closer to the AI frame problem, but for humans in determining relevance.
6
We might understand the distinction between the computational and epistemological relevance problems, as
I presented them here, as in some respects corresponding to the distinction I made in chapter 2 between computational and cognitive heuristics (see section 2.4.1).
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The heuristic solution

Many philosophers and cognitive scientists have posed the question: How do we solve the
frame problem? However, this question is rarely, if ever, posed within the context of demarcating the various aspects of the frame problem outlined here. The question, “How do we solve
the frame problem?”, might not even be meaningful without specifying which guise of the
frame problem is being referred to. It does appear as if humans somehow manage to solve all
aspects of the frame problem, and as we shall see some philosophers believe that heuristics are
the operative solution in human cognition. But we might want to ask whether heuristics really
offer a tenable solution to the frame problem, and indeed which, if any, guises of the frame
problem humans actually solve despite appearances.
By way of addressing these concerns, I will now introduce the heuristic solution to the
frame problem as a response to worries emphatically advanced by Fodor concerning a plausible
theory of central cognition. My intention will then be to show that the heuristic solution, as
advanced as a response to Fodor, applies only to the computational relevance problem, ignoring
the epistemological problem. In chapter 6, I take up the question of whether heuristics do in
fact circumvent the epistemological problem. For ease of exposition, I will use “relevance
problems” to refer to all guises of the frame problem here expounded, save for what I have
called the AI frame problem; as mentioned, the AI frame problem will not be of concern to this
dissertation.
Fodor (1983, 1987, 2000) argues that only a suitably informationally encapsulated system
can avoid relevance problems. Roughly stated, informational encapsulation refers to a property
of a cognitive system that can draw on only a highly restricted database of information in the
course of its processing. There is some debate on how to interpret informational encapsulation
and what is entailed by it.7 However, for our purposes let us understand it thus: A cognitive
system is encapsulated to the extent that, of all the information held by other systems that is
relevant to its processing, only a strictly delimited portion is available to it. The peripheral
7

For further discussion see Carruthers (2006a, 2006c); Samuels (2005, 2006); Sperber and Wilson (1996).
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.1: The Müller-Lyer Illusion. (a) appears shorter than (b), although the lines are the
same length; and (a) continues to appear shorter than (b) despite knowing that the lines are of
equal length. The visual system is therefore said to be encapsulated with respect to the belief
that the lines are of equal length.

(as opposed to central) cognitive systems dedicated to linguistic and perceptual processing are
paradigm cases of encapsulated systems. A common example is the Müller-Lyer illusion (see
Figure 3.1): the belief that the two lines are actually equivalent is relevant to determining their
relative lengths, but the visual system is encapsulated with respect to this information; it has
access to only a highly restricted or proprietary database (of visual information) in the course
of its processing.
Relevance problems do not arise for sufficiently informationally encapsulated systems,
since there would be a sufficiently small amount of information over which to compute. To
be more precise, encapsulated systems avoid relevance problems in two subtly distinct ways:
Not only does the small amount of information contained in the system’s database constitute
all the information that the system can consider, thus considerably reducing the number of
computations needed for information search, but that small amount of information ipso facto
constitutes the one and only set of background information against which relevance is determined. The more encapsulated a system is, the more tractable its computations will be, and the

Chapter 3. Beginning to Understand How Heuristics Work

86

less that relevance problems will be problems.8
Nevertheless, Fodor stresses that central cognition cannot be encapsulated given its holistic
character and the wealth of complex beliefs and other representations it has access to. Central
processing thus appears squarely faced with relevance problems. In addition, Fodor asserts
that central cognition is, what he calls, “global”. There has been some misconceptions in the
literature about what Fodor is referring to, but the basic idea is this: Computations are, by definition, operations over local, context-insensitive properties, i.e., the syntax of the items being
computed. In other words, it is only local properties that are causal determinants in computations. Fodor points out, however, that there are properties that central cognition assesses,
such as relevance, simplicity, and conservativism. Unlike the local properties of syntax, these
are extra-syntactic, global properties of representations in relation to (what can be very large)
contexts, requiring in the limit that entire belief systems be assessed.9 The result is intractable
cognition. According to Fodor, there can be no computational account of how central cognition is sensitive to global properties, since only syntax is supposed to be a causal determinant
in computations. He therefore concludes that CTM is not a viable theory for cental cognition. And since he claims that CTM is the only plausible theory of mind, Fodor is therefore
pessimistic about the prospects of a cognitive science for central cognition. Hence:
‘Fodor’s First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science’ . . . : the more global
(e.g., the more isotropic [holisitc]) a cognitive process is, the less anybody understands it. Very global processes, like analogical reasoning, aren’t understood at all.
(Fodor, 1983, p. 107)
As Fodor (2000) later makes clear, we can add assessments of relevance to the “very global
8

Of course, this does not mean that the system’s database will necessarily contain everything that is relevant
to its tasks. And so it is possible that an encapsulated system can still have a problem with respect to considering
what is relevant. But this poses a relevance problem of a different sort, which I will not be discussing here. In
addition, even if an encapsulated system had access to all relevant information (but not only what is relevant), the
system might still face the epistemological relevance problem if its database was not organized in such a way that
would facilitate determinations of relevance, or that would enable the the system to consider only what is relevant.
See the discussion toward the end of this chapter on what I call the representational frame problem. Nevertheless,
at the very least, a suitably encapsulated system will avoid the computational problem of tractably delimiting what
gets considered in its tasks.
9
Fodor (2000) argues that this implies that entire theories are the units of cognition. See Samuels (forthcoming)
for arguments against this view.
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processes” he has in mind.
In response, however, certain philosophers argue that Fodor overstates what tractable computation requires. Samuels (2005, forthcoming) and Carruthers (2006a, 2006c), for instance,
both claim that, although encapsulation will ensure computational tractability, tractability does
not necessarily require encapsulation.10 Rather, they argue that all that tractable computation
requires is that computations be suitably frugal, in the sense of simply putting limits on the
amount of information used or processed. A frugal process may therefore have every bit of
information at its disposal, and hence be unencapsulated, but considers only a tractable amount
according to certain parameters (e.g., the number of computations needed to gather the information).
Frugal computational processes can, of course, be realized by “techniques that often, though
not invariably, identify a substantial subset of those representations that are relevant to the task
at hand” (Samuels, forthcoming), namely heuristics. The idea, then, is that by employing
heuristics a system can avoid computationally taxing assessments of relevance, and they do
this by instantiating suitable search and stopping rules that effectively limit the amount of information surveyed in its computations, but that still bring to bear an appropriate subset of
information on the system’s tasks. This escapes the need to invoke encapsulation in explaining
computational tractability. For a system can very well be unencapsulated, where any information can be brought to bear on a system’s computations, but the use of heuristics will ensure
that only a small (and hopefully relevant) amount of this information will in fact be brought
to bear in its processing.11 Hence, for these theorists heuristics ensure that central cognition is
computational and unencapsulated, but yet operates in a tractable way.12
10

See also Sperber and Wilson (1996).
Carruthers actually believes that we may still speak of systems as informationally encapsulated if we construe
encapsulation as a property that simply restricts informational access in processing. In this way, Carruthers
believes that encapsulation can mean just that most information simply will not be considered in a system’s
computations—a notion he calls “wide encapsulation”. However, Samuels (2006) criticizes Carruthers’ view,
claiming that “not only is it [wide encapsulation] different from what most theorists mean by ‘encapsulation,’
but it’s simply what you get by denying exhaustive search; and since virtually no one thinks exhaustive search
is characteristic of human cognition, the present kind of ‘encapsulation’ is neither distinctive nor interesting” (p.
45).
12
We might think of it like this: To determine everything that is relevant to the task at hand, the powerset of the
11
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Recently, Fodor (2008) exclaims that resorting to heuristic procedures to circumvent relevance problems “is among the most characteristic ways that cognitive scientists have of not
recognizing how serious the issues are that the isotropy [holism] of relevance raises for a theory
of the cognitive mind” (p. 116). By referring to what has come to be known as the “sleeping
dog” strategy (McDermott, 1987),13 he goes on to argue that the appeal to heuristics begs the
question it is supposed to answer. Specifically, Fodor claims that the sleeping dog strategy takes
for granted some principle that individuates situations; but the task of individuating situations
presupposes that determinations of relevance have already been made (i.e., regarding what is
relevant to circumscribing a situation). However, Fodor not only ignores possible heuristics
that may not beg the relevance problem, but he fails to consider non-question-begging possibilities to individuate situations. It is possible, for example, that a heuristic can identify a
situation as a certain type given a small set of cues, and this identification procedure can be
completely based on local considerations. There is of course an accompanying risk of the
heuristic being wrong in identifying a given situation, but (as was made evident in the previous
chapter) heuristics provide no guarantees.
In an earlier work, Fodor (2000) gives a different, though equally bad, argument against
heuristic solutions to relevance problems. In short, his argument is this: In deciding which
heuristic to use for a given cognitive task, there is a meta-problem of deciding how to decide
which heuristic to use. According to Fodor, not only is this the beginning of an infinite regress,
but the meta-problem of deciding how to decide is faced with the relevance problems associated with holism and global inference just as the first problem is. However, here again Fodor
fails to consider the possibility of heuristics being cued by a small set of abstract features of the
problem (cf. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). This is not a failsafe plan and it will sometimes
available information would have to be computed for relevance. (If S is the set under consideration, the powerset
is the set of all subsets of S including S itself (and the empty set, though this does not matter much for present
purposes).) For an unencapsulated system with lots of information, this is an intractable task. Frugal processes,
on the other hand, would consider only a small number of different subsets of the available information, hence
remaining tractable.
13
Roughly, the sleeping dog strategy is a rule to the effect of: Do not alter (update) a representation unless
there is explicit indication of change, according to the dictum “let sleeping dogs lie”.
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misfire, but it would work nonetheless without invoking any regress. Or indeed, if we use my
characterization of heuristics as cognitive procedures that can be expressed as rules that one
reasons in accordance with (as given by H3 in the previous chapter), heuristics need not be represented in cognition, but rather can be primitive processes, perhaps built into the architecture
of cognition. And if this is the case, then there may not be any deciding which heuristic to use,
and ipso facto no deciding how to decide which heuristic to use.
Thus, despite Fodor’s worries, heuristics may very well play a crucial role in achieving frugality in cognition, as is certainly the case for our AI counterparts. At the very least, heuristics
appear to circumvent the problem of delimiting the amount of information a system considers
in its processing—heuristics can simply pick out an appropriately limited set of representations
from the total set possessed by an agent according to certain parameters,14 and the system can
make use of them accordingly. There will be no guarantees that all and only relevant representations will be picked out (Samuels, 2005, forthcoming), but again, such follows from the nature
of heuristics. Presumably, heuristics will somehow be attuned, via the specified parameters, to
picking out mostly relevant representations, but there will be times when what is considered
will happen to be irrelevant. Humans are fallible, so we should not expect perfection in their
cognition. At any rate, it appears as if heuristics do indeed avoid relevance problems.
However, appearances can deceive, and we must therefore look at the details of these
claims. To see if heuristics do in fact circumvent relevance problems, let us take a closer
look at what is being proposed in response to Fodor’s worries about a computational theory of
central cognition.
In specifying the heuristics that make cognition tractable, Carruthers (2006a, 2006c) draws
on the work of Gigerenzer and his collaborators (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Carruthers
appears to take Gigerenzer’s analysis of fast and frugal heuristics as suggestive of the general
processes that we might expect to find in human cognition to enable suitably frugal computations.15 However, the domains of inference for which most of Gigerenzer’s heuristics perform
14
15

We will see some of these parameters below when I discuss in more detail how heuristics work.
To be sure, Gigerenzer likewise believes that the majority of human inference and decision-making involves
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best are not general enough to support the claim that the said heuristics are commonly employed for most human cognitive tasks. The tasks for which Gigerenzer’s heuristics are best
suited are decision tasks of choice between two alternatives, or of some value to be estimated
among alternatives, and wherein the cognizer has limited familiarity of the alternatives. These
tasks constitute only a small subset of the cognitive tasks humans commonly face (cf. Sterelny,
2003, p. 208). Even for those instances when we have to make choices or estimate values, we
are not always forced to choose among pairs of alternatives—we are often faced with many
options. Moreover, when we are faced with tasks of choice or value-estimation, we are usually
confronted with things we not only recognize but that we are very familiar with. Indeed, many
of our choices demand an intimate acquaintance with the alternatives (cf. Sterelny, 2003,
2006). It therefore seems as if Gigerenzer’s proposed heuristics have only a limited role in
our reasoning. This is in stark contrast to Gigerenzer and Todd’s (1999) assertion that their
research on heuristics is the study of “the way that real people make the majority of their inferences and decisions” (p. 15, my emphasis). This also undermines Carruthers’ suggestion that
Gigerenzer’s fast and frugal heuristics can provide tractable processes for cognition tout court.
Samuels (2005, forthcoming), on the other hand, does not specify any heuristics that he
thinks can ensure computational frugality in determining what representations get considered
in a given cognitive task. He rests his arguments instead on an intuitive, though vague, appeal
to web-search-engine-like heuristic or approximation techniques (Samuels, forthcoming; cf.
Shanahan, 2009). The prospect of web-search-engine-like heuristics initially looks promising
to deliver the desired frugality since actual web search engines are able to search through
billions of websites in fractions of a second. Yet it is not entirely clear from Samuels’ account
exactly what role such heuristics would play in relevance determinations in human cognition.
To be sure, web-search-engine-like heuristics can certainly search and retrieve information
quickly, efficiently, and frugally, but these heuristics per se do not determine the relevance of
heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; see also Gigerenzer, 2007). But Gigerenzer’s analysis extends to reasoning
and inference qua central cognition, whereas Carruthers, in arguing for the massive modularity thesis (Sperber,
1994), suggests that Gigerenzer-style heuristics can be deployed by the various modules that purportedly compose
central cognition. More on modularity below.
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the information it retrieves. This is made apparent by Samuels’ (correct) assertion that the
representations that a heuristic will bring to bear on a given task will not be invariably relevant.
To put the point more directly, web-search-engine-like heuristics may very well circumvent
the computational relevance problem, but this solution does not address the epistemological
relevance problem (cf. Shanahan, 2009).16
Certainly, one can point to the advances in AI, computer programming, and other real-world
computational applications, and proclaim that there are real instances where a program successfully deployed heuristics without having to go through computationally taxing processing to
determine relevance beforehand (much like how web search engines are real-world examples
of success). However, this observation fails to acknowledge the fact that the AI researchers and
computer programmers have already determined the relevance of certain information to certain
tasks, and that they design heuristics to operate according to those determinations. This is what
I take Fodor’s (1987) point to be: In describing the frame problem as a problem of formalizing
computationally relevant facts from irrelevant ones—and hence delimiting the candidates for
belief-updating when certain events occur—Fodor asserts,
The programmer decides, case by case, which properties get specified in the data
base; but the decision is unsystematic and unprincipled. . . . [T]here appears to be
no disciplined way to justify the exclusion [of properties that cause a system to
update indefinitely many facts about the world,] and no way to implement it that
doesn’t involve excluding indefinitely many computationally relevant concepts as
well. (Fodor, 1987, p. 33)
The question is not: How do AI and computer programs determine what information is relevant? We already know the answer to this, namely such information is programmed into them.
The question is rather: How did the AI researchers and computer programmers determine what
information is relevant to what tasks in the first place? In the absence of an answer to this question, the epistemological problem remains. (And this is not to mention Fodor’s worry about
excluding indefinitely many computationally relevant concepts when implementing a program,
16

We shall see in the next chapter, however, that there is an interesting theory of web search engine strategies
expounded by Andy Clark (2002) that can play a role in addressing the epistemological relevance problem. This
role will be made clear once we understand the cognitive architecture I develop in this chapter and the next.
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which is a problem that also remains unaddressed.)
Both Samuels (2005) and Carruthers (2006a) also appeal to the notion of satisficing to
explain how human cognition can be computationally tractable. However, such an appeal is
empty as it stands. For satisficing is really a substitution for a stopping rule for search among
alternatives—a rule that instructs search to stop once a certain goal is reached (see e.g., Simon,
1979). But relevance determinations involve more than just search. Even if we generalize the
notion of satisficing (which seems to be the case in many discussions in cognitive science) to a
procedure that arrives at solutions that are not optimal but are in some sense “good enough”—
processing (e.g., evaluation) continues until some specified aspiration level is reached—the
very process that satisfices remains unaccounted for. That is, asserting that a system satisfices
says nothing of how the goals or aspiration levels are specified, nor of how it is determined
when these goals or levels are reached; and these are the very problems of relevance under
consideration. Certainly, heuristics can satisfice, but it is a further question how they make
relevance determinations in their processing. On this Samuels and Carruthers are silent.
Fodor rightly points out that (what I am calling here) the epistemological relevance problem
“goes as deep as the analysis of rationality” (1987, p. 27). We can see why—namely, because
the demands to be satisfied in determining what is relevant just are the demands of rationality. To repeat, humans appear to be largely rational—in Fodor’s words, “witness our not all
being dead” (2008, p. 116)—and determining what is relevant is part and parcel of rationality.
Samuels (2005, forthcoming) demurs at Fodor’s suggestion that the totality of one’s beliefs
must be consulted in determining relevance, since this is the “only guaranteed way” (Fodor,
2000, p. 36) of classically computing a global property like relevance. As Samuels remarks,
guarantees are beside the point. Why suppose that we always successfully compute
the global properties on which abduction depends? Presumably we do not. And
one very plausible suggestion is that we fail to do so when the cognitive demands
required are just too great. In particular, for all that is known, we may well fail under precisely those circumstances that the classical view would predict—namely,
when too much of a belief system needs to be consulted in order to compute the
simplicity or conservativism of a given belief. (Samuels, 2005, p. 119)
Samuels is right that guarantees are beside the point (cf. Shanahan, 2009; Sperber & Wilson,
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1996), and that we often fail in determining relevance. Nevertheless, we are still left to explain
our successes in determining what is relevant to our cognitive tasks. And, again, our successes
are not few. To paraphrase Fodor,17 the moral is not that the heuristic solution to the frame
problem—or to relevance problems more generally—is wrong; it is that the heuristic solution
is empty unless we have, together with the heuristic strategy (or strategies), some idea of what is
to count as relevant. Thus, despite the fact that heuristics can probably avoid the computational
relevance problem, we are still faced with the epistemological relevance problem.
Let us briefly pause to see where we have gotten to. We have been discussing what heuristics are supposed to do for us in cognition. The part of cognition that is of concern is central
cognition, since this is where problems of relevance arise. We saw that philosophers such as
Samuels and Carruthers believe that heuristics offer a solution to problems of relevance.18 I
argued, however, that heuristics do not offer the kind of solution that Samuels and Carruthers
think; specifically, given the distinctions of the kinds of relevance problems I described above,
heuristics do not offer a complete solution to relevance problems, as they fail to solve or circumvent the epistemological problem.
We also saw that Fodor believes that heuristics fail as a solution to relevance problems
in central cognition. Yet Fodor’s rejection of the heuristic solution is not motivated by the
concerns I gave. Rather, Fodor believes that typical tasks in central cognition require global
assessments of information, requiring in the limit consideration of one’s entire set of beliefs,
and this is something that heuristics cannot do. If Fodor is right, then it is hopeless to look to
heuristics as a solution to relevance problems in central cognition. Nevertheless, not only do I
think that the demands of global assessment that Fodor believes is placed on central cognition
are too lofty (I am not sure if anyone except for Fodor believes that central cognition is global
in his sense; cf. Samuels, forthcoming), but, despite my arguments against Samuels’ and
17

“The moral is not that the sleeping-dog strategy is wrong; it is that the sleeping-dog strategy is empty unless
we have, together with the strategy, some idea of what is to count as a fact for the purposes at hand” (Fodor, 1987,
p. 31).
18
Notwithstanding that Carruthers believes that central cognition is massively modular (see below).
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Carruthers’ suppositions about the work heuristics do for us, I believe that heuristics actually
help in circumventing the epistemological worries associated with relevance problems. To
see how this is so, we will have to gain a better understanding of the role heuristics play in
cognition, and this means investigating more thoroughly how heuristics work and the structures
they operate over.
In the next section, I will discuss the architecture of cognition in order to develop a view
of central cognition which facilitates heuristic processes. The section that follows will be
devoted to elaborating the kinds of cognitive structures that heuristics operate over (or exploit,
as suggested in the previous chapter). In the final chapter of this dissertation I will attempt to
address the epistemological relevance problem. I will argue that humans do not actually solve
the epistemological relevance problem, and therefore the heuristic solution is empty. However,
I will also show that the theory of cognition and how heuristics work that I advance in this
chapter and the next suggests its own means of alleviating us of the epistemological worries.

3.2

Toward a general architecture

Heuristics are specified reasoning patterns, or, as explicated in the previous chapter, cognitive
procedures. Some believe that heuristics are executed by specialized cognitive mechanisms,
conceived as “modules” of the mind (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2000; Carruthers, 2006a). There are
many ways that one can characterize a module, but there are two core features that are generally
believed to facilitate fast and frugal reasoning (Samuels, 2005): domain-specificity and informational encapsulation.19 These two properties were those (among others) that Fodor (1983)
had originally used to define the input-output modules that appear to subserve our peripheral
systems (paradigmatically, those responsible for visual and language processing). We have
already discussed the role that informational encapsulation would play in facilitating fast and
frugal reasoning, and in avoiding the computational and epistemological worries in cognition
19

There is substantial debate over what constitutes a module and how to best characterize such properties. I
want to avoid this debate, however. So I will rely on a relaxed understanding that entails at least that a module is
a relatively autonomous component of the mind.
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generally. Encapsulation is supposed to confine the amount of information that can be surveyed
to a highly restricted proprietary database. In consequence, there is little computational burden
associated with information search, and the information possessed by the proprietary database
constitutes the one and only background against which relevance is determined.
Nevertheless, a defining characteristic of central systems is that they do not exhibit modular
encapsulation. For it also may be recalled that a widely recognized feature of central systems
is that they allow for the free exchange of information.20 For example, when he discovered
the chemical structure of benzene, Kekulé credited a dream he had of a snake biting its own
tail (Hempel, 1966, pp. 15-16). Thus, for Kekulé—and for anyone, really—his dream of a
snake bore in novel and important ways on his theorizing about chemical structures. All of us
can understand this; in fact, we all can envision a snake biting its own tail and acknowledge
its resemblance to a ring that is benzene’s structure. The purported feature of our general
reasoning that allows us to understand how images of snakes bear on chemical structures—
two disparate representations, and a priori not obviously relevant to each other—is that any
conceptual piece of information we hold in our head can bear on any other. But if general
reasoning is subserved by modular encapsulated mechanisms, then it would seem, prima facie
at least, and contrary to fact, that some conceptual information cannot be brought to bear on
others.
Of course, this is not a decisive case against the possibility of encapsulated modular central
systems. But it shows that there is room to doubt the plausibility of the thesis. This in turn
casts doubt on the hypothesis that heuristics are executed by encapsulated modules in central
cognition—if central cognition is not modular, then ipso facto modules would not be the structures that are executing heuristics in central cognition.21 Yet, if heuristics are not executed by
mental modules, then there is no indication that heuristics are informationally encapsulated
20

This is a feature acknowledged by those who deny central systems modularity (e.g., Fodor, 1983, 2000;
Samuels, 2000, 2006) as well as those who advocate for it (e.g., Carruthers, 2006a; Sperber, 1994).
21
The present discussion is about the role of heuristics in central cognition. Though it is an interesting question
what role(s) heuristics have in peripheral systems, this is not a matter that will be addressed in this dissertation.
Therefore, whenever I speak of heuristics, I should be understood as referring to them as operations or procedures
in central cognition only.

Chapter 3. Beginning to Understand How Heuristics Work

96

processes. In turn, if heuristic processes are not encapsulated, one might wonder how they can
perform rapidly and frugally, and avoid the computational relevance problem. An appeal to
heuristics would be circular; so without encapsulation it appears that we are left with the task
of explaining how they work the way they do.
The solution might come by way of the other aforementioned feature of modules that is
supposed to enable quick and frugal cognition, namely domain-specificity. Before we continue, it is important to note that there are two ways to understand domain-specificity, one
in terms of the function a mechanism computes and the other in terms of the range of representations a mechanism takes as input (Samuels, 2005; Carruthers, 2006a). On the former
understanding, a cognitive mechanism’s domain is the task it is dedicated to performing, and
on the latter the domain is the type of content or class of representations that it takes as input. Hence, these two senses of cognitive domain are often called function- or task-domain,
and content- or input-domain, respectively. However, as we continue on, it will become apparent that my argument does not hang on which interpretation is adopted, although it will
be more amenable to the content/input reading.22 Nevertheless, it is important at this point
that the notion of domain-specificity does not get confused with informational encapsulation
or with frugality. Domain-specificity is about restrictions on what a system computes or what
representations can serve as input to a system, depending on the interpretation. In other words,
domain-specificity is about the subject matter computed or the kinds of representations the
system can compute. In contrast, informational encapsulation has to do with access—what
information a system has access to. A system might be informationally encapsulated, but the
information that it has access to might span many domains (which would mean that the system can compute either different domain functions or representations that belong to different
domains). On the other hand, a system might be domain-specific, but have access to quite a lot
of information (regardless of domain), and thus be unencapsulated. Finally, let us remind our22

Carruthers (2006a, p. 6, n4) suggests that the content/input reading may be tied to a function/task reading,
insofar as an evolutionary story can be told about how the representations that a cognitive mechanism (or module)
computes (constituting its content-/input-domain) are the ones that it was designed to process (constituting its
function-/task-domain) (cf. Sperber, 1994).
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selves that frugality is just a general notion of providing limits on the information processed in
a system’s computations. Frugality can be achieved by informational encapsulation or domainspecificity (or indeed, as we saw, by heuristics, which may not be encapsulated (at least for the
case of central cognition) but may be domain-specific; more on this presently).
Returning to the matter at hand, within the framework of CTM, the potential benefits of
domain-specificity and its role in cognition become especially apparent:
if a mechanism is sufficiently domain specific, then it becomes possible to utilize
a potent strategy for reducing computational load, namely, to build into the mechanism substantial amounts of information about the domain in which it operates.
This might be done in a variety of ways. . . . But however this information gets encoded, the key point is that a domain-specific mechanism can be informationally
rich and, as a result, capable of rapidly and efficiently deploying those strategies
and options most relevant to the domain in which it operates. (Samuels, 2005, p.
111)
A domain-specific mechanism can thus be understood as an “expert system” (with respect to
its domain), and can thereby be frugal in its computations.
Some researchers believe that humans possess a wide variety of domain-specific mechanisms, such as a “theory of mind” module which is dedicated to reasoning about the mental
states and behaviour of people (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995). This module is understood to be
domain-specific because the class of representations that it can process is restricted to a distinct
kind—namely, intentional mental states. The purported theory of mind module can draw rich
inferences about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of people without being computationally
expensive by having a lot of information about intentional mental states built into the mechanism. The suggestion, then, is that heuristics can likewise be fast and frugal, not by being
encapsulated, but by operating according to built-in information about the respective domains
in which they operate.23
23

Many evolutionary psychologists, such as Cosmides and Tooby (1992), Sperber (1994, 1996), and BaronCohen (1995), do not follow Fodor’s characterization of modules. They reject the supposition that informational
encapsulation is a core feature, and insist only that domain-specificity is essential to modularity. Thus, what is
being suggested here with respect to how heuristics operate is consistent with such a conception of modularity.
In other words, on the evolutionary psychology conception of modules, heuristics may very well be executed
by modules. I will add, however, that I think that a conception of module that does not include informational
encapsulation as a central feature is uninteresting. But I will not argue the point here (though see the following
footnote).
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However, we are faced with an ambiguity with respect to the kind of system that is domainspecific. This is because domain-specificity can be a property of either a computational system
or a system of representations. The distinction between these two types of cognitive systems
is made by Fodor (1983, 2000), and is acutely emphasized by Samuels (1998, 2000). A computational (cognitive) system is a (classical) device which takes symbols (or representations)
as input and manipulates them according to formally specifiable rules to generate outputs,
which may either be symbolic (or representational) or action-producing. These computational
systems—or “computational modules”—may be presumed to be domain-specific insofar as
they are capable of carrying out only a restricted class of computations or computing only a specific range of representations (depending on how one reads domain-specificity). On the other
hand, a system of mental representations is simply a stored body of knowledge or, more generally, information which may be accessed by other cognitive systems. These systems of mental
representations are individuated according to the specific (content) domains to which each is
dedicated. They are typically thought to be innate, but need not be. Nevertheless, such systems
encode various kinds of information about their respective domains. Both Fodor and Samuels
refer to such systems as “Chomskian modules”, so named because of Chomsky’s hypothesis
of innate Universal Grammar; however, other proposed innate domain-specific knowledge besides that of language, such as theory of mind, or so-called “folk physics” or “folk biology”,
qualify as Chomskian modules as well.
What is important to notice is that
computational modules are a very different kind of mental structure from Chomskian modules. . . . In a sense, [Chomskian modules] are ‘inert’. They only eventuate in behaviour when manipulated by various cognitive mechanisms. By contrast,
computational modules are . . . mechanisms that manipulate representations. Computational modules and Chomskian modules are thus importantly different with
respect to the functional roles that they play in our cognitive economy. (Samuels,
2000, p. 19)
It should be clear that, although Chomskian modules and computational modules alike can be
characterized as domain-specific, Chomskian modules cannot be characterized as informationally encapsulated. For it is only a module qua mechanism that can properly be encapsulated; it
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makes no sense to claim that a system of mental representations has constraints on the amount
of information it can access, since such a system does not access, or indeed do, anything. (We
might think of Chomskian modules instead as encapsulated information.)
Samuels makes a further observation worth mentioning. He reports that computational
modules can coexist with Chomskian modules. And indeed, a natural way of conceiving the operations of the mind is that the proprietary databases to which access to information is restricted
for computational modules are just Chomskian modules. Nevertheless, this does not have to be
the case. As Samuels emphasizes, Chomskian modules do not entail computational modules.
He goes on to argue instead that we may very well possess a variety of Chomskian modules
without possessing any domain-specific computational mechanisms at all. Indeed, he contends
that it is possible that the “domain-specific knowledge [of Chomskian modules] is only utilised
by domain-general, and hence non-modular, computational mechanisms” (Samuels, 2000, p.
19).
Let us return now to heuristics. Heuristics are certainly computational insofar as CTM
holds. But if heuristics indeed operate according to built-in information about the respective
domains in which they operate, the question is whether such information is built into an instantiating computational module or an accessed Chomskian module. It seems that there is
nothing particular about the nature of heuristics that entails computational modules. For, mirroring Samuels’ argument, it is possible that heuristics are instantiated by a domain-general
computational mechanism which draws on domain-specific bodies of knowledge or information (i.e., Chomskian modules). This would permit heuristic procedures to be applied across
many domains (i.e., they would be domain-general), and yet still operate quickly and frugally.
Carruthers (2006a, 2006c), in advancing a massive modularity hypothesis (i.e., the thesis
that the mind is entirely, or nearly entirely, composed of individuated modules), argues for the
possibility of multiple copies of the same type of heuristic instantiated by different modules. If
this is right, then there can exist a number of different domain-specific computational modules,
each dedicated to different tasks and carrying out a restricted class of computations or operating
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over a specific class of representations, but each employing its own heuristic of the same type.
However, this possibility rests on an independent assumption about the architecture of central
cognition—that it is massively modular. As explained above, however, the thesis that central
cognition is subserved by a number of distinct computational modules is implausible.24 Thus,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to reject the domain-general view
of central systems and the execution of heuristics given here.
This is not to say that heuristics are not domain-specific independent of the mechanism that
instantiates them. However, the heuristics that are of interest here—i.e., cognitive (inferential)
heuristics—appear to be domain-general. For instance, Gigerenzer’s Take the Best or Recognition heuristic, or Kahneman and Tversky’s Representativeness or Availability heuristic, can
operate over many different ranges of representations. That is, such heuristics themselves do
not specify any content. It is not the case that Take the Best says
(i) Search among alternative cities; (ii) stop search when one city scores on whether
it has a university; (iii) choose the city identified in step ii;
or that Availability says
The probability of a plane crashing is assessed according to the ease with which
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.
Rather, cognitive (inferential) heuristics are general procedures of inference that can be applied
across many different domains—they can be employed in contexts of choosing which car to
buy inasmuch as in contexts of deciding which city is larger; or in contexts of estimating the
probability of plane crashes inasmuch as estimating the frequency of spousal abuse. In fact,
the domain-generality of heuristics is what leads Gigerenzer to assert that the heuristics he
24

The notion of “module” adopted by evolutionary psychologists suggests that the possibility that central cognition is subserved by a number of unencapsulated, domain-specific mechanisms (see previous footnote); in which
case, Carruthers’ argument would go through. However, I agree with Fodor that “it’s informational encapsulation,
however achieved, that’s at the heart of modularity” (Fodor, 2000, p. 63). I therefore view any modularity thesis
that foregoes informational encapsulation as a central property as no modularity thesis at all. In addition, there are
a number of authors who argue that empirical evidence suggests the implausibility of modular central cognition
(Prinz, 2006; Samuels, 1998, 2000, 2006; Sterelny, 2003; for a conceptual argument against central systems being
subserved by a number of domain-specific mechanisms, see Aspeitia, Eraña, & Stainton, 2010).
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studies are robust: they can be effectively applied to a variety of different (sometimes new and
novel) situations and environments (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2004, 2006). At
the same time, however, on the function/task reading of domain-specificity, these heuristics
may be construed as domain-specific.
It is important to be clear about the scope of the claim. The claim being made is about
the architecture of central cognition. This says nothing about the extent to which the mind
in general is modular. Considerable empirical evidence supports the claim that there are a
number of modular mental systems, which are both encapsulated and domain-specific, but
these are most likely restricted to the peripheral systems (Fodor, 1983; Samuels, 2000, 2006).
Furthermore, this says nothing about whether computational modules use certain heuristics in
their processing. By all lights, it appears that peripheral modules do indeed utilize heuristics,
such as perceptual heuristics as explicated in the previous chapter.
The claim being made here is that the use of heuristics in general reasoning does not entail a
modular view of central cognition, and thus there is no apparent need to invoke domain-specific
computational modules in explaining the use of heuristics and how they generally work. Instead, it is possible to characterize heuristics as cognitive procedures that are instantiated by a
domain-general computational system, but operate with specialized bodies of domain-specific
information (i.e., Chomskian modules). Once again, this is not a decisive argument against
the possibility that heuristics are executed by computational modules in central cognition. But
unless there is empirical evidence to the contrary, rejecting the domain-general view of central
systems and heuristics is unmotivated.

3.3

Informationally rich structures: k-systems

If the above picture is correct, and heuristics are deployed by a domain-general computational
mechanism in central cognition, two further questions arise: What is the nature of the representational modules heuristics exploit? and How does the suggested architecture facilitate
heuristic reasoning? It is not obvious from the surface how heuristics work, since they are

Chapter 3. Beginning to Understand How Heuristics Work

102

essentially simple algorithms; there is nothing in the heuristics themselves that specifies how
they make use of informationally rich structures of representations. I will address these issues
in turn in the present section and the next.
Let us begin by scrutinizing what Chomskian modules are and their role in the proposed architecture. Chomskian modules are essentially systems of mental representations. But Samuels
(1998) and Fodor (1983, 2000) specify certain other features. One is that Chomskian modules
are supposed to be bodies of mentally represented knowledge. Of course, there are different sorts of knowledge, declarative (or propositional) and procedural being most commonly
distinguished. But the kind of knowledge that Samuels and Fodor are referring to is truthevaluable knowledge. This implies, at least, that the representations of interest have propositional content. The importance of this is evident vis-à-vis CTM: Computations are transformations of representations which respect semantical relations, such as implication and logical
consequence; and, in Fodor’s words, “It is . . . a point of definition that such semantic relations
hold only among the sorts of things to which propositional content can be ascribed” (Fodor,
1983, p. 5).
Another feature of Chomskian modules, according to Samuels, is that they encode various
kinds of information about their domain. This, as we saw, is how Chomskian modules are
informationally rich. But I think we can add to this that the information encoded in a Chomskian module is encoded in a highly organized fashion. A domain-general mechanism can
take advantage of generous amounts of domain-specific information encoded in a Chomskian
module, and thereby enable quick and frugal cognition. But if the information is structured or
organized in specific ways, it would enable quicker and more frugal cognition. Contrariwise,
if such information is not structured or organized in specific ways, it would retard the speed
and efficiency of search and processing. Characteristic human performance on many cognitive
tasks suggests that the structures heuristics exploit are distinctly organized to produce robust
reasoning and inference patterns.
Moreover, it would seem that Chomskian modules must not only have a specific internal

Chapter 3. Beginning to Understand How Heuristics Work

103

structure, but also bear specific intra-system relations, which would further facilitate fast and
frugal reasoning. Reasoning within one domain, such as “folk psychology”, often bears in a
number of ways on other domains, such as “folk biology”. For example, in deciding what
intentions to ascribe an organism, one must make inferences about the kind of organism to
which one is ascribing intentions. Without such connections between bodies of knowledge, we
would not be able to make the rich inferences we characteristically do. I will return to these
issues concerning informational organization below.
Samuels introduces a further feature in response to the possibility of counting any domainspecific collection of truth-evaluable representations as Chomskian modules: “We do not want,
for example, to treat a child’s beliefs about toy dinosaurs as a module” (Samuels, 2000, p. 18).
Thus, Samuels asserts that Chomskian modules are innate. Along with Fodor, Samuels understands Chomskian modules to be the very kind of system that Chomsky’s Universal Grammar
is supposed to be (hence the namesake), and Chomsky’s Universal Grammar is supposed to be
inter alia innate. However, I do not see why heuristics, or any domain-general operation for
that matter, must be conceived to exploit only innate domain-specific systems of knowledge. It
is quite conceivable that there is at least some acquired knowledge contained within many of
our domain-specific systems of knowledge.25 Furthermore, there is no principled reason why
there cannot be entire systems of acquired information that is stored and organized in a fashion
similar to innate domain-specific knowledge, and exploited by domain-general systems just as
innate systems are.
Certainly, the way something like Universal Grammar is supposed to get unpacked during
childhood development and early language learning cannot be emulated by acquired bodies of
knowledge. However, the architecture suggested above and its operations are not about cog25

“Acquired” should be read as “acquired in consequence of experience”, thus contrasting “innate”. Learning is
sufficient for acquiring, but it is not necessary. One can be hit on the head and thereby acquire beliefs, though these
are not learned beliefs. We might hesitate calling non-learned acquired beliefs knowledge, since such acquired
beliefs may not meet a criterion of justification. However, I want to avoid speaking of learned knowledge to
avoid issues concerning what constitutes learning. Fodor (2008), for instance, believes that learning consists in “a
rational process like inductive inference” (p. 145). Yet I do not want to suggest here that the systems of knowledge
to which I am referring in the text are learned in this way. In fact, I do not want to commit to any particular account
of learning.
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nitive development, but about cognitive deployment. The discussion that took place there, as
well as the discussion provided by Samuels (1998, 2000), concerns how the mind can do what
it does given a domain-general architecture of central cognition. Nothing was said, nor need
be said, about the poverty of stimulus with respect to how we know the grammar of language,
or conceptions of (folk) psychology, or (folk) biology, or whatever. Thus, it seems perfectly
acceptable within the foregoing cognitive architecture that a domain-general computational
device can utilize informationally rich, acquired domain-specific systems of knowledge. If
this is right, then I believe it is necessary to forego the Chomskian namesake to refer to such
informationally rich representational structures.
In addition to dropping the innateness requirement, I propose to jettison the domain-specificity
requirement. This is not as bold of a move as it may appear. It seems that what is really doing the work in facilitating fast and frugal cognition is not the domain-specificity per se of a
system of representations, but the kinds of information encoded in these systems and the manner in which it is encoded. For, to partially echo what was said above, it is possible that one
can have an unorganized system of lots of domain-specific information, but it will be doubtful
that a domain-general computational mechanism would exhibit the same speed and efficiency
operating over this unorganized body of knowledge as it would operating over a highly structured system. Moreover, it is possible that one can have a domain-specific body of knowledge
that is quite impoverished; and although a domain-general device would likely be able to operate quickly and frugally over such a system, owing primarily to the little information that
ever gets considered, the inferences made would not be as robust and accurate as those made
by operations over richer systems.26 That a system of information is dedicated to a specific
domain no doubt contributes to the extent to which the system is organized, since there are
natural relations among items of information within a domain. However, domain-specificity
per se does not seem to be necessary for a body of knowledge to be structured and organized
in ways conducive to fast and frugal exploitation by a domain-general computational mecha26

Notwithstanding that accuracy is not a general feature of heuristics, as illustrated by the work of Kahneman
and Tversky.
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nism. To be sure, it is conceivable that someone has an exceeding amount of knowledge about
the French Revolution, and thereby has built a non-domain-specific system of representations
on this topic, which is highly organized and informationally rich.27 When drawing inferences
about or relating to the French Revolution (via her domain-general reasoning mechanism), this
person would almost certainly carry them out quickly and frugally (and probably robustly and
accurately too).
To summarize, a domain-general computational mechanism can deploy suitable strategies
(such as heuristics) to enable quick and frugal cognition by exploiting informationally rich
systems of representations, or truth-evaluable knowledge. These latter systems encode various
kinds of information in a highly organized fashion; not only is there internal organization,
but there is also intra-system organization that exhibits specific relations between systems.
But unlike Chomskian modules, these systems have to be neither innate nor domain-specific.
Instead, they can be acquired and/or non-domain-specific, so long as they possess the requisite
structure and organization. This should not be taken to mean that the systems of representations
under consideration can be domain-general. A domain-general collection of representations
would not bear the kinds of organization and relations that I take to be characteristic of such
informationally rich systems. Working memory may be a domain-general system capable of
storing any kind of representation, but it may store, at the same time, completely unrelated
representations. For a system of representations to be non-domain-specific, on the other hand,
simply means that it fails to pick out a proper domain as cognitive scientists usually understand
the term (which is closely related to natural kinds).
I already suggested dropping the Chomskian namesake to refer to such non-domain-specific
systems. But since domain-specificity is considered by most, if not all, theorists to be essential
to modularity, it appears that “module” must also be omitted. Hence, for lack of a better name,
I will call these informationally rich systems of representations presently under consideration
27

Few cognitive scientists, if any, would consider the French Revolution as a proper domain, since the class of
representations that belong to such a topic do not pick out anything resembling a natural kind. I do not want to
enter into any debate over what constitutes a domain. The reader who is dissatisfied with this can substitute any
non-domain-specific example. See Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) for debates on what constitutes a domain.
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k-systems (where “k” stands for knowledge). We shall see in the next chapter that the knowledge that k-systems are supposed to embody does not necessarily have to be truth-evaluable.
Indeed, as I will argue, perceptual information can be, and often is, included within the systems
of representations over which a domain-general computational device can operate. For now,
however, it will do no harm to assume that such knowledge is truth-evaluable, but it should be
kept in mind that this is only part of the story.
K-systems are what heuristics partially owe their speed and efficiency to, but k-systems are
also what heuristics owe their robustness and potency to. To be sure, heuristics are robust and
potent strategies insofar as they can be applied in a vast number of contexts while producing
satisficing inferences. The way I suggest that heuristics can perform like this is by being sensitive to specific parameters that are built into k-systems. For example, a k-system for chess
might contain numerous parameters for openings, endgames, the pieces and their positions on
the board, etc. Depending on what the task at hand is, certain representations will be thereby
more readily available and more easily brought to bear than others. And indeed, the parameters
may affect how the present game is represented. Other k-systems that exhibit similar parameters will be amenable to the same heuristics and strategies deployed by the central system for
chess—for example, k-systems for other chess-like games, or even for activities such as battle or sports that bear certain relations to chess. The parameters possessed by k-systems thus
control the flow of information, but more importantly, they partly constrain the operations performed by the domain-general computational device. More specifically, I claim that k-systems
have control parameters that partly constrain how the information possessed by the system can
be manipulated; in terms of what is of interest here, the control parameters partly constrain the
way heuristics operate, or equivalently, what heuristics are brought to bear. These parameters
embedded in k-systems are either acquired or innate, depending on the nature of the k-system
in question.28
28

We might note a similarity to Marvin Minsky’s (1975) notion of frames (not to be confused with the frames
of the frame problem, though there is a relation). In Minsky’s words, “A frame is a data-structure for representing
a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child’s birthday party. Attached
to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame. Some
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Cognitive tasks will also have certain structures of their own. For instance, a task of deciding between two alternatives will have a specific structure that enables comparisons between
the two alternatives on a number of dimensions, and the consideration of relevant representations and other information. Such a decision structure will be different from the structure of,
say, estimating the probability of an event, which might enable the recall of past occurrences
and perhaps other knowledge about probability and frequencies. Moreover, the content under
consideration will influence the structure of the task. For a decision of choosing which car to
buy will not share the exact structure with a decision of which move to make in chess, or with a
decision of whether to accept a job offer. My suggestion is that the structures of cognitive tasks
will help in cuing the activation of particular k-systems. Thus, it is in conjunction with the
informational structure of the task that the control parameters of the activated k-systems constrain what heuristics are deployed; in the right conditions, the informational structure of the
task and the activated k-systems’ control parameters determine what heuristics are deployed.29
In this way, a domain-general device can deploy suitable task-specific heuristics without being
task- or domain-specific itself. This is a lot like how a Universal Turing Machine can simulate
any specific Turing machine given the appropriate input. Thus, the claim here is that heuristics
are powerful inference strategies in the same way that Universal Turing Machines are powerful
computing devices.
There will be instances, however, when k-systems will lack the appropriate control parameters. This can occur especially with impoverished k-systems. Yet this does not mean that the
k-systems in question will lack control parameters altogether, although this can be the case.
When a k-system lacks the appropriate control parameters, the speed, efficiency, and/or accuis about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these expectations are not confirmed”
(p. 211). The view I am advancing, however, is different from Minsky’s frames (or the related notion of scripts).
K-systems are not to be understood in terms of stereotypes or paradigms, and not in terms of “situations” either.
As we shall see in the next chapter, k-systems are to be conceived as concepts. Moreover, the function of frames
(or scripts) in cognition is supposed to be quite extensive, having a role in the processes of vision and imagery,
linguistic and other kinds of understanding, and memory storage and recall. On the other hand, I am not making
such lofty suggestions here, as I am confining my account of k-systems to facilitating heuristic processes (though
future work might extend this to include other aspects of cognition).
29
This is another possible way to avoid Fodor’s (2000) worry about an ensuing infinite regress when employing
heuristics, as outlined above.
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racy of inferences are negatively affected. In such instances, heuristics may be deployed based
on the structure of the problem alone, or default heuristics may be deployed, or no heuristics
will be deployed at all. In some of these instances, I believe, we witness the mistakes and
biases that Kahneman and Tversky (and their followers) emphasized and researched. In fact, I
believe that such mistakes and biases result from impoverished k-systems generally, in terms
of the kinds, amount, accuracy, and organization of information. But I will save discussion on
this issue for chapter 5.
In sum, k-systems influence the kinds of computations that operate over them in central
cognition via the information contained in the k-system along with the relations within or between them. What is entailed is that the operations of heuristics exploit ordered and structured
systems of knowledge.
Let us now switch gears and consider a more general view of how heuristics exploit informationally rich structures and of the role of k-systems in cognition. This will be my task in
the next section. In the chapters to follow I will return to the matters of what kind of entity
k-systems are, and how heuristics exploit them.

3.4

Exploiting informational richness

So far I have expounded a general cognitive architecture for central systems, and discussed
how such an architecture can facilitate heuristics or heuristic reasoning. What I have been
describing is consistent with the characterization of “heuristic” presented at the end of the
previous chapter, viz.
H7 Heuristics are cognitive procedures that satisfice, and that require little cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution; they operate by exploiting
informational structures.
I will now discuss in more detail the role of k-systems in cognition, and more specifically
how heuristics can harness the informational richness of k-systems. I will argue that a lot of
information does indeed bear on many of our cognitive tasks, but by the end of this section
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it will become clear how heuristics remain frugal in their processing. This sounds paradoxical, but as we shall see, frugality in information-processing can be realized in the appropriate
management of the information that bears on cognitive tasks.

3.4.1

High information load cognition

Let us consider a common problem that someone may face. Alice is deciding what to do on
Saturday night. There are a number of viable options: go to a movie, stay in to watch a movie,
go out to a pub, go out dancing, go out for dinner, dinner and dancing, dinner and a movie,
stay in for dinner, stay in for dinner and go out for a movie, etc. Alice’s choice will be guided
by her multiple beliefs, desires, and preferences, as well as by a number of external factors:
What is playing at the local movie theatre? Is there any particular movie she has been wanting
to see? Is there any movie that she can rent that she has been wanting to see? Does she want
to stay in? What did she do last Saturday night? What are her friends doing? Does she want
to be with her friends? Which friends? If Alice does in fact want to spend Saturday night
with her friends, she must participate in coordination problems: Would they all be happy to go
dancing? Would some rather go to a movie while others would rather stay in for dinner? Are
there any friends with which Alice prefers to spend time over others? Will she want to go out to
a movie with Bob, even though he has an annoying habit of talking throughout a film? Will she
want to invite Carol, even though she suspects that Carol will invite Ted, whom Alice dislikes?
Alice might have to consider her financial situation: Can she, and does she want to, spend the
money to go out for dinner and a movie? Do her friends? Alice will also have to consider her
other obligations: Does she have to be somewhere important early Sunday morning? This will
bear on how late she would want to stay out; whether she would rather have a quiet night in;
etc. Much more can certainly be added here for Alice to take into consideration, but the point
should be clear that a lot of information must be used in making typical, everyday decisions
such as these. Indeed, they are problems of the ill-defined variety discussed in the previous
chapter, so it is no wonder why navigating through them can be a complex thing to do.
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Gigerenzer would have us believe that such a decision can be made on one reason. For
instance, he suggests that Darwin may have decided to marry based on one reason (namely,
having a constant companion), despite the fact that Darwin had written out a list of reasons
for why he should or should not marry, so as to help him in his decision process (Gigerenzer
& Todd, 1999). Gigerenzer observes that Darwin’s pro/con list contained incommensurable
items. How does one, for instance, compare “having a constant companion” to “if many children forced to gain one’s bread”? Such incommensurability is why Gigerenzer claims that
a one-reason decision-strategy is needed—a strategy that would forego the effort of attempting to convert all the reasons into some common commensurable scale. Likewise, Gigerenzer
would likely claim that the multiple issues that Alice must consider are incommensurable, and
thus so too would her situation call for a one-reason decision-strategy. One-reason decisionmaking ensures that reasoning is frugal. (Cf. the discussion regarding problems of comparing
incommensurability in the previous chapter (section 2.2.2).)
Nevertheless, I believe that Gigerenzer is overlooking the potential of human cognition
when dealing with issues or problems that are cognitively demanding, such as those faced
by Alice and Darwin alike. And in so doing, Gigerenzer is making the converse error that he
accuses standard statistical models and theories of rationality of committing, namely of making
too many simplifying assumptions about the problems to which they are applied. Gigerenzer
and Todd (1999) assert that “the way information is structured in real-world environments
often does not follow convenient simplifying assumptions” (p. 19). The converse error that I
accuse Gigerenzer of making (and to some extent his colleagues as well) is making simplifying
assumptions about human cognition. In a way that paraphrases Gigerenzer and Todd, human
cognition often does not follow convenient simplifying assumptions, and it would be folly
to presume so. For as Alice’s situation demonstrates, generous amounts of information are
in fact brought to bear on many of our decisions and inferences. Therefore, we should not
make simplifying assumptions about the way humans reason, but instead look to model human
cognition in a way that accounts for how humans manage such informational complexity.
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To see what I mean, let us consider an argument recently put forward by Kim Sterelny
(2004, 2006). Sterelny claims that the majority of real-world problems have a high information load—they are informationally demanding, requiring significant amounts of information.
Sterelny believes that problems that bear a high information load, as complex as they are, are
typical rather than extraordinary, especially in a social world:
Human decision-making often has a high informational load, for we depend on
knowledge-intensive methods of extracting resources from our worlds. . . . [H]uman
social worlds are complex, demanding, and only partly cooperative. They are complexly structured: divided by gender, status, occupation, generation. They are operationally complex: much human action requires coordination with others. And
they are complex in their resource demands: successful human life requires access
to a large range of goods, not just a few. (Sterelny, 2006, p. 221)
Yet humans are impeccable at handling these high-cognitive-load problems in a quick and
frugal way. The question then is: How do we manage to do it? This is, of course, an incarnation
of the frame problem discussed above.
Sterelny argues that our uncanny ability to respond successfully to problems with high
information loads can reside in modules—i.e., informationally encapsulated, domain-specific
computational mechanisms. But such a solution is restricted to problems that are predictable
and occur in a stable environment over evolutionary time. Thus, while Sterelny concedes
that we likely possess innate modules dedicated to certain capacities, such as visual perception, language, and perhaps even folk physics, he goes on to claim that “human environments
are heterogeneous in space and time, and as a consequence there are many high-cognitiveload problems that we face whose informational requirements are not stable over evolutionary
time” (p. 218), as described in the passage above. This means that it would be difficult for
natural selection to have equipped humans with specialized mechanisms to determine relevant
information for the unstable, heterogeneous problems typical of human life.
Nevertheless, Sterelny believes that humans deal with high-cognitive-load problems by relying on a distinctively human evolved strategy: epistemic niche construction. Epistemic niche
construction is evident in humans’ propensity to develop epistemic technology.30 Humans epis30

Sterelny is actually picking up and responding to the ideas of Clark (1999, 2002b; Clark & Chalmers, 1998),
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temically engineer their environments “in ways that circumvent the cognitive limits of individuals on their own” (p. 229). This is a special form of niche construction: it is informational,
which consists in either the transformation of the informational structures of the problems that
are to be solved, or the creation of “cognitive tools” to “enhance the capabilities of our naked
brains. . . . To take the simplest of examples, the practice of marking a trail while walking in the
bush converts a difficult memory problem into a simple perceptual problem” (Sterelny, 2006,
p. 225; see also Sterelny, 2003, 2004).31 Sterelny further points out that epistemic niche construction can consist in the use of epistemic technology to store and organize information in
our environment. External representations, such as pictures or words, are obvious examples.
But, perhaps more interestingly, artifacts can encode other kinds of information, such as their
function; or they can act as exemplars or templates, and in this way carry information about
how to make others like it (cf. Mithen, 2000; Dennett, 1991). In short, “we alter our environment to ease memory burdens. We store information in the environment; we recode it; and
we exploit our social organization through a division of intellectual labour” (Sterelny, 2006, p.
230).
Sterelny concludes that “Good decisions require access to, and use of, generous amounts
of information” (p. 233), and therefore much of human decision-making really carries high
information loads. Even the use of epistemic technology is informationally demanding, according to Sterelny. (I will return to this point presently.) However, instead of speculating
about innate cognitive mechanisms to assist us in our high-cognitive-load problem-solving and
decision-making, he claims that most of our cognitive abilities are the products of learning how
to exploit the right kinds of information in the right ways. This requires structured learning,
or “scaffolding”, to mitigate informational burdens, and to allow us to harness what is realized
by epistemic technology. Thus, according to Sterelny, human competencies that many evolutionary psychologists (such as Gigerenzer and Carruthers) believe to be the products of innate
Dennett (2000, 1993), and Mithen (2000). I am choosing to focus on Sterelny’s position in particular because he
attends to some of the central points relevant to this dissertation in a more direct fashion than Clark, Dennett, and
Mithen.
31
Similar ideas are found in Dennett (2000).
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mechanisms can be the result of perceptual preadaptation to relevant features of the natural environment (inherited from innate perceptual tuning to certain objective features of the world),
plus structured training to be sensitive to such features by a community or culture (i.e., social learning); social learning will direct a learning-individual’s attention to the relevant salient
features in the environment (through, for example, cultural representations such as pictures or
words), thereby further entrenching their respective roles in cognition.
It is interesting to note a certain parallel between Sterelny’s position and Gigerenzer’s understanding of how heuristics work, as outlined in the previous chapter. Gigerenzer appears to
recognize that humans are informational niche constructors, though he does not use such terms.
For example, he advocates for changing the way information is externally represented (such as
probabilistic information) in order to facilitate correct or better inferences and judgments (e.g.,
Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996). Further, with respect to his notion of ecological rationality, Gigerenzer asserts, “From an ecological view, environmental structures . . . directly influence cognition and can be designed to improve it” (Gigerenzer, 2006, p. 128). In another, more recent
work, he speaks of “design[ing] human environments” (Gigerenzer, 2008c, p. 27) to support
better decisions (cf. Gigerenzer, 2010). Nevertheless, not only are Gigerenzer’s discussions
on the actual phenomenon of informational niche construction too brief and underdeveloped
for what the topic deserves, he fails to appreciate the resulting informational richness of such
designed environmental structures. Yet his fundamental features of heuristics—that they (i) exploit evolved capacities, and (ii) exploit informational structures in the environment—appear
to correspond to ideas advanced by Sterelny. In particular, the exploitation of evolved capacities appears to correspond to what Sterelny believes are perceptual preadaptations to relevant
features of the environment, which are requisites for many human competencies. Furthermore,
according to Sterelny, humans use these perceptual preadaptations to exploit informational
niches and epistemic technology, which are really just special kinds of informational structures
in the environment. This is to say that, on Sterelny’s account, some of the environmental structures that Gigerenzer talks about are human-engineered materials and niches for the purposes
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of exploitation.
It should be noted, however, that Gigerenzer refers to naturally occurring informational
structures in the environment, and how heuristics are mechanisms adapted to specific environments. Although epistemic technology is, by definition, human-made and therefore not
naturally occurring, Sterelny’s broader story about the evolution of cognition is compatible
with Gigerenzer’s, so long as the environmental structures in question are stable enough to
invite specialized adaptations. In sum, Gigerenzer believes that heuristics work very well for
us—they are ecologically rational—just because they exploit environmental structures, and
Sterelny gives an account of precisely how this is done for a certain range of environmental
structures, namely through epistemic technology along with structured learning which finely
tunes our awareness to these structures and our skills to exploit them.
This is not to say that Sterelny’s position is continuous with Gigerenzer’s. For Gigerenzer
believes that the ubiquity of heuristics makes much human decision-making informationally
cheap, whereas Sterelny’s point is that this is not so. As we shall see, my view agrees with
Sterelny’s. If Sterelny is correct in that much of human cognition bears a high information
load, then contrary to the common conception about the nature of heuristics, they actually
draw on and use a great deal of information. However, I will argue that heuristics are still
computationally frugal despite the high information loads. This is one respect in which my
view is importantly different from both Sterelny’s and Gigerenzer’s—whereas Gigerenzer is
too optimistic with respect to the amount of information heuristics process, Sterelny does not
see heuristics as providing computational frugality. Moreover, both Sterelny and Gigerenzer emphasize the information in the environment that is exploited by humans—information
manifested in epistemic technology for Sterelny, and information embodied by “environmental structures” for Gigerenzer. I claim, on the other hand, that the informational structures
that humans exploit are in the head—specifically, information embodied by k-systems.32 We
32

Sterelny (2004) emphasizes the elaboration of mental representation as a result of the development and use of
epistemic technology. In the next chapter we will see that my view is along the same lines. However, we will also
see that my view goes several steps further than Sterelny’s in that I develop a thesis about the cognitive structures
that embody our mental representations (what I am here calling k-systems), and I argue that the informational
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shall see more of this presently. But this does not mean that my view is incompatible with
Gigerenzer’s or Sterelny’s. Rather, I understand my view to complement theirs. To see this,
first note that Sterelny’s account is not so much about how humans exploit informationally rich
structures as it is about how humans create ways to store and organize information. Sterelny
certainly advocates for the role of special cognitive preadaptations (i.e., modules) and structured learning in honing our abilities to exploit epistemic technology. However, he is silent on
the underlying mechanisms by which we harness such informationally rich structures. On the
other hand, as recently pointed out, Gigerenzer believes that simple heuristics altogether avoid
the need to utilize significant amounts of information in decision-making. In these respects,
then, my account offers additions to Sterelny’s and Gigerenzer’s views, and thereby suggests a
more comprehensive understanding of human cognition.
Let us return to the central topic of this section. If we are to have any hope in exploiting the
informationally rich structures manifested in epistemic technology or environmental structures
in the ways that we in fact do, we had better have the appropriate cognitive wherewithal to do so
in the first place. What this partly entails is that we had better have the cognitive wherewithal to
conceptualize epistemic technology as things that we can exploit in very specific ways. A fish
trap is an epistemic technology that inter alia encodes information about its function (Sterelny,
2006; cf. Mithen, 2000). But if one cannot recognize the fish trap as a fish trap, then one cannot
exploit its function (or at least, one could only do so by accident). Instead, one may only be able
to exploit it qua some decorative artefact, rather than as a specific tool for a specific purpose.
To recognize and conceptualize a fish trap as a fish trap, one needs to have specific knowledge
about fishes, traps, hunting, bodies of water, and so on. In other words, one needs to have a
specific k-system (or a set of k-systems) from which to draw in cognition. In yet more general
terms, how we exploit epistemic technology is via the k-systems we possess.
This view is Dretskean in an important sense. In developing his information-theoretic epistemology, Fred Dretske commented that there is “a relativization of the information contained
organization of these structures is what enables heuristic processes. Also see below.
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in a signal because how much information a signal contains, and hence what information it
carries, depends on what the potential receiver already knows about the various possibilities
that exist at the source” (Dretske, 1981, p. 79). Although we might not know (or even cannot
know) absolute measures associated with the amount of information generated by an event or
carried by a signal, Dretske believes that comparisons can be made, “in particular comparisons
between the amount of information generated by the occurrence of an event and the amount of
information a signal carries about that event. . . . For example, if I tell you that Denny lives on
Adams Street in Madison, Wisconsin, I give you more information than if I tell you, simply,
that he lives in Madison, Wisconsin” (p. 54). With respect to the epistemological account I am
suggesting, we might consider epistemic technology as sources of information, and, of course,
the k-systems a person possesses determine what one knows about the source. Thus, what a
person can learn from epistemic technology depends on what one already knows about it. If I
give you a fish trap, and you know it as a fish trap (i.e., you can conceptualize it as a fish trap),
then you can get more information from it (to manipulate, for heuristics to exploit) than if you
do not know it as a fish trap.

What I am suggesting, then, is that, contra Sterelny and Gigerenzer, heuristics do not exploit
environmental structures directly. Rather, heuristics exploit k-systems within which substantial
amounts of information about the environmental structures in question are built, and this is how
we manage high-information-load cognition. That is, the information embodied by k-systems,
along with the extant relations within and between k-systems, are what enable heuristics to operate as they do; without the information and relations within and among k-systems, heuristics
certainly would not be as powerful and robust as they in fact are. Epistemic technology and
other environmental structures certainly can store and organize information, and thus exist as
informationally rich structures, but cognitive exploitation occurs via what is known about the
objects or events in concert with the problem(s) in question. We will get a better idea of how
this works in the next chapter.
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Exploiting k-systems, but still frugal

Before concluding this section, I will return to the issue of frugality with respect to heuristics. Notwithstanding that little cognitive resources are required to deploy heuristics, it appears
that the foregoing account suggests that heuristics can entail the processing of quite a lot of
information, since heuristics operate over informationally rich k-systems, and since heuristics
operate in high-information-load cognition. All sorts of information and assumptions can bear
in a variety of ways in much of our reasoning. We already saw this with respect to central
cognition, and we discussed its implications with respect to incurring relevance problems. But
on the foregoing account of central cognitive systems, it seems not only that a lot of information can bear on a given cognitive task, but a lot of information does bear. If so, this would
run against what most researchers (most notably Gigerenzer and his colleagues) believe of the
nature of heuristics—i.e., that heuristics are frugal processes, requiring little information in
their processing—as well as against what is generally believed to be necessary to avoid computational relevance problems—i.e., that the computational burdens associated with relevance
assessments can be relieved only if little information is processed, as outlined above.
It is instructive to consider here Dennett’s (1984) account of the frame problem. He offers
as an example a mundane task of making a midnight snack (complete with beverage):

Now of course I couldn’t do this without knowing a good deal—about bread,
spreading mayonnaise, opening the fridge, the friction and inertia that will keep
the turkey between the bread slices and the bread on the plate as I carry the plate
over to the table beside my easy chair. I also need to know about how to get the
beer out of the bottle into the glass. Thanks to my previous accumulation of experience in the world, fortunately, I am equipped with all this worldly knowledge.
. . . Such utterly banal facts escape our notice as we act and plan. (Dennett, 1984,
p. 134)

Dennett continues:

my midnight-snack-making behaviour is multifariously sensitive to current and
background information about the situation. The only way it could be so sensitive
. . . is for it to examine, or test for, the information in question. The information
manipulation may be unconscious and swift, and it need not (it better not) consist
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of hundreds or thousands of seriatim testing procedures, but it must occur somehow, and its benefits must appear in time to help me as I commit myself to action.
(Dennett, 1984, p. 138)
[The frame] problem concerns how to represent (so it can be used) all that hardwon empirical information . . . . Even if you have excellent knowledge (and not
mere belief) about the changing world, how can this knowledge be represented
so that it can be efficaciously brought to bear? . . . A walking encyclopedia will
walk over a cliff, for all its knowledge of cliffs and the effects of gravity, unless
it is designed in such a fashion that it can find the right bits of knowledge at the
right times, so it can plan its engagements with the real world. (Dennett, 1984, pp.
140-1)
In this light, the frame problem can be understood as the problem of how cognition achieves
the informational organization, and enables access to the relevant information, that seems to be
required for human-like cognitive performance. Interestingly, this idea was intimated by Fodor
(1975) in The Language of Thought, though his purposes for broaching the issue were slightly
different (though related). He there commented that “a fundamental and pervasive feature of
higher cognitive processes [is] the intelligent management of internal representations” (p. 164,
emphasis in original). In light of these considerations, we have yet a further aspect of the frame
problem—what I will call the representational frame problem:
The representational frame problem The problem of how a cognitive system
embodies the informational organization, and enables access to the relevant
information, that seems to be required for human-like cognitive performance.
I am claiming that k-systems are precisely the cognitive structures that exhibit the requisite
informational organization—that appropriately represent knowledge—to ensure access to the
right information for given cognitive tasks. And heuristics exploit such informational organization in their operations, effecting fast, on-the-fly cognition with reasonable levels of success.
At the same time, despite the exploitation of generous amounts of information, nothing
of what I have said implies that heuristics are not frugal. Frugality is (in a certain sense)
the essence of computational tractability, without which the computational relevance problem
threatens. Moreover, on the characterization given in the previous chapter, heuristics by their
very nature satisfice. And this entails that most information will not get considered in their
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processing; that is, satisficing and frugality go hand-in-hand. How, then, can heuristics’ frugality be reconciled with their being informationally taxing? The answer, I believe, lies in the
way information is organized and encoded in informational structures, such as k-systems and
epistemic technologies. It is these epistemic structures that shoulder the informational burden,
not the heuristics themselves. On my account of the architecture of central cognition, highly
organized epistemic structures (or systems) bear dense relations among its constituents, and
in addition, there are specific relations between epistemic structures. This is to say that the
architecture of k-systems themselves affect information flow. When one part of a structure is
utilized by a heuristic, there will be implications for other constituent parts (or other systems),
depending on the organization of the structure and the nature of the relations among its parts,
or to other systems. This might mean that other items of knowledge are activated (to a greater
or lesser extent) when a heuristic exploits one (or more) items in a given k-system.
For example, Gigerenzer’s Take the Best heuristic is a simple algorithm that produces a
decision solely based on a single discriminating cue.
(15)

(i) Search among alternatives; (ii) stop search when one alternative scores higher
on some predetermined criterion; (iii) choose the object identified in step ii.

The specifics of Take the Best was presented at the end of the previous chapter, where I argued
that heuristics are more than mere rules of thumb. But let us here remind ourselves of the
details of the heuristic as I draw implications for its frugality. Take the Best assumes that an
individual has a subjectively ranked order of cues stored in her memory which are believed to
discriminate between objects, and which are sequentially searched to make predictions.33 The
highest ranked cue which discriminates is believed to be “the best”, and the object which has
a positive value with respect to this best cue is chosen or assumed to score higher on some
criterion.34 The idea behind this heuristic is something like the following: Suppose you had to
33

I suppose that one can produce cue rankings on the fly, as the situation arises. However, according to Gigerenzer, we must have predetermined cue rankings stored in memory (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 1999). For
further discussion see chapter 5 (section 5.2.2).
34
Take the Best is supposed to apply only when there are two alternatives, but I believe that the heuristic can be
generalized to apply to situations in which there are more than two alternatives.
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choose which of a pair of cities is larger; you believe that having a university is the best cue
which discriminates on the criterion of relative city size; you know that one of the pair of cities
has a university and that the other does not. Using Take the Best, you would infer that the city
with the university is the larger of the two. But note that significant amounts of information are
probably built into the very belief that a cue discriminates. That having a university is a good
predictor of relative city size may presume, for instance, that one understands what a university
is; its function in society; how it houses a number of faculty, staff, and students; perhaps the
relative social classes of members of a community typical of such faculty, staff, and students;
maybe the ways in which having a university relates to the economy of a city; and probably
much more. Indeed, it is the presumption of this information that can make one believe that
having a university is a good predictor of relative city size, and enables one to recognize and
understand the cue as a (discriminating) cue. On my account, all this information can very
well constitute a dense web, but it would be embedded and organized within the k-systems
of an individual. The important point is this implies that when one uses a heuristic like Take
the Best, which operates according to a single cue to discriminate, one is actually (implicitly)
relying on much more information than is revealed by the heuristic’s surface simplicity.
Here are two more examples in a little less detail. Simon’s chess heuristic (9) and Kahneman and Tversky’s Recognition heuristic (11) each uses a small number of factors in its
operation.
(9)
(11)

In chess, consider first those moves that remove or protect pieces under attack.
Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is
representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness
(resemblance) the higher the probability estimation.

Similar to Take the Best, the Representativeness heuristic operates according to resemblance,
which is just one cue. Yet judging resemblance is not such a simple process. Rather, it is an
informationally demanding task, involving the extrapolation of relevant features from items
in perception and/or memory. Whether Dick’s description is judged to resemble an engineer
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rather than a lawyer requires that one understand what each of these occupations are, what
members of each occupations are typically like, why members of each occupation are typically
like their stereotype, and so on.35 On the other hand, (9) considers whether any of one’s own
chess pieces is threatened, and the feasibility of the moves that would remove the threats, if
any. At any given point in a typical chess match, the number of pieces under threat of capture
is small (usually no more than three). And the potential moves to remove or protect the piece
are also typically relatively few. However, the heuristic must rely on other information if it is
to operate at all, such as what moves each piece can legally make (and really, all, or most, of
the rules of the game). Since chess is a finite, well-defined game, the amount of information
that (9) invokes and relies upon, despite how simple it appears on the surface, may not be as
much as the Representativeness heuristic or Take the Best, but the point holds just the same.
It is in this way that I believe heuristics exploit informationally rich k-systems, but remain
frugal in their computations. In fact, we might say that it is because heuristics exploit k-systems
that they can be frugal, since it is the informational richness that is bearing the cognitive load.
If this is right, then I believe we have the beginnings of a plausible model of how heuristics
operate in central cognition.

3.5

Concluding remarks

To recap, we began by considering the frame problem and saw that there are many aspects to it.
This chapter was guided by the computational relevance problem, and more specifically with
the appeal to heuristics to circumvent the problem. I showed that such an appeal to heuristics
has implications for cognitive architecture.
Philosophers such as Samuels (2005, forthcoming) and Carruthers (2006a, 2006c) believe
that heuristics solve the frame problem, whereas Fodor argues that they do not. I argued that
heuristics do not offer the kind of solution that Samuels and Carruthers think; specifically,
heuristics fail to circumvent the epistemological relevance problem. However, despite these
35

In chapter 5, I will be giving a fuller description of the Dick example, and an analysis in light of the thesis of
this dissertation.
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arguments, I want to maintain that heuristics actually have a significant role in circumventing
such epistemological worries (though, of course, not in the way that Samuels and Carruthers
suggest). So I went on to gain a better understanding of the role heuristics have in cognition,
which meant investigating more thoroughly how heuristics work and the structures they operate
over.
Some authors believe that tractable cognition requires domain-specific computational mechanisms, and thus heuristics must be domain-specific. A domain-specific mechanism is supposed to have built into it a significant amount of information about the domain in which
it operates so as to render it informationally rich, capable of quickly deploying strategies to
(re)solve the problems with which it is faced. Nevertheless, following Samuels (2000, 2005),
I argued that central cognition can be a domain-general computational system that draws on a
variety of specialized bodies of knowledge. Samuels and Fodor (2000) construe such domainspecific bodies of knowledge as Chomskian modules, which are innate and domain-specific.
But I argued that such specialized bodies of knowledge need be neither innate nor domainspecific. These k-systems, as I call them, are simply highly organized and structured systems
of knowledge.
We saw that Sterelny (2003, 2006) believes that humans tend to increase their cognitive
powers by informational niche construction, and creating and utilizing epistemic technology.
Thus, Sterelny offers a plausible account of how informationally rich bodies of knowledge can
be constructed, developed, and possessed by humans, as well as how such informational richness can be instilled and stored in the environment for humans to, perhaps heuristically, draw
on and exploit. In contrast to Sterelny (and Gigerenzer), however, I claimed that heuristics do
not exploit information in the environment directly, but the information about the environment
embodied by the appropriate k-systems in our heads.
Finally, I argued that, although heuristics carry a high informational load, they remain
frugal in their operations or computations by exploiting informationally rich k-systems. In
short, exploiting k-systems is ultimately what allows heuristics to be fast and frugal, as k-
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systems bear much of the information load in cognition. This view is consistent with the
characterization of “heuristic” I developed in the previous chapter.
In the next chapter I will provide a more specific picture of k-systems and of how heuristics
exploit their informational richness. I will claim that what I have been referring to as k-systems
are in fact concepts. And after developing a specific theory of concepts, I will explain in more
detail how heuristics work.

Chapter 4
Concepts, Heuristics, and Relevance
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Now that I have described a general architecture of cognition, it is time to provide a more detailed account of the cognitive structures I have been calling k-systems. The account I will give
will show that concepts are the cognitive structures that fulfill the role of k-systems explained
in the previous chapter. The basic idea is that our concepts embody the kind of informational
structure that k-systems are supposed to have; and as such, concepts guide our reasoning and
inference, and they have a special role to play with respect to facilitating the operations of
heuristics in particular.
There are many theories of concepts. The theory that I will adapt is Lawrence Barsalou’s
(1999, 2003, 2005, 2008b, 2009; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003). Barsalou’s
account of concepts is unlike many of the leading philosophical accounts insofar as it comes
from a psychologist, and more importantly it is grounded in perception rather than nonperceptual cognition or a language of thought hypothesis.1 More specifically, Barsalou claims
that concepts are partly realized in collections of neural patterns in the perceptual centres of
the brain that were originally activated upon perceiving instances of entities in a concept’s
extension. Barsalou’s theory of concepts is situated in his more general view of conceptual
cognition, which he calls the perceptual symbol systems (PSS) view of cognition.
Although I will be drawing heavily from it in giving my own account of cognition and
how heuristics work, Barsalou’s theory will go largely undefended. Providing a full defence
of a theory of concepts is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, my reliance on PSS
is justified to the extent that the theory has psychological and neural (biological) plausibility.
Moreover, since my proposed cognitive architecture enables us to model heuristic cognition,
my reliance of the PSS model is justified insofar as we are able to explain a wide range of
phenomena (which, it may be recalled, was a goal set out in chapter 2).
As I shall show, the PSS theory of concepts is in some respects related to an account of
cognition that many philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists have converged on,
namely the file model of cognition. Such widespread convergence indicates that there likely is
1

Although see Prinz (2002).
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something right—or at least interesting—about the theory. According to the file model, concepts come with “files” that contain information (e.g., representations and beliefs) about the
concepts, or more precisely about the entities in the concept’s extension. In section 1 of this
chapter, I will expound Barsalou’s PSS theory as well as the file model of cognition. It will
be seen that these two accounts are not immediately compatible with each other. However, in
section 2 I will offer a critical assessment of each account, which will entail certain modifications and qualifications. The result will be a reconciled theory of concepts and cognition that
is more robust and, in my view, more fruitful.
In section 3 I argue that concepts, understood in terms of my reconciled theory, fulfill the
role of k-systems described in the previous chapter. I will there pick up the discussion from
the previous chapter regarding the exploitation of information in the environment, such as
epistemic technology, and argue that it is in fact one’s conceptual wherewithal to which one
owes the ability to exploit such information in the right ways. We will then be in a position
to see that concepts—or more precisely, the information embodied by concepts and the relations among such information—facilitate heuristic inference. Specifically, I will contend that
concepts constrain heuristic inference, and furthermore that the characterization of “heuristic”
given at the end of chapter 2 (viz. that they are cognitive procedures that satisfice, and require
little resources for their recruitment and deployment) is met by virtue of such constraints.
Section 4 will be devoted to providing a more detailed understanding of how heuristics
work. I contend that heuristics do not operate over conceptual content, but over higher-order
relations between active and primed concepts and their content (conceptualizations and representations). I describe two sorts of informational structure that heuristics exploit. These two
kinds of structure are not meant to be exhaustive, but in the next chapter I will illustrate that
they have a role in facilitating some of the heuristics studied by Kahneman and Tversky, and
Gigerenzer.
As we shall see, the present chapter will be one largely of synthesis, but it will provide
substance to many of the ideas central to this dissertation.
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Concepts and representation
Perceptual symbol systems

As alluded to, Barsalou’s (1999) theory of mental representation is perceptually grounded. His
view is in a similar vein as the British Empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. According
to the Empiricist tradition, sense experience is the only source of ideas (or mental representations), and moreover, ideas are imagistic in nature. The British Empiricists also believed
that thought proceeded via associations among ideas. Though Barsalou’s theory does not align
precisely with British Empiricism, his theory steps away from language of thought approaches
to mental representation by grounding representation in the perceptual system of the human
brain.
As Barsalou explains, the language of thought hypothesis originated from developments
in logic and computer science, from which formalisms such as the predicate calculus and
programming languages inspired new ways to conceive of mental representation.2 The new
conception of representation departed from experience-based empiricism, and this had considerable consequences, not least of which was a drawn principled distinction between perception
and cognition. One important difference believed to exist between perception and cognition is
that perceptual representations are understood to be modal (i.e., they have specific properties
that are bound to specific mental/neural systems), whereas cognitive representations are conceived to be inherently modality-neutral, or amodal. This immediately leads to the assumptions
that there must be separate mental/neural systems dedicated to perception on the one hand, and
cognition on the other, and that each system must use different means of representation and
operate on different principles. Thus, for instance, a perceptual representation of a chair will
have specific properties and be produced by specific systems that are able to represent its shape,
colour, tactile features, and so on. On the other hand, a cognitive representation of the same
chair will have none of these features, but will be represented—via a transduction of information from perceptual systems to cognitive systems—as a nonperceptual, amodal symbol
2

Cf. the discussion in chapter 2 of this dissertation regarding the rise of the interest in heuristics.
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chair,3 that behaves a lot like and shares similar properties with words or sentences of natural
languages. It is believed that, as amodal symbols are transduced from perceptual systems, they
enter into larger representational structures that operate as a fully functional symbolic system
which supports all of the higher cognitive functions. Assuming CTM, mental conceptual processing can thereby be understood to be computational operations defined over the word- or
sentence-like syntax of the representations of the language of thought. Thus, we get in thought
and thinking the productivity, systematicity, compositionality, and everything else that we get
with natural languages (Fodor, 1975, 1983, 2008; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988).
Nevertheless, Barsalou believes that mental representations are not amodal language-like
structures. Rather, he argues that representations are modal “perceptual symbols”. Perceptual
symbols “are records of the neural states that underlie perception” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 582),
and therefore perceptual symbols “are modal because they are represented in the same systems
as the perceptual states that produced them” (p. 578).4 Thus, on Barsalou’s account, perception and cognition share representational systems. This does not mean that identical systems
subserve perception and conceptual thought; for indeed, mechanisms additional to perceptual
systems are needed for conceptual thought. Instead, perceptual symbols are essentially based
in or arise from perceptual systems in virtue of capturing and maintaining information from
perceiving entities and events in the environment and the body. Hence, for Barsalou, “cognition is inherently perceptual” (p. 577).
We should note that in important ways perceptual symbols are unlike the ideas or mental
images envisioned by the British Empiricists. Perceptual symbols are not conscious mental
images, but are patterns of neuron activations. Therefore, although perceptual symbols can
function in consciousness or unconsciousness, they are essentially unconscious mental representations. Moreover, whereas Berkeley and Hume believed that representation cannot occur
without some specific particular being represented, Barsalou claims that perceptual symbols do
3

The convention I adopt here is to represent concepts in small caps, contents in italics, and uses in quotes.
It is not entirely clear what makes perceptual symbols, symbols in the philosophical sense (i.e., in terms
of meaning, referring, and being grounded). I want to avoid these issues, however, so I will uncritically follow
Barsalou’s terminology.
4
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not necessarily represent particulars. This is because perceptual symbols are not entire neural
states that are activated in perception. Rather, they are only schematic aspects of the neural
states of active perception. According to Barsalou, selective attention allows the cognitive system to isolate and focus on only certain features of a perceptual state, depending on the nature
of the cognitive/perceptual task. As he observes, psychological work on attention has shown
that cognition can attend to the shape of an object while ignoring its colour, texture, and other
surrounding objects. Those features of a perceptual state (i.e., the subset of neural patterns active in perceptual systems) that are attended to in the right sort of way5 are consequently stored
in long-term memory (although some information not attended to may get encoded as well to
a lesser degree). It is these attended-to features that constitute mental representations.
As a result of the selective attention process of symbol storage, perceptual symbols are
componential, not holistic. This is to say that perceptual symbols represent certain features
determined by the stored neural patterns, not entire “images” as understood in the Empiricist
tradition in which Locke’s primary properties (such as shape or size) are necessarily present.
As Barsalou explains, “It is well known that high-level neurons in perceptual systems can
code information qualitatively. For example, a neuron can code the presence of a line without
coding its specific length, position, or orientation” (p. 585). One can therefore represent a line
with few or no other specific qualities.6 This may seem counterintuitive, but it is important to
keep in mind here that perceptual symbols are essentially unconscious representations (that can
function in consciousness). Thus, despite the fact that it is difficult, or maybe even impossible,
to consciously construct a nonholistic representation (e.g., an image), it is not unreasonable to
assume that this can be done unconsciously.
5

Barsalou does not offer a theory of attention.
One might conjecture here that it is the use of one’s concept that enables someone to represent a line without
representing a specific length, position, or orientation. That is, once one grasps the concept line, one need not
represent any specific features of a particular line when mentally invoking the concept. This may very well be the
case, but it misses the point being made here, which is that Barsalou’s conception of perceptual symbols is not to
be equated with static images (Barsalou, 1999, 2008b) such as those envisioned by the British Empiricists, and
moreover, that Barsalou cites empirical evidence for the possibility of human neurology to realize representations
of an object without representing many of its specific features. (Pylyshyn (2003) gives evidence that properties
of objects can be tracked without being represented, and this lends support to the possibility of representing an
object without representing specific properties of it.)
6
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Perceptual symbols are not only supposed to be modal, according to Barsalou, but multimodal
in the sense that they encode information from any of the sensory modalities. The idea is that
different neural/sensory systems will become active upon perceiving an object, and information captured by these systems will serve to represent various perceptual features of the object.
Thus, during visual processing of a chair, edge and surface detector neurons fire, while other
neurons fire for colour, orientation, and motion. The overall pattern of activation across this
distributed system represents the entity in vision. Analogous patterns of neural activation in
other sensory modality systems represent how the chair feels, smells, sounds, etc. (Barsalou,
2009). Attended-to aspects of these activation patterns are conjoined by “conjunctive neurons”
that bind features within a given modality (Barsalou, 2009; Barsalou et al., 2003; Simmons
& Barsalou, 2003; cf. Damasio’s (1989) notion of convergence zones), and these bound patterns are stored in memory as perceptual symbols. “Later, in the absence of [perceptual] input,
these conjunctive neurons partially reactivate the original set of feature detectors to represent
the [chair]” (Barsalou et al., 2003, p. 85), and higher association areas of the brain (i.e., the
temporal, parietal, and frontal lobes) integrate activations across modalities (Barsalou, 2009).
These integrated activations thus constitute multimodal perceptual symbol representations.
A very important feature of PSS is that perceptual symbols do not exist independently of
one another. Rather, “related [perceptual] symbols become organized into a simulator that allows the cognitive system to construct specific simulations” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 586) of the
perceptual component it represents.7 The simulations Barsalou has in mind are analogous to
7

In his original paper, Barsalou (1999) was not explicit on what makes perceptual symbols “related”, though
he hinted toward the roles played by spatial and temporal relations of external events. More recently, Simmons
and Barsalou (2003) propose that the spatial proximity between conjunctive neurons (i.e., the neurons that bind
the neural patterns that represent perceptual features) in the brain’s association areas is indicative of similarity
relations between representations. In more specific terms, Simmons and Barsalou propose what they call the
similarity-in-topography principle, which states that the closer that conjunctive neurons are in the spatial topography of an association area, the more similar those features will be; in their own words: “In general, the topographic
proximity of two conjunctive neurons reflects the similarity of the features they link” (p. 458). As an example,
Simmons and Barsalou claim that the conjunctive neurons that serve to represent a human face will lie close to,
and even partly overlap with, the conjunctive neurons that serve to represent a monkey face; the conjunctive neurons for the face of an elephant, on the other hand, will not reside as close to those for the human face, but will
be much closer than conjunctive neurons that serve to represent a completely different type of object, such as a
chair. Simmons and Barsalou do not have an answer as to what makes conjunctive neurons bind certain features
rather than others. However, they suggest that conjunctive neurons may be “tuned” to certain features that are of
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the simulations that are conducted in mental imagery. When multimodal perceptual information is extracted and integrated into an organized system, one can, at any point thereafter,
mentally simulate one’s experiences. Barsalou goes on to assert that, according to his theory,
“the primary goal of human learning is to establish simulators. . . . Once individuals can simulate a kind of thing to a culturally acceptable degree, they have an adequate understanding of
it” (p. 587). In other words, once one is able to construct a range of multimodal simulations
of an object or event (in a manner that is congruent within one’s community), one possesses
the concept for that object or event. Hence, Barsalou claims that “a concept is equivalent to a
simulator” insofar as a concept consists of “the knowledge and accompanying processes that
allow an individual to represent some kind of entity or event adequately” (p. 587).8 It will become much clearer as we work through this chapter how important the knowledge to represent
an entity or event adequately is; specifically with respect to enabling certain neural activations
(e.g., those activated for words) to activate the appropriate representations for a given concept.
Moreover, a concept is a general kind, but since simulators produce simulations, a concept can undergo any number of conceptualizations—different representations of a concept
according to the many different possible simulations of it. Again, for example, a chair can
be conceptualized (represented) in different ways concerning its size, shape, colour, material
evolutionary significance; and they leave the door open to the possibility that (at least some) “tuning” is learned.
These matters are tangential to the present discussion, so I will not assess them here.
8
Since the publication of his original paper, Barsalou has wavered on his stance on equating simulators with
concepts. For instance, in a paper published some four years later, he and his collaborators discuss some empirical
data on grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. They there state that “nothing is explicitly called a concept”, and that the simulator is “one central mechanism” of conceptual processing (Barsalou et
al., 2003, p. 84, Box 1). Yet, in a publication that same year, Barsalou asserts, “a concept is a simulator that
constructs an infinite set of specific simulations” (Barsalou, 2003, p. 522; more on this below). More recently,
Barsalou contends that simulators “implement” concepts and conceptual processing, while at the same time stating that “Theoretically, a simulator functions as a concept or type in more traditional theories by integrating the
multi-modal content of a category across instances, and by providing the ability to interpret individuals as tokens
of the type” (Barsalou, 2009, p. 1282). In another work, he states, “simulators are roughly equivalent to concepts
in traditional theories of knowledge” (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008, p. 251). Barsalou’s noncommittal stance toward strictly identifying concepts with simulators may be a reflection of his effort to distance
his view from language of thought theories of mental representation and concepts (Barsalou, 2003, 2005b). It is
also possible that Barsalou is using the term “concept” to refer to categories, as psychologists are wont to do, as
opposed to what philosophers mean by concepts. However, on some occasions it appears as if Barsalou is in fact
using “concept” the way philosophers use the term. In any event, to avoid the vagueness of Barsalou’s position,
I will assume here that simulators are to be identified with concepts. As we shall see presently, the theory of
concepts I develop adopts this position.
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composition, feel, etc.9 Different conceptualizations will be activated depending on the context
and goals of the agent.
Concepts are standardly conceived to represent categories or classes of things in the world,
i.e., the objects in their extension. chair represents the class of chairs; cat represents the
class of cats; etc. As such, Barsalou claims that once a simulator becomes established in
memory, and as knowledge is accumulated and added to the simulator, one is in a position
to identify members of its class, adequately interact with its members, and make categorical
inferences about them. Categorical inferences proceed from knowledge associated with the
category, which “provides predictions about [an] entity’s structure, history, and behavior, and
also suggests ways of interacting with it” (p. 587). Furthermore, since a simulator contains
an enormous amount of (multimodal) knowledge about a category, one can simulate aspects
that go beyond what is perceived, such as anticipating an entity’s structure or behaviour. For
example, Barsalou claims that the simulator for jet “might suggest that the jet contains pilots,
passengers, luggage, and fuel . . . that the jet is likely to fly horizontally, not vertically, and is
eventually likely to decrease altitude, put down its wheels, and land at an airport” (p. 596).
Thus, simulators, according to Barsalou, afford a wealth of top-down inferences.
It would be instructive to pause here to note that, as Barsalou describes the affordances of
simulators, simulators appear to be as potent as propositional knowledge. We should be hesitant
to accept this, at least not without some critical reflection. Simulators consist of perceptual
symbols which are in some ways similar to images (though, recall, they are distinct from
images). There is a problem, however, with images expressing propositions—a problem that
goes as far back as Fodor (1975) in The Language of Thought (chapter 4). Fodor argued that
9

Barsalou (1999) claims that, despite the fact that an individual can produce different simulations or conceptualizations of a given concept, concepts are stable for an individual insofar as the same simulator (i.e., the same
areas of neural activation) produces the different simulations. Moreover, Barsalou claims that, although different
individuals conceptualize concepts differently, concepts are stable between individuals insofar as (i) they share
similar cognitive systems and experiences, and (ii) they have the ability to simulate each others’ conceptualizations. I mention these issues to anticipate some philosophical worries that some may have with Barsalou’s theory,
such as how we are to individuate concepts, how to account for concept stability (i.e., how a concept can remain
the same concept under different simulations or conceptualizations), how the same person can maintain the same
concepts over time, and how different people share the same concepts (this is what Fodor (2008) calls “publicity”).
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we cannot think in images because images cannot express propositions, and this is because
images “are insufficiently abstract to be the vehicles of truth” (p. 180)—a problem that does
not exist for a representational system like language. Consider for example a picture of Bob,
who happens to be a short and fat man. Can we say that the picture truly express “This is
Bob”? Or “This is a man”? Or “Bob is a short, fat man”? Or “Bob is pregnant”? (For the last,
think about what picture would express that proposition.) In short, images do not do the kind of
work that language does, since images are essentially analogue representations while linguistic
representations are digital. In light of this, then, we might be skeptical about Barsalou’s claims
regarding the work that simulators qua collections of perceptual symbols do. As indicated,
perceptual symbols are not to be identified with images.10 Nevertheless, the fact that simulators
are based in the perceptual centres of the brain should cause us to question whether simulators
can “suggest” the propositional knowledge that Barsalou claims (e.g., can a simulator for jet
be a vehicle for the truth that the jet will eventually land at an airport?). This problem may
be circumvented if we include a role for natural language in our conceptualizations. I will
be returning to this suggestion when I adapt Barsalou’s theory to achieve an understanding of
richer concepts.
In any event, simulators, as Barsalou envisions them, also impose constraints on conceptual
processing, which arise from associative connections between perceptual symbols that represent individuals within the simulator. Thus, activating a subset of perceptual symbols having to
do with the back of a chair can activate associated subsets of perceptual symbols having to do
with the seat of the chair. Constraints weaken or strengthen over time, and default perceptual
symbols can be constructed. Hence, what one simulates (or at least the ease with which one
simulates) is constrained by the perceptual symbols one possesses and the relations between
them. Furthermore, simulators provide background structures that support understanding concepts. For example, the meaning of “lock” is ambiguous when left unspecified relative to some
background—it can mean (among other things) a tuft of hair or something that fastens a door.
10

Maybe they are better likened to film strips, though with the possibility of only certain properties being
represented.
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But different perceptual symbols are accessed for “lock” depending on the context. An active
simulator for hair will determine a background of organized knowledge against which “lock”
is understood and conceptualized as a tuft of hair; whereas “lock” will be conceptualized as
something that fastens a door when entertained against the background simulator for door.
Such constraints on conceptualization and representation will have a significant role in the
account I develop below of how heuristics work.
In summary, multimodal perceptual symbols are derived from previous perceptual experiences with certain events or objects. Perceptual symbols get bound up and integrated into a
simulator that produces a range of simulations or conceptualizations of the events or objects in
question. In this way, simulators are concepts, and the simulations produced by a simulator represent multimodal features of entities that belong to the concept’s extension (i.e., simulations
are conceptualizations).
Barsalou’s theory of concepts is certainly unlike the standard accounts found in philosophy,
especially those that rely on the language of thought hypothesis. Although it is beyond the
scope of this dissertation to fully defend Barsalou’s theory, I believe that it is a psychologically
and neurologically (biologically) plausible account of mental representation. As we shall later
see, I will adapt PSS theory to advance my account of how heuristics work. Nevertheless, some
justification for adopting Barsalou’s account can be found vis-à-vis a model of cognition that
is becoming increasingly popular in philosophy and cognitive science, namely the file model
of cognition. I will now briefly expound the file model, and afterwards I will critically assess
it in concert with Barsalou’s theory of concepts in an attempt to reconcile the two accounts.

4.1.2

The file metaphor

A number of cognitive scientists and philosophers have converged on an idea about the nature
and function of mental representations (e.g., Bach, 1987; G. Evans, 1982, 1985; Fodor, 2008;
Lawlor, 2001; Perry, 2001). The idea is a file model of cognition (Kahneman, Treisman,
& Gibbs, 1992; Pylyshyn, 2003; Treisman, 1982; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). There is no
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standard doctrine accepted by everyone who endorses the file model, but there is some common
ground that can be identified. I will here roughly follow Fodor’s (2008) account since it brings
to bear a number of issues that are of concern to this chapter.
According to the file model of cognition, each object that one has beliefs about (i.e., knows
of, is acquainted with, erroneously believes exists, etc.) has its own mental “file” in one’s
head. Each mental file has a “label” that both picks out the file, and names the object that is
associated with the file. Further, each file holds a number of “notes” or “memos” that contain
various kinds of information or beliefs about the given object. Recently, the file model has
been adapted as a way to understand the nature and function of concepts.
According to Fodor, mental file-labels are expressions in Mentalese, and the file-notes are
written also in Mentalese. For example, when you think office, you token an office-label,
which calls up the corresponding file. You can then open the office-file and find in it notes
containing representations about desks, office doors, books, shelves, papers, computers, and so
on, depending on what you believe about offices. Conversely, the office-file is what gets brought
to mind when you, for instance, recall where you left your copy of Modularity of Mind.
Of course, files get created and altered subsequent to new experiences and changes of beliefs. When you meet Alice for the first time, a new mental file gets created, labeled Alice,11
and in it a number of notes are created according to the beliefs you acquire about Alice. Over
time new notes are added and some notes get revised: You had initially thought that Alice was
single, but now you have come to believe that she is married, and so you make the appropriate
corrections to the notes in your Alice-file. The number of files and the number of notes in each
file can be very large. Fodor believes that they can be “arbitrarily large” and speculates that this
might mean “potentially infinite” (p. 94). But surely, what files and notes one has are bound
by limitations on memory. This does not mean, however, that one cannot have an extremely
large number of files and notes.
There is also the possibility, as acknowledged by Fodor, that beliefs not contained within a
11

If one knows more than one Alice, the mental file would be labeled Alicen , where n differentiates. (This is
how Fodor (2008) claims to have solved Frege-style problems of sense and reference.)
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given file may be inferred “online”. Thus, the belief that your cat is not in the top drawer of the
desk in your office is probably not in your office-file, and is generally not something that you
store anywhere in memory, but can be inferred when and if there is an occasion to do so. This
certainly mitigates the demands that the file model places on memory. Moreover, there will
likely be constraints on these sorts of inferences. An inference that your pen is in your desk
drawer is easily made, since that is the place where you usually keep your pen—you therefore
have a store of memories and representations of your pen in your desk drawer. Inferring that
your cat is not in your desk drawer may not be as readily made, given that your cat is never
in your office and may not even fit in the drawer. However, you will probably never infer that
your car is not in your desk drawer (except when doing philosophy), since your car is simply
not the kind of thing that is or can be in a desk drawer (not to mention in an office).12 We
should acknowledge, however, that this is an empirical matter, as is what is actually stored in
one’s files and gets inferred online.
The file model of cognition is useful in explaining the flow of thought. For the notes of a
file can themselves contain the names of labels for other files. Thus, when one searches through
the contents of a given file, other files may be brought to mind. When you recall that your copy
of Modularity of Mind is on top of a stack of papers on your desk by opening your office-file,
the files for papers and desk may be made available for opening and searching among their
contents. Alternatively, one may make inferences and thereby make available further files.
Thus, even so your office-file does not contain a note conveying the belief that your cat is not
in the top drawer of your desk, you can infer this and thereby bring to mind the file for Felix,
your cat.
It is important for the present purposes to understand how the file model can be understood
12

We might think of these constraints in terms of pattern matching of information stored in memory. In our
example, you have memories and representations of your pen in your desk drawer, whereas you have no memories
or representations of your cat (or your car) in your desk drawer. And, by assumption, it would be much easier
to match and retrieve associated representations in memory (your pen and your desk drawer) than unassociated
representations (your cat (or your car) and your desk drawer); and there may even be resistance in associating
certain representations if there are conceptual problems in bringing them together (such as your car and your desk
drawer, as cars are not the kinds of things that can fit in a desk). See below for further remarks.
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more particularly to be a theory of the structure of concepts. On this reading, a concept names
a file that contains beliefs about the things in the concept’s extension. When thinking about
cats, for instance, one calls upon one’s file for cat, which may contain such information as is
a living thing, is a furry creature, is a quadruped, is grandma’s favourite animal, etc. Notice
now that what is contained in the file—what notes there are in the file—name other concepts:
living thing, furry creature, quadruped, grandma’s favourite animal, etc. This is not classical
decomposition. Rather, concept files contain notes that convey information about the concept
in question. Hence, unpacking the notes of one’s cat concept file is unpacking one’s beliefs
and other stored information about cats, the representations of which invoke further concepts.
Moreover, similar to what was explained above, whatever is inferred from the beliefs one holds
about a given concept may also excite further concepts, thereby bringing to mind files of their
own. The upshot of this picture for Fodor is that, since concepts name files, one thinks in
file names; and one can subsequently entertain the notes of a file once the appropriate file
name (i.e., concept) is tokened. In short, “file names are Janus-faced: one face turned towards
thinking and the other face turned towards what is thought about” (Fodor, 2008, p. 100).
What I have presented here in brief is a basic file model of cognition. Some authors add a
number of details beyond this basic model, but considering these extra details will take us too
far afield. We will gain a better understanding of how Fodor envisions the file model to contribute to the nature and function of concepts when I critically assess his account below. For
now, however, let us observe that Barsalou’s theory of concepts bears a certain relation to the
file model, as both theories characterize cognitive representations and concepts in relation to
ensembles of information that exhibit specific structures and relations. More specifically, the
information constituting the perceptual symbols involved in a concept’s simulations can be understood to be what is contained in the concept’s file. Nevertheless, there are some details that
need to get ironed out if Barsalou’s theory of concepts is to be reconciled with the file model of
cognition, and, importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, if the resulting reconciliation
can fulfill the role of k-systems as conceived in the previous chapter. For instance, Barsalou’s

Chapter 4. Concepts, Heuristics, and Relevance

138

perceptual symbols are multimodal and grounded in perception whereas the labels and notes
of a file are supposed to be conceived in terms of an amodal language of thought. In the next
section I will argue for some amendments to both Barsalou’s theory and the file model, the
result of which will be a reconciled theory of concepts and cognition. I will subsequently show
that this reconciled theory indeed supports the role of k-systems; I will then be in a position to
propose that they underlie the operations of heuristics.

4.2

A theory of richer concepts

This section will proceed in two steps. First, I will discuss a problem faced by the file model.
This problem is regarding whether it is possible to token a concept without invoking any representational content. I will argue that this is not possible on Fodor’s version of the file model,
since it runs contrary to some assumptions of the language of thought hypothesis. I will suggest
more generally that conceptual content and associations between representations are invariably
invoked when mentally entertaining a concept. This view will play a crucial role for my account of how heuristics work. In suggesting this view, moreover, I will propose that Barsalou’s
PSS theory be interpreted in light of the file model, thereby initiating a reconciliation between
the file model and Barsalou’s theory of concepts.
The second step entails a critique of the PSS theory of concepts as envisioned by Barsalou.
In this subsection, I will argue for a role for natural language that augments Barsalou’s understanding of simulators and simulations. The result will be an enriched theory of concepts and
cognition which will underwrite the remainder of the discussion in this dissertation.

4.2.1

Conceptual content and associations

The degree to which notes are extracted from files will depend on the cognitive task and task
demands. In general, the whole of what one believes about an object or concept will not
be brought to bear in one’s thinking. Instead, one will tend to (or at least hope to) bring to
bear only what is relevant. In recalling where you left your copy of Modularity of Mind, for
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example, you will not recall everything you know or believe about offices—that is, you will
not consider the office-file in its entirety. You would likely extract some information to the
effect of, say, Modularity of Mind being on your office desk; and other representations may
also concomitantly be brought to mind, such as those having to do with the stack of papers
you have sitting on your desk, on top of which lies Modularity of Mind. (I italicize papers and
desk to signify, as explained above, that these representations can also be the labels of files
themselves (i.e., concepts), and thus any of a host of representations related to these objects
may be activated.)
On the other hand, Fodor contends that label-representations can serve in one’s thoughts
without inviting any other representations contained in their corresponding files to be brought
to mind. This means, for instance, that you can token an office-representation qua file label
without attending to any other beliefs about offices—that is, token the label without opening
the mental file. Whether one does or does not open files when labels serve as constituents of
one’s thoughts will, again, depend on the cognitive task and the task demands. Although this
is an empirical claim, it is a matter of principle according to Fodor. As he asserts, there is a
principled distinction between a file and the notes it contains; and this allows for a correspondingly principled distinction between entertaining a representation and entertaining other beliefs
about that representation (Fodor, 2008, p. 97).
Whether one can in fact entertain a representation without entertaining other beliefs about
that representation, or whether and to what extent this actually does happen, are issues that
deserve serious attention. I suppose, however, that one cannot think a representation (have
a representation in thought) without entertaining other (related) representations. Indeed, it is
hard to understand how one can token a file label without invoking any content on Fodor’s
view, since file labels are supposed to be the constituents of thought, namely concepts. But
tokening a concept supposes content. The crux of this issue has to do with the way in which
labels are connected to their referents. Since, according to Fodor, labels are concepts, tokening
a label in thought must bring the referent to mind, and this implies that some content must
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be invoked. Thus, the tokening of a concept in thought supposes entertaining other (related)
representations.
It is important to keep in mind that the principled distinction between a file and the file’s
contents, and the correspondingly principled distinction between entertaining a concept and
entertaining other beliefs about that concept, are grounded in the language of thought hypothesis. It is the labels of files that are supposed to be the representations we think in, i.e., our
concepts. In other words, file labels are the nonperceptual, amodal, language-like symbolic
representations that are the constituents of the language of thought. Notes that are in attending
files are also written in the language of thought, though they would be complex constructions
of the basic constituents, i.e., complex constructions of concepts. According to Fodor’s account of the file model, it is because we think in file labels that we are able to pull files, as
it were, without necessarily opening them; and hence, so Fodor claims, one can think office
without entertaining any beliefs about offices. Fodor claims that this is possible when the name
of the office-file is the constituent of one’s thoughts. But it is difficult to understand what he
means by this when he is committed to the position that the proper constituents of thought
are supposed to be concepts and not the names of concepts. As we shall see below, there is
a sense in which Fodor’s claim is tenable, namely if we understand file labels to be natural
language forms (e.g., words). Labels might thereby be connected to the referents expressed
by concepts, but tokening a linguistic form in thought will not necessarily bring the referent to
mind—linguistic forms per se are contentless. That is, if we understand file labels to be natural
language forms, the label would be connected to the file, but the content is the stuff in the file,
and whether and the extent to which the file is opened and explored will depend on the task,
cognitive demands, etc. Nevertheless, this possibility is not open to Fodor since, again, he is
committed to the assumption that file labels just are concepts. Yet concepts are unlike natural language words in that inter alia concepts cannot be divorced from their representational
content. Natural language words, on the other hand, are not essentially mental representations;
rather, they are linguistic representations which can be mentally represented. This is an onto-
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logical distinction that should not be ignored. I will return to this distinction between natural
language and Fodor’s file labels below.
It therefore does not appear that Fodor can consistently maintain that file labels can be
entertained without invoking (at least some of) the file’s representational content.13 In general,
I assume that concept-files are brought to mind partly opened with some of its contents spilling
out—some of its contents are activated, while other contents are primed. This may be due to
unconscious14 entertaining of representations before they are “brought to mind” in conscious
thought. But whatever the case may be, if this is correct, the principled distinction between
entertaining a representation and entertaining other beliefs about that representation does not
hold.15
We already saw that Barsalou does not subscribe to the language of thought hypothesis,
and that concepts, according to his theory, are multimodal and grounded in perception. Furthermore, concepts are richly structured on Barsalou’s account, consisting of a simulator and a
potentially infinite set of simulations. Indeed, Barsalou argues that such structure can provide
for the productivity and compositionality we get with natural language. I propose, however,
that his theory of concepts be interpreted in light of the file model. Accordingly, the PSS view
would entail that concepts are not mere file labels, but are the files in their entirety, notes and
all. The integrated perceptual symbols in a simulator and its simulations can be understood as
the notes in the file, while the simulator can be understood as the file itself. Barsalou’s theory
thus interpreted is consistent with the assumption that files are brought to mind partly opened
with some of its contents spilling out. For on the foregoing account, entertaining a concept by
conducting simulations will necessarily activate and prime a variety of information about the
13

Save for the possibility of contentless concepts. I am unsure, however, whether there can be contentless
concepts. At the very least, we can safely assume that the concepts we usually entertain in thought will have
content.
14
To be succinct, I will use “unconscious” to refer to anything that is not conscious, including preconscious
thought or representation.
15
We might also note that if it is possible to token a concept without tokening any other representations, then
it would be possible for a mind to contain only a single concept which it grasps and of which it has thoughts (cf.
Fodor, 1990)—in Fodor’s words, thinking about the concept “as such”. However, this is seen to be absurd, since
thinking in concepts supposes content, and content supposes more than a single representation.
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concept.
Fodor maintains that it is wrong to characterize concepts as files themselves, rather than
labels, since not only does this dissolve the distinction between entertaining a file and considering its contents, but it also threatens associationist commitments that, being a computationalist,
Fodor is loathe to endorse. For instance, if we accept that concepts are files themselves, then
when one entertains a file one must entertain all thoughts implicated by the notes that happen
to “spill out”. Fodor might be right that not everyone thinks mouse when she thinks cat, even
though these are highly associated concepts. However, the co-tokening of representations need
not occur in conscious thought. Indeed, it may be recalled that Barsalou believes that perceptual symbols are mostly utilized unconsciously. Thus, co-activations or primings of concepts
and representations can very well occur unconsciously, even if they do not reach consciousness.
It can be that I consciously token cat, but I unconsciously token mouse representations. Or, in
terms of Barsalou’s theory, I consciously token cat, and perceptual symbols having to do with
mice (say, a cat chasing a mouse) are activated unconsciously; in fact, on Barsalou’s theory,
unconscious perceptual symbols may cause me to consciously token cat in the first place.
This picture, however, should not be confused with the associationists’ doctrine that Fodor
argues against; Barsalou’s theory is not an associative-dispositionalist theory. Whereas associationists believe that fixed associations are what guide thought, the connections between representations on Barsalou’s account are dynamic and vary in degree, depending on the context
and the cognitive task, as well as on the strength of connections between perceptual symbols.
If I am simply thinking about how lazy cats can be, I may entertain no representations of mice
at all, consciously or unconsciously. Again, in terms of Barsalou’s theory, my cat simulator
would not be simulating anything having to do with mice.
Moreover, Barsalou need not be committed to the claim that thought generally proceeds via
associations among representations, despite the claim that ex hypothesi people have a general
tendency to co-token representations associated with the concept one is entertaining. When tokening cat, one can very well entertain a number of beliefs about cats (from the notes in the cat
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file or the perceptual symbols involved in a simulation) and thereby activate a network of associations between various other concepts, without thought proceeding via those associations.
Certainly, one can proceed from one thought to the next based on associations, but this is optional and depends on the cognitive task and effort being invested in the task. At the same time,
it is perfectly acceptable on the foregoing account that thought generally proceeds via inference (consciously or unconsciously). One can certainly entertain representations and attending
concepts associated with cat without inferring anything from those associations. Yet inferences
can be made by utilizing the associations or co-tokenings of representations. In this way, one’s
thoughts might be “guided by” associations in a loose sense. We shall see in more detail below
the role of co-tokened representations when entertaining concepts in inferential cognition. The
present point, however, is simply that the analysis of Barsalou’s theory of concepts that I am
giving here should not be understood as a brand of associative-dispositionalism.
To sum up the discussion so far, it is possible to reconcile Barsalou’s theory of concepts
with the file model, even if the language of thought hypothesis is rejected. Concepts are thus
understood as files in their entirety, notes and all, and with at least some associated representations active and others primed (most of which occurs unconsciously) while the concept is being
entertained. This is approaching the kind of structure that I envision serves the role played by
k-systems in cognition developed in the previous chapter. Before explaining this in more detail, however, I will point out a problem that Barsalou’s account faces, and offer a remedy. This
will lead to an enrichment of conceptual structure better suited to the informational structure
of k-systems.

4.2.2

A critique of the PSS theory of concepts

Barsalou has recently acknowledged the involvement of more than just perceptual systems in
conceptual knowledge, including systems subserving language, affect or emotion, and statistical representation (Barsalou, 2009; Barsalou et al., 2008; Santos, Chaigneau, Simmons, &
Barsalou, forthcoming). As we shall see below, he assigns a special role to the language fac-
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ulty in particular for representing and processing concepts. Nevertheless, the involvement of
these other cognitive systems in conceptual cognition is restricted to guiding conceptual processes, and they do not contribute to the nature of concepts themselves. That is, Barsalou
continues to maintain that concepts are inherently perceptual—concepts are collections and
activations of perceptual symbols, which are based in the perceptual systems and have been
stored in long-term memory. (Although he is open to revising his position pending empirical
evidence; Barsalou et al., 2008.)
One thing that Barsalou’s theory fails to account for, however, is how we acquire concepts
for which no perceptual events are associated, or for which no perceptual events are possible.
Barsalou discusses how we might acquire and use abstract concepts, such as truth or disjunction, via simulations of perceptual symbols of events (e.g., he claims that we can simulate
truth by simulating an event conveyed by a sentence, and then check to see if the simulated
event—or something sufficiently close to it—is in the actual world). I am not convinced by
Barsalou’s account of how we might acquire and use abstract concepts, but I will not adjudicate the matter here. For in any event, these are not the kinds of concepts that I have in mind
by those for which no perceptual events are associated or possible. Rather, the kinds of concepts that cause serious trouble for Barsalou’s account are concepts like proton. A proton is a
subatomic particle of which any type of perceptual experience is impossible. How are we to
simulate proton if we cannot acquire any perceptual symbols for it? Certainly we can conceive
a proton to be a tiny sphere spinning around, but no serious (contemporary) scientist believes
this to be true. In fact, protons have a specific structure made up of three quarks. Protons also
have a +1 elementary charge. What perceptual symbols would be used to simulate these properties? Analogies can be made with visual diagrams, but these do not adequately capture the
conceptual information afforded by grasping the concept itself. Quarks are not circles, nuclear
bonds are not squiggly lines, and a positive elementary charge is not a “+” symbol. This is not
to say that these visual things cannot represent the properties of protons. But we need some
requisite conceptual knowledge of the referents before we can understand the representation
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relation and what is being represented. A red octagon does not look like “Stop!” any more
than a sphere looks like a proton, but we need knowledge of stop if we are to understand that a
red octagon represents a command to stop (e.g., via, perhaps, perceptual symbols having to do
with ceasing motion). If someone does not already have some understanding of stop, then she
would not know what is being represented by the red octagon.
Imagine trying to teach the concept proton solely by perceptual means to a complete neophyte with respect to science. You might draw a few circles, some squiggly lines connecting
them, and a “+” symbol, and then tell the neophyte that it is a diagram of a proton. You
might even try to convey that a circle represents quark, a line represents nuclear bond, and
the “+” represents positive elementary charge. You mention, however, that protons, quarks,
and so on, do not really look like what is presented in the diagram. But you continue to enhance her perceptual experiences, maybe by presenting many such diagrams. The neophyte
might then store her perceptual experiences as perceptual symbols in her long-term memory,
integrate them in a simulator, and perform a number of simulations. It seems that according
to Barsalou’s theory, these perceptual experiences and her resulting perceptual symbols may
be the only means to understanding the concepts proton, quark, nuclear bond, positive elementary charge, and really any concept for which it is impossible to have direct perceptual
experiences (e.g., unicorn). Yet most of us would doubt that the neophyte really does possess
the concepts proton, quark, etc., based on her perceptual symbols and simulations of whatever
perceptual information she received from the diagrams. At the same time, however, professors
and teachers get their students to understand concepts such as proton, quark, etc., at considerable rates of success. Thus, our understanding of concepts in general cannot be owed simply to
perception—something more than perception must ground our (human) concepts.16 We might
recall here Barsalou’s claim that “a concept is equivalent to a simulator” insofar as a concept
consists of “the knowledge and accompanying processes that allow an individual to represent
some kind of entity or event adequately” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 587). It seems that it is “the
16

This is to say nothing of what grounds the concepts possessed by other animals, or how other animals acquire
concepts, or whether they possess or acquire concepts at all.
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knowledge” part that requires further explication.
Natural language presents itself as a way around the problem I am posing for Barsalou’s
account of concepts—a way in which we might cash out “the knowledge”, in addition to perceptual symbol simulations, in which a concept consists (or at least in which some concepts
consist). In many ways, one can do more with language than what can be done by perception
alone. Metaphor and analogy are just two examples.17 It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to simulate with perceptual symbols: “Juliet is the sun”. One might try to simulate
this by somehow combining the perceptual symbols one has for Juliet and for the sun. But not
only would this not convey the full intended meaning behind this statement, it would convey
the wrong meaning. For Romeo, Juliet is the sun not in any literal sense, but in the sense that
his love for Juliet overpowers his feelings for other women, and that (when one understands
the play as a whole) Juliet is in a way necessary for his life. It is unclear how something like
this can be simulated by perceptual symbols. And yet, all of us can very well understand the
metaphor, at least after it is explained.
My suggestion, then, is that Barsalou’s theory of concepts be augmented by natural language for the human case, since perceptual symbols do not have the resources needed to grasp
many of the concepts we in fact grasp. This would entail two important related additions.
First, simulators would be enriched by including linguistic forms; in terms of the file model,
concept-files would contain as notes both perceptual and linguistic information. Second, natural language affords connections between simulators (or concept-files), thereby substantially
increasing the operational power of our central cognitive processes. I will discuss these in turn.
4.2.2.1 Integrating linguistic information
Natural language increases the informational resources of our conceptual systems such that
all our concepts are enriched. The idea is that linguistic information gets encoded and integrated into our concepts as we learn language(s), hear linguistic descriptions about the classes
17

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that our concepts are metaphorical in nature. I do not endorse their argument. However, there is an interesting connection, I think, between (our use of) natural language and understanding our concepts.
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or referents of concepts, and form beliefs that are expressed in natural language. As a human
infant learns a concept, she learns words and other linguistic forms accepted and used by her
linguistic community to refer to the extension of the concept in question. I am not prepared to
offer here a full theory of content or symbol grounding, but the process would likely occur by
first learning the relation between the said linguistic forms and direct stimuli in the environment; and as her conceptual and linguistic skills develop, the infant would cognitively realize
a similar relation between the linguistic forms and the perceptual symbols (stored in long-term
memory) associated with the stimuli (cf. Viger, 2007). During this learning process, the infant would increasingly be able to recall and use the appropriate linguistic forms as she learns
to adequately represent the concept in question. I am suggesting that the appropriate linguistic forms eventually get integrated in the simulator created for the concept just as multimodal
perceptual symbols get integrated. More specifically, we may consider the neural activations
involved in producing and processing linguistic forms (in the Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas) as
“linguistic symbols” (to adopt Barsalou’s terminology) on par with perceptual symbols. If this
is accepted, then linguistic symbols can get coded and stored in long-term memory along with
the other perceptual symbols associated with a simulator via the higher association areas of the
brain that integrate activations across cognitive systems (i.e., the temporal and frontal lobes),18
as Barsalou describes and outlined above. The only difference is the cognitive systems from
which the symbols originate and are (re)activated upon tokening or simulating the relevant
representations.19 Hence, I contend that linguistic symbols come to be part of an individual’s
concept-simulator, or what amounts to the same on the foregoing account, linguistic symbols
18

Recall that Barsalou includes the parietal lobe as an association area for perceptual symbols. I omit this lobe
here since it does not seem to have much of a role with respect to processing language.
19
My suggestion that linguistic symbols get integrated in a simulator inasmuch as perceptual symbols means
that linguistic symbols would have to get bound up with perceptual symbols in specific ways. Barsalou borrows
Antonio Damasio’s (1989) idea of convergence zones to explain how the brain integrates different features of
perceptual experience via conjunctive neurons to form perceptual symbols. According to Damasio, convergence
zones are neural ensembles that store the relevant neural patterns active upon perception, and enact “binding
codes” that specify the neural patterns to be (re)activated during mental representation (in the absence of stimuli).
If this right, then my proposal would require that linguistic symbols are encoded in the binding codes along with
perceptual symbols. At the very least, something in the neural operations underlying mental representation would
have to (re)activate the neural patterns of linguistic symbols in addition to those of perceptual symbols.
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serve as notes in a concept’s file.20
If Barsalou (1999, p. 587) is correct that an individual is understood to grasp a concept
to the extent that she possesses the knowledge that allows her to represent the concept to a
culturally acceptable degree, then linguistic symbols ought to be considered part of a simulator
inasmuch as perceptual symbols are, since the appropriate application and use of linguistic
forms is certainly indicative of the knowledge one possesses with respect to the concept in
question. For example, experiments by Karen Wynn (1990, 1992) reveal that most children
begin counting when they are two or three years old. However, it is not until months or years
after that they are able to understand the meanings of the number words, or the meaning of the
counting routine generally. For instance, children between 2 and 2.5 years of age can count; but
if they are allowed to count an array of objects and then are asked to give the experimenter, say,
four objects, they grab a handful of objects at random, notwithstanding that “four” is a part of
their counting routine. This is certainly evidence that such children do not grasp natural number
concepts, even if they are able to employ the words designating such concepts in a limited
range of situations. Thus, coming to understand a concept includes being able to appropriately
employ the correct linguistic forms in the correct circumstances;21 and according to the view
I am suggesting here, this is facilitated by having specific linguistic symbols integrated in the
concept’s simulator or file.
Allowing for linguistic symbols to be integrated in simulators or files enriches the content
of concepts in significant ways. For not only do linguistic symbols afford additional resources
to token conceptual representations in different ways (i.e., via various linguistic forms, in addition to perceptual symbols), but linguistic forms may be used in sentences of natural language
20

Throughout the remainder of this dissertation I shall employ talk of simulators and talk of files more or less
interchangeably.
21
Of course, this does not mean that we must get things right all of the time if we are to possess a given
concept. I am sure that competent people sometimes (or even often) inappropriately employ words. The point
I am making, however, is that, if one understands a concept, one would be able to correctly and appropriately
employ its referring word(s) on the whole or in general; and one’s competence can be assessed according to the
standards of one’s community. Let me point out also that this applies only to linguistically competent humans.
We certainly would not hold a nonlinguistic, nonhuman animal to this criterion; and we probably would not hold
humans suffering from aphasia to this criterion.
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to produce novel descriptions of conceptual content without necessarily invoking perceptual
symbols. Thus, when I entertain the concept cat, I can engage in cat-simulations or I can
activate the linguistic symbol for “cat”. Similarly, I can represent various aspects of cats or a
particular cat by using my perceptual symbols (e.g., the furriness of cats), or I can describe
these aspects, mentally to myself or aloud to others, by linguistic means (e.g., expressing the
belief cats are furry by saying “cats are furry”).22 The “or” in these cases should be understood as inclusive here, for we have no reason to believe that thinking in language cannot be
accompanied by perceptual symbol simulation, or vice versa. Moreover, if Barsalou is right in
that perceptual symbols can be entertained, and that simulations can occur, unconsciously, then
we might expect that linguistically coded information, such as beliefs, can be entertained and
processed unconsciously as well. In fact, that sentence parsing and other linguistic processes
occur unconsciously suggests that this is not implausible.
Furthermore, on the present account it is entirely possible to learn a word in natural language without any conceptual content save for grammatical information, such as whether the
word is a noun or verb. At this stage, a person—who can be an adult or child—would know the
role of the word in language but nothing about the concept the word names. And so the person
could very well use the word properly in some contexts, but would not be able to appropriately
employ the word in all the correct circumstances. Over time and with experience, however, the
person would learn what the word refers to and would thereby build up conceptual information (filling the concept-file with notes), and this could continue until the person has sufficient
knowledge to grasp the concept in question. This example shows that a word token can initially
create a concept-file which is then subsequently filled with conceptual content (notes). The result is a concept which one can represent with linguistic or perceptual information (together
22

The question may arise here as to whether sentences are included among the linguistic forms that get integrated in concept-simulators or files. My answer would be the following. Whatever neural activity it is that
constitutes a linguistic symbol and gets (re)activated upon tokening conceptualizations of a given concept is that
which is a proper part of the concept’s simulator. I see no reason thus far to preclude the possibility of whole
sentences being (re)activated in certain conceptualizations. I suspect, however, that limitations on memory recall
and other cognitive resources would restrict the length of sentences that get integrated in a concept’s simulator, if
sentences are the units available for integration at all.
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or independently, as mentioned). Indeed, this seems to be how we in fact learn some of our
concepts.23
The integration of linguistic symbols in concept simulators or files also explains at once
how one can acquire and appropriately employ concepts for which there are no possible perceptual experiences (such as proton), as well as how one can learn abstract concepts more
generally. A student can learn proton because the teacher explains in natural language that
protons are subatomic particles composed of three quarks, etc., while explaining at the same
time the concepts quark, nuclear bond, etc. (the teacher can also draw diagrams to supplement the learning process). The student’s simulator for proton would thus consist mainly of
linguistic symbols with which she would be able to use as and productively incorporate in locutions pertaining to protons and related matters. The student is subsequently prepared to draw
inferences about protons and comes to have beliefs about such entities, and hence she grasps
the concept proton. The same sort of learning process would apply to how one can acquire
concepts for nonexistent entities, such as unicorn, along with abstract concepts. The import
of this picture is great, since many of our concepts are initially formed in the absence of direct perceptual experience. As Christopher Viger (2007) observes, “My acquisition of ‘shark’
was more like my acquisition of ‘unicorn’ than that of ‘tree’ ” (p. 133). In a word, linguistic symbols are constitutive of most, if not all, of our concepts, and have a significant role in
conceptual cognition.
The importance and utility of concepts containing linguistically coded information (as part
of a simulator or as notes in concept-files) extends further. For there are certain events that
language can represent generically. Consider, for instance, the thought Alice stole the pen.
This thought need not be completely perceptually grounded.24 The manner in which Alice
stole the pen may be irrelevant; it might not matter whether Alice took the pen off Bob’s desk
and slyly placed it in her pocket, or whether Alice forcefully grabbed the pen out of Bob’s
23

I owe this point to Chris Viger. See below.
I say “completely” because there may be certain aspects of this thought, such as Alice or pen that is perceptually grounded, notwithstanding that the entire thought Alice stole the pen is not.
24
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hand as he was writing with it, or whether Alice borrowed the pen and then decided to keep
it without permission. If the thought Alice stole the pen would be completely perceptually
grounded, specific perceptual symbols would have to be activated for specific simulations, and
thus such details (e.g., the manner in which the pen was stolen) would be filled in. However,
if the thought were to be linguistically coded, “Alice stole the pen”, all that matters (viz. that
Alice stole the pen) can be coded, brought to mind, and conveyed, and irrelevant details need
not be represented. In a way, linguistically coding representations saves cognitive resources in
storing and entertaining certain thoughts. But more importantly for the present purposes, it is
a means by which specific, relevant information gets represented without representing what is
irrelevant.25
4.2.2.2 Affording connections between concepts
So far I have discussed the way in which augmenting Barsalou’s theory of concepts with natural language would enrich the simulators or files of concepts. As indicated above, the other
role for natural language is to provide a medium for establishing connections between simulators (or concept-files), thereby substantially increasing the operational power of our conceptual
cognition. The idea here is that natural language is a powerful combinatorial system that affords a means by which to combine diverse representations from different systems—an ability
that otherwise may not have been possible. This suggestion follows the accounts offered by
Elizabeth Spelke (2003a, 2003b, 2009; Condry & Spelke, 2008; Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, &
Katsnelson, 1999) and Viger (2005, 2006c, 2007).
Spelke (2009) observes that many species are able to combine representations from differ25

Barsalou asserts that perceptual symbols can be indeterminate and generic representations insofar as qualitatively specified neurons can encode specific qualities but not others (as explained above). His example is of a
triangle: A given set of qualitatively specified neurons can encode the presence of lines without encoding length;
length may be encoded by a different set of neurons. Thus, we can have a generic representation of a triangle
in the sense that a triangle can be represented without having a specific size. Though I do not doubt that this is
possible—and in fact, Barsalou cites empirical support for the existence of qualitatively specified neurons—this
is not the kind of generic representation that I have in mind here. For it does not appear that representations like
Alice stole the pen can be represented by qualitatively specified neurons in the same way as triangle, and there is
no evidence that this can be done neurologically. With the triangle case only part of what is perceptual is specified
(i.e., shape), whereas with the stolen pen case nothing perceptual is specified in the relevant sense.
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ent cognitive systems, at least to a certain extent, in making inferences. It is possible that an
organism’s cognitive architecture enables such combinations by embodying certain pathways
between representational systems; and some pathways may get established through the neural/cognitive development of an organism. It is also possible that an organism may learn to
combine representations from different systems, though this would be a slow and piecemeal
process. Humans, on the other hand, have available in addition to these two options a capacity that enables arbitrary combinations between representations, and as Spelke contends, this
combinatorial capacity may be identical to the human capacity for natural language. Spelke
acknowledges that the human brain might develop a rich combinatorial power per se, but she
believes that this power is at least bolstered or guided by, and mutually developed in conjunction with, the development of natural language. Spelke cites empirical evidence to support her
position. For the sake of brevity, I will only discuss one kind of evidence here.
Spelke and her collaborators (Gouteux & Spelke, 2001; Hermer & Spelke, 1994, 1996;
Wang, Hermer-Vazquez, & Spelke, 1999) reveal interesting limits on navigational abilities in
children. In their experiments, children up to 2 years of age were tested in reorientation tasks
in which an object was hidden in a room, the child was disoriented, and then asked to find the
object. It was evident that the children were able to represent that the target object was located,
for example, at a corner with a long wall on the left, but they were unable to represent that
the object was at a corner with a blue wall on the left. According to Spelke, the children were
unable to combine geometrical representations (e.g., left of a long wall) with object-property
representations (e.g., blue wall) in order to represent the locations of the target objects.
As may be expected, human adults exhibit the ability to combine such geometrical and
object-property information under similar circumstances with ease. Spelke claims that the difference in performance between the young children and adults can be accounted for by the
emergence of spatial language. The developmental research of Hermer-Vazquez, Moffett, and
Munkholm (2001) reveal that the transition to flexible navigation in humans occurs around the
time when children master spatial expressions in natural language, such as “left” and “right”.
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Furthermore, performance on productive language tasks with items involving the terms “left”
and “right” turn out to be the best indicator of success on reorientation tasks for children at
this transitional age. These findings suggest that natural language has a key role to play in
navigation for humans. This suggestion is supported by further experiments on human adults.
For instance, Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) presented human adults with navigation tasks accompanied by interference tasks. Participants exhibited a general impairment in navigation
performance for all cases, but those who were given an interference task that specifically interfered with language production performed like the young children—they were unable to
reorient with respect to nongeometric properties.
Spelke goes on to suggest that natural language assists in improved navigation performance
due to the combinatorial properties of language. The property of compositionality of natural
language allows speakers to represent the meanings of arbitrarily many combinations of words,
once the meanings of a given set of words and the syntactic rules for their combination are
known. Moreover, natural language crosscuts representational systems, and in this sense it acts
as a domain-general system of representation. Thus, natural language allows linguisticallycompetent people to combine information in such a way that allows them to form representations that might not have been otherwise possible. With respect to the spatial and navigation
tasks,
the combinatorial machinery of natural language allows children to formulate and
understand expressions such as left of the blue wall with no further learning. This
expression cannot be formulated readily outside of language, because it crosscuts
the child’s encapsulated domains. Thanks to the language faculty, however, this
expression serves to represent this conjunction of information quickly and flexibly.
(Spelke, 2003b, p. 296)26
Though the evidence discussed here is only with respect to spatial representation, I believe
that the role of natural language can be generalized. Indeed, Spelke (2003a, 2003b, 2009) argues that natural language enables the creation of new concepts and changes within concepts,
26

Spelke (2000, 2003a, 2003b; Spelke, Lee, & Izard, 2010; Spelke, 2007) also provides convincing evidence
that shows that distinct and more-or-less encapsulated systems in the human brain produce representations of the
geometric properties of spatial layouts, on the one hand, and properties (e.g., colour and shape) of objects, on the
other. The work of Susan Carey (2004, 2009) also suggests this.
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and that natural language is significantly involved in our representational capacities with respect to artifacts, natural number, and social cognition. Extending this idea further, there is no
principled reason why the productivity, compositionality, and combinatorial power of natural
language cannot be harnessed in cognition generally. The latter is suggested by Viger (2005,
2006c, 2007). Viger argues against the language of thought hypothesis, claiming that concepts
need not possess the logical or compositional relations exhibited in natural language, and also
that the language of thought hypothesis does not possess the wherewithal to deal with the problem of how conceptual symbols are grounded. According to Viger, our conceptual apparatus
is enhanced once we learn natural language. He therefore advances what he calls the acquired
language of thought (ALOT) hypothesis: “some of our ability to think is acquired in learning
. . . a natural language” (Viger, 2005, p. 322). Unlike the properties ascribed to concepts by the
language of thought hypothesis, natural language terms are connected to each other in many
different associative respects. And so tokening a natural language word, for instance, can cotoken other associated words. Whether and to what extent co-tokening occurs will depend on
the organization of connections among words in cognition, but if the foregoing view is correct,
the result is an interconnected network of words that allows for any attending content to in principle activate any other content (which, as discussed in the previous chapter, is paradigmatic
of central cognition; Viger, 2006c). “The interconnected network is like a roadway through
the mind, a constructed central superstructure that makes for easier travel among the modular
cognitive operations embedded within this superstructure” (Viger, 2007, p. 135). Thus, in a
sense, natural language encodes information in our concepts in such a way that makes it easier
to activate certain cognitive operations (Viger, 2006c). This picture is certainly consistent with
how Barsalou envisions conceptual thought.

4.2.3

Putting it together

The application of Spelke’s and Viger’s work to my account of concepts and cognition is best
understood in terms of the file model of cognition. It may be recalled that Fodor believes that
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one can think in file labels without invoking any content (i.e., any notes in the file), and that I
argued against this view since Fodor takes file labels to be concepts. I had proposed earlier that
concepts be understood as files in their entirety. I now further propose that we revise the file
model such that natural language representations (linguistic forms) that name concepts are the
labels attached to the files. On this revised model of concept-files, it may very well be possible
for the language faculty to token file labels in the absence of conceptual content (cf. my comments above regarding learning a word and building up conceptual content afterward). That is,
it is possible that we can entertain natural language words without invoking any content, such
as when I mindlessly associate words like “salt” and “pepper”. Fodor endorses such associations between words (see Fodor, 1983, pp. 78-83; Fodor, 2008, pp. 98-99). However, Fodor
“suggests . . . that associations are the means whereby stupid processing systems manage to
behave as though they were smart ones” (Fodor, 1983, p. 81).27 On my account, on the other
hand, associations among words offer a means by which smart systems exercise their intelligence. Furthermore, unlike Fodor, I have two distinct ways that associations can occur, namely
among items within a file or between natural language words qua file labels. This bimodal
means of association thus provides resources for thought and reasoning within and between
files, and this would certainly play a role not only in making inferences, but also in reinforcing
and corroborating inferences.
Perhaps more importantly, if we understand labels as linguistic forms, then the language
faculty can operate over file labels, and thereby enable the connections and combinatorial operations suggested by Spelke. For it is in virtue of being linguistic forms that file labels would
possess the formal syntactic properties that lexical items have in a natural language. Thus,
according to my view, lexical items qua linguistic symbols can be integrated in and serve as
labels for concepts, and thereby serve as units over which different cognitive systems can operate (cf. Viger, 2006c). The language faculty may therefore independently operate on file labels
27

To give this passage context, Fodor is arguing that informationally encapsulated systems (namely, modules)
are stupid systems, and so they do not intelligently evaluate information; according to Fodor, one recourse is for
them to operate according to associations.
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to establish the connections initially needed to bring diverse concepts to bear on one another.
Indeed, words are independent objects—independent from concepts—and therefore they can
be independently manipulated. Thus, as the language faculty operates over file labels qua lexical items, all the linguistic machinery can be brought to bear when thinking in file labels. We
have noted that the linguistic machinery includes the combinatorial power of language, which,
as suggested, can enable connections between and combinations of concepts. Natural language
may not be necessary in combining content across concepts, but it certainly seems as if it plays
a significant role in facilitating the process.
In addition, as intimated above, the linguistic machinery includes the grammar of natural
language, which can yield important and rich information about the concept the label names.
For example, the label for one’s cat concept is a noun (i.e., “cat”), and “cat” does not act as,
say, a verb in language. Information such as this can indicate something about the nature of
cat—at the very least, it indicates that it is a thing—and this in turn tells us something about
the role the concept plays (or can play) in thought.
Construed as such, file labels really are Janus-faced, but not precisely in the way that Fodor
(2008, p. 100) described (viz. “one face turned towards thinking and the other face turned
towards what is thought about”). In light of the present considerations, it is more appropriate
to claim that file labels are Janus-faced where one face is turned toward the concepts they label
(what the thought is about) and the other face turned toward their role as a lexical item in
natural language.
I have shifted here from talking about concepts in terms of simulators to talking about
them in terms of files, but this was mainly for expository purposes. In terms of simulators, we
can envision a natural language form qua linguistic symbol to be integrated into a simulator
in such a way that it is flagged and understood to name (or label) the simulator. I suppose
this happens by a neural ensemble that encodes in a specific way the relevant neural patterns
in tokening the linguistic symbol (cf. Damasio, 1989; see footnote 19 above); this neural
ensemble would thereby specify the neural patterns that point or refer to the concept, and in
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this way the linguistic symbol acts as a symbol insofar as it names or stands in for the concept
in question. In this way, a linguistic form can function in cognition as a symbol that represents
or expresses a concept.28
As explained above, I am assuming that linguistic forms are grounded in the linguistic
systems of the brain and (re)activated as linguistic symbols. The language faculty may be
an independent representational system, but the lexicon can be understood to exist separately
from the linguistic system. So linguistic symbol activations can belong to a simulator, where
the linguistic symbol continues to be operated on by the language faculty according to the
formal syntactic properties it exhibits as a lexical item in natural language. Thus, simulators
can encode natural language forms qua linguistic symbols, and produce simulations and conceptualizations with them (where the content of the conceptualization, it may be recalled, will
depend on the context and cognitive task). As an independent system, the language faculty
can process the linguistic symbols flagged as naming simulators and thereby make connections
between simulators according to the syntactic properties of the linguistic forms as exhibited
by natural language. Subsequent simulations then serve as deeper conceptual processing, providing deeper integrations of conceptual information between concepts, notwithstanding that
language initially makes possible many connections between concepts, as Spelke contends
(rightfully, I believe). Moreover, linguistic symbols activated by simulation will suggest further conceptual connections, since the linguistic symbols embedded within a simulator can
very well pick out the names of other simulators.
In summary, my suggestion is that Barsalou’s theory be augmented by natural language.
Natural language enriches the content of simulators by allowing the integration of linguistic
symbols; in terms of the file model, concept-files contain as notes both perceptual symbols
and linguistic forms. Furthermore, if we understand file labels to be natural language words,
then, following Spelke and Viger, natural language affords combinatorial resources needed to
28

This approaches what Viger (2007) claims. He posits the existence of interface structures between cognitive
systems that are activated during object recognition. Viger asserts that “a symbol is neurally encoded with a
projection to the interface site of what the symbol stands for” (p. 132).
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make connections between concept-files or simulators and their content. Natural language thus
enables more powerful cognitive operations than would otherwise be available.
It should be acknowledged that Barsalou (1999) assigns a role for natural language in his
symbol systems theory. However, the role he describes is not precisely the role I am advocating
here. Rather, Barsalou envisions linguistic symbols as perceptual symbols. More specifically,
he claims that spoken and written words are the perceived events from which selective attention
focuses and extracts perceptual symbols from the modes of perception (typically of hearing
spoken words or seeing them written), which then “become integrated into simulators that later
produce simulations of these words in recognition, imagination, and production” (Barsalou,
1999, p. 592, my emphasis). The simulators for words are subsequently associated or “linked”
to the entities or events they name, or more specifically, to the concepts the words label. Once
this linking happens, according to Barsalou, words can control simulations: “On recognizing
a word, the cognitive system activates the simulator for the associated concept to simulate a
possible referent. On parsing the sentences in a text, surface syntax provides instructions for
building perceptual simulations” (ibid.). Barsalou goes on to claim that “the productive nature
of language, coupled with the links between linguistic and perceptual simulators, provides a
powerful means of constructing simulations that go far beyond an individual’s experience”
(ibid.).
Nevertheless, I do not believe that these simulations will go far enough. For notice that
Barsalou is not claiming that words or linguistic symbols are integrated into the same simulator of the concepts they label. Instead, words have their own simulators, the constituents of
which are perceptual symbols for the perceived events of hearing spoken words or reading written words; these simulators then become linked to the simulators (or concepts) they express.
On this account, then, Barsalou still faces the problem presented by nonperceptual concepts
like proton. Certainly, one can develop a simulator from the perceptual symbols extracted
from perceptual experiences of hearing or reading “proton” (call this the pprotonq simulator,
since the concept is not proton but of the word “proton”), but without any perceptual experi-
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ences from which to extract perceptual symbols for proton itself, there would be nothing to
link pprotonq to. This is similar to the problem I discussed earlier about needing requisite
knowledge of stop to understand that a red octagon means “Stop!”.
In contrast, on the account I am suggesting here linguistic symbols are not merely linked to
the concept(s) they express, but get integrated into the simulators themselves as, for example,
words or beliefs expressed in natural language, and some word(s) would function as names for
the simulators (concepts). Natural language words and sentences may not be amodal,29 just as
Barsalou claims, but as I argued above there is a way in which language enables its users to
abstract away from modalities to express a proposition, make an exclamation, ask a question,
perform a speech act, or whatever. This is what allows us to understand what protons are (along
with everything else we cannot perceive), as well as what allows us to represent logical entities
and mathematical objects, have thoughts of impossible or nonexistent entities (such as unicorn
or god), and have coherent and robust abstract concepts.30 Information is encoded in language
differently than in perceptual symbols, and as such, the kind and the amount of information
that can be expressed in either format differs from each other. As should be apparent given the
discussion above, thinking the cat is on the mat in natural language expresses the proposition
that the cat is on the mat, whereas thinking it in simulations of perceptual symbols expresses the
same content but also carries much more information—perceptual information, to be precise.
And the degree to which simulations in perceptual symbols carry more information depends
on the manner in which the cat is on the mat is simulated (e.g., depending on whether the cat is
simulated to have a specific orientation; whether the cat is simulated to have a specific colour;
whether the cat is simulated as a specific breed; whether the mat is simulated to have a specific
colour or pattern; etc.).31 Thus, although linguistic symbols as constituents of natural language
29

It might be more appropriate to say that natural language words and sentences may be amodal in certain
respects but not others. Word or sentence tokens that are spoken or written on a page, for instance, are certainly
not amodal, as they involve the sensory modalities of audition and vision, respectively. However, it is not so clear
whether employing a word or a sentence in thought and grasping its meaning involves any sensory modality.
30
As I had indicated above, Barsalou argues that his PSS theory can account for representing abstract concepts.
He uses the examples of truth, disjunction, negation, and anger. However, I do not think his theory can account
for all abstract concepts. (I believe that his account of anger is particularly inadequate.)
31
Cf. the discussion above in section 4.1.1 regarding what can be expressed by images as opposed to what can

Chapter 4. Concepts, Heuristics, and Relevance

160

can be the stuff of thought and can express some of the same information as perceptual symbols,
either format will embody and express different concomitant information.32
It might be noticed, however, that Barsalou recognizes that natural language plays a central
role in producing simulations. This is indicated in the passage cited above: “the productive
nature of language, coupled with the links between linguistic and perceptual simulators, provides a powerful means of constructing simulations” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 592). More recently,
Barsalou has discussed an even more prominent role for natural language (Barsalou, 2008a;
Barsalou et al., 2008). For instance, Barsalou et al. (2008) assert, “In general, we assume that
linguistic forms provide a powerful means of indexing simulations (via simulators), and for
manipulating simulations in language and thought” (p. 252). This approaches the role of natural language assigned by Spelke and Viger, and the one advocated here. In more specific terms,
Barsalou et al. believe that associations between linguistic forms generate “pointers” to associated conceptual information. They claim that humans can employ “linguistic strategies” to
facilitate easy but superficial, shallow inferences. Such superficial linguistic strategies can be
highly effective, but according to Barsalou et al., they do not directly involve deep conceptual
processing; conceptual processing is supposed to occur only via simulations. In a little more
detail:
we assume that the syntactic structure of sentences controls the retrieval, assembly,
and transformation of the componential simulations that people integrate to represent sentences and texts. Similarly, we assume that interactions between the two
systems are responsible for the representation of propositions, conceptual combinations, productively produced phrases, recursively embedded structure, etc. In
general, we assume that symbolic structures and symbolic operations on these
structures emerge from ongoing interactions between the language and simulation systems. (pp. 272-273)
be expressed by propositions. It should be noted, however, that nothing I am saying here hangs on whether images
can express propositions—I am not here talking about the proposition phrase “The cat is on the mat”, but rather
the content of the proposition.
32
I suppose that there can be natural language simulations analogous to perceptual symbol simulations. With
respect to natural language, however, simulations would occur as rehearsals of some form of “inner speech” (cf.
Carruthers, 2006a). The sentences that this inner speech would produce would be various descriptions of the
associated concept in natural language, and there may also be a kind of inner conversation—a talking to oneself,
as it were—in which various questions are posed and answered. And, like perceptual symbol simulations, natural
language simulations mainly occur unconsciously. This is mere speculation, however. None of what I have to say
here depends on the details of such natural language simulations, or indeed whether they actually occur.
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[B]oth systems are probably essential for achieving the powerful symbolic abilities
of the human cognitive system. Neither alone is likely to be sufficient for symbolic
behaviour. . . . Across many abilities, the two systems work together to achieve the
power and distinctive properties of human intelligence. (p. 274)
We might therefore observe that the present account of cognition is at least consistent with
Barsalou’s recent writings. However, to repeat, my account of concepts allows for the integration of linguistic symbols in simulators, and I believe this is needed to account for representing
abstract and nonperceptual content. I also believe that the integration of linguistic symbols in
simulators aids in establishing and maintaining connections between simulators (concepts), as
well as in offering a means by which certain linguistic symbols (words) can serve as labels that
name or stand in for concepts. This indicates another important respect in which my account
differs from Barsalou’s, namely having to do with the feature of concepts that allows natural
language to negotiate conceptual processing. For Barsalou and his collaborators do not share
the reconciled file model in which simulators have labels in natural language, which enable
the linguistic system to connect concepts and representations across domains, and exploit their
content. Barsalou et al. (2008) assign natural language a substantial role in cognition, but they
do not adequately explore what it is about concepts that allows natural language to connect
and combine them. In fact, Barsalou et al. assume, following Barsalou (1999), that simulation
mechanisms implement combinatorial symbolic operations (see Barsalou et al., 2008, p. 251),
not natural language operating over linguistic data integrated in concepts as labels.
I should note that this account is meant to be neutral with respect to the language of thought
hypothesis. The foregoing view is that natural language augments perceptual symbols in our
conceptual apparatus in more elaborate ways than proposed by Barsalou. As such, the present
account enriches Barsalou’s theory of concepts. Yet, although Barsalou’s theory rejects the
basic tenets of the language of thought hypothesis, I have not given any arguments against the
possibility that the stuff of thought is in fact language-like representations. All I have argued is
for an interrelation between concepts (as simulators or files) and language.
Given this initial discussion on the account of concepts that I am adopting here, we are now in a
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position to understand more fully the role of heuristics in cognition, and more specifically how
heuristics work. In the next section I will explain how the foregoing account of concepts fulfill
the role of k-systems envisioned in the previous chapter. Examples illustrating my claims will
be provided in the following chapter, wherein I discuss how some of the heuristics proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky, and Gigerenzer, can be understood in terms of the theory of concepts
and cognition proposed in this dissertation.

4.3

From k-systems to concepts

Recall that a k-system is an informationally rich system of knowledge or representations. Ksystems encode various kinds of information in a highly organized fashion—information is
encoded such that specific relations hold between items of information within systems, as
well as between different systems. As explained in the previous chapter, k-systems are what
facilitate the kind of reasoning we witness from humans—reasoning that is quick and efficient,
and that is frugal in its computations. I claimed that without the right kind of architecture and
the right kind of structure and relations among items of knowledge in our heads, we would
be unable to make the inferences that we in fact do—inferences which underlie much of our
cognition. I want to now claim that concepts, as explicated above, are the cognitive structures
suited to the role of k-systems. More specifically, I want to claim that the way heuristics work
is by exploiting concepts, and by the same token that concepts constrain heuristics.
Given the account of the nature of concepts and conceptual cognition just presented, it is
not hard to see why I believe concepts to be the kind of cognitive structure that I described ksystems to be. It may be recalled that the function of k-systems is to deal with high informationload and cognitively-demanding problems, paradigmatically ill-defined problems (which are,
again, the problems that we typically have to deal with). I argued in the previous chapter
that humans characteristically handle such ill-defined problems successfully and solve them
because we exploit the information embodied by our k-systems. In light of my explication of
the nature of concepts, however, the information we exploit can be seen to be actually embodied
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by our concepts.
Last chapter I had discussed the role of information in the environment with respect to
cognition and k-systems. Much of the burden placed on cognition can be off-loaded into the
environment. Information can be stored and made to be organized in specific ways by means of
notepads, books, calendars, pictures, and so on. Moreover, external devices such as calculators
and computers can aid in problem-solving. These technologies can certainly mitigate cognitive
costs. I claimed in turn that the requisite knowledge needed to exploit epistemic technology
must be the structured and organized k-systems I described (cf. Sterelny, 2004, 2006). We
can see more clearly now that one in fact requires the appropriate concepts and conceptual
knowledge to suitably exploit epistemic technology. For epistemic technology can be as informationally rich as we like, but we must conceptualize the technology in certain specific ways
if we hope to exploit its embodied information in the right ways. Consider, for example, a
map. A map encodes information about topography, landmarks, and distances, but if one does
not recognize and conceptualize a map as a map, then one cannot hope to exploit any of the
information it embodies (cf. Sterelny, 2004). At the very least, one must have the concept map,
with the appropriate representational content, to read a map in the right ways.
Imagine that Alice and Bob come across a piece of paper with various markings on it,
mostly lines and geometric figures but no words. Alice and Bob both examine the paper and
its markings. Bob cannot make sense of it, and he therefore believes that it is just a bunch of
doodles. On the other hand, the markings on the paper activate map symbols for Alice. She thus
begins to conceptualize the piece of paper as a map, and she begins to conceptualize the lines
as streets, the squares as city blocks, the blue markings as bodies of water, and so on. Thus
conceptualized, Alice can exploit the representational content of the map. If Alice figures out
which markings on the map correspond to what landmarks, she can triangulate her location on
the map, she can figure out what direction to walk to get to the shoreline, she can infer that
there is a railway two blocks north, and so on. Bob on the other hand cannot exploit any such
information.
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Notice, however, that Alice’s map concept must be sufficiently rich if she is to exploit the
map’s information. For instance, if it is not in Alice’s map file that maps usually represent
water with the colour blue, then she would not understand that the blue markings she sees
indicate bodies of water. Or if Alice did not know that maps are often not in the business of
accurately representing the colour of the land, then she might wrongly believe that the map
conveys information about land colour. Thus, knowing that a piece of paper is a map is not
enough to appropriately conceptualize the information embodied by the map. This is to say
that our concepts must be rich enough to afford the conceptualizations necessary to exploit
information possessed by epistemic technology. In fact, being able to conceptualize certain
things in certain ways in the first place is what allows us to create epistemic technology qua
objects that store and encode certain kinds of information in certain ways.
To recall the Dretskean theme pointed out in the previous chapter, what information a signal
carries depends on what the receiver already knows about the source. When confronted with
epistemic technology, or any object at all, our sensory experiences embody a great variety of
information. Our concepts are cognitive structures that enable us to extract and exploit certain
features. In this sense, learning or enriching a concept provides us with the ability to decode
certain aspects of our sensory experience in such a way that we cognitively respond in certain
ways. In Dretske’s terms, concepts allow us to digitalize information from an analog signal.33
A map might contain information about the topography of the land, and anyone who views the
map is seeing this information. But those who do not have a rich enough concept of map to
recognize and interpret topographical information are incapable of extracting or attending to
such information, and therefore incapable of cognizing it or allowing it to affect one’s cognitive
dispositions and behaviour. In Dretske’s words:
33

Dretske believes that concepts are cognitive structures that decode analog signals to digital. In a sense, I
believe Dretske is right, although perhaps not completely. It may be more accurate to claim that concepts are
cognitive structures that decode some of the information in an analogue signal. What gets decoded may not be
fully digital, although this can be the case—natural language, for instance, appears to be digital. (Cf. my remarks
above concerning thinking in images in section 4.1.1.). At the very least, however, my position is that having the
appropriate perceptual symbols and/or linguistic information is what would enable one to decode various aspects
of an analog signal.
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Learning to recognize and identify daffodils, say, is not a process that requires
the pickup of more information from (or about) the daffodils. . . . The requisite
information (requisite to identifying the flower as a daffodil) is getting in. What is
lacking is an ability to extract this information, an ability to decode or interpret the
sensory messages. What [a] child [who is learning to recognize daffodils] needs
is not more information about the daffodil but a change in the way she codes the
information she has been getting all along. Until this information (vis., that they
are daffodils) is recoded . . . , the child sees daffodils but neither knows nor believes
that they are daffodils. (Dretske, 1981, p. 144)
According to Dretske, developing a concept daffodil is what will enable the child to identify
daffodils, to know and believe that certain flowers are daffodils, and to behave appropriately.
As explained above, natural language can facilitate connections between concepts. However, deeper conceptual processing also has a role in combining and integrating the representational content of concepts (notwithstanding, however, that language makes possible many
connections between concepts in the first place). Once a concept becomes established, and
as knowledge is accumulated and added to the concept, one is put in an increasingly better
position to make inferences about the objects or events picked out by the concept. Let us recall here Barsalou’s claim that, since a concept contains an enormous amount of (multimodal)
knowledge and information, one can simulate aspects that go beyond what is perceived, and
thereby make various inferences about an entity. As described above, for example, the concept
jet might suggest that a perceived jet contains passengers, luggage, pilots, and so on; that the
jet will continue to fly horizontally and in a single trajectory, not vertically or sideways; and so
on.34 Thus, the conceptual content35 —the representations and conceptualizations—of active
or primed concepts guide inference. Furthermore, what inferences one can make, and the relative ease with which one makes inferences, is constrained by the concepts one possesses and
the relations between them. This is because the associative connections that exist within and
between concepts inhibit certain inferences while facilitating other inferences. This was illustrated by the example above: the ease with which inferring that your pen is in your desk drawer
34

We should keep in mind here, however, the hesitations outlined above in section 4.1.1 with respect to this
example.
35
For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the perceptual symbols, simulations, beliefs, and other linguistically
coded information (i.e., the representations and conceptualizations) embodied by concepts simply as “conceptual
content”, unless there is a need to be more specific.
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will be much easier and more natural than inferring that your car is not in your desk drawer.
Pens are the kinds of things that are typically in desk drawers, while cars are not. Thus, we
typically have positive experiences of pens in desks, and these experiences and representations
are stored in our memory as items in the respective concept files. On the other hand, we have
no experiences of cars in desks, and so we will have no such representations in our files. You
can therefore just recall from memory that your pen is in your desk drawer, whereas you have
to do cognitive work to infer that your car is not in your desk drawer. In fact, one’s conceptual
content of our car and desk concepts will generally inhibit the inference that one’s car is in
one’s desk drawer, since (as I observed above) cars are not the kinds of things that can fit in
desks. And even when we do the cognitive work to make the inference, we may still resist it:
if we were to hear someone say “My car is in my desk drawer!” we would likely assume that
a joke was being told or that a toy car was being referred to, rather than that someone’s actual
car was in a desk drawer.

4.3.1

What this means for heuristics

Now that we have done all this work on understanding the architecture of cognition, and the
nature of concepts, let us see what it does for our investigation into how heuristics work. As
I was saying, concepts guide and impose constraints on inference. Yet it is certainly possible
that one can reason beyond the constraints imposed by the conceptual content of active and
primed concepts in making inferences. The latter impose only initial constraints on inferences.
If one were to thoroughly reason through a problem by fully exploring potential outcomes,
solutions, or consequences, and the means to achieve them, one could make any number of
inferences. Heuristic reasoning, however, does not proceed this way. Rather, heuristics are
completely subject to the constraints imposed by the conceptual content of active and primed
concepts. And this is what makes heuristics work the way they do. Let us recall, once again,
the characterization of “heuristic” that I developed in chapter 2.
H7 Heuristics are cognitive procedures that satisfice, and that require little cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution; they operate by exploiting
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informational structures.
Heuristics, by their very nature, are not procedures that thoroughly explore problems (i.e., they
satisfice), and so they operate according to the information that is made available (in terms
of what is activated or primed) throughout the satisficing process. How much information is
surveyed will depend on the heuristic used, the nature of the task, the goals of the agent, and
constraints on time, resources, etc. Sometimes conceptual information will continue to get
activated or primed until a goal is met—until something “good enough” (i.e., that satisfices)
turns up. Other times, we may not need to go too deep into our concept files to activate
conceptual information, if we arrive at our satisficing answer quickly. And we might not even
need to use a heuristic if we get the correct answer right away. However, the information made
available to heuristics will generally not be sufficient to make deep conceptual inferences,
but sometimes (if the conceptual information is sufficiently organized) heuristics can produce
good inferences based on present relations and activations. The aspiration level set for a given
heuristic can entail that a certain (small) number of inferences is made before reasoning is
terminated (e.g., a decision is made, or one capitulates), but the exploration of the problem will
usually not go too far. Thus, the operations of such a heuristic will remain constrained by the
concepts that get activated or primed throughout the satisficing process.
As explained in chapter 2, the satisficing nature of heuristics contributes to their requiring
little cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution. But the way concepts constrain
the operations of heuristics is what really enables heuristics to be frugal. Much of the previous
chapter was devoted to showing that the organization among k-systems bears a lot of the burden entailed by high-information-load problems. Now we can understand that it is in fact the
organization of the perceptual symbols and linguistic information of our concepts that bears
the burden entailed by high-information-load problems. The productivity and combinatorial
power of natural language is certainly a factor in mitigating high-information-load problems,
as connections between concepts can be established via concept labels. In addition, the associations among perceptual symbols and linguistic information, within and between concept
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files, makes concepts parts of an organized infrastructure of conceptual content. Reasoning and
making inferences are thereby simplified in many ways. We often do not have to spend very
much cognitive resources integrating a lot of information due to the informational richness of
our concepts, for either sufficient information has already been integrated for us by the simulators for our concepts, or our concepts are inherently organized in such ways that facilitate
the retrieval of information. The relations between conceptual content allow easy access to
associated concepts and representations. Consequently, however, the more impoverished one’s
concepts are (with respect to conceptual content or organization), the harder it will be to reason in certain ways with them. I will return to this point below. The point to note for now is
that the organization of information within and between concepts eases the burdens associated
with information processing and information search, and this in turn facilitates swift and frugal
heuristic reasoning.

Thus, in a word, it is our concepts—the information they embody and extant relations
within and between them—to which heuristics owe their ability to satisfice, and to require little
cognitive resources for their recruitment and deployment. Concepts enable heuristics to operate
quickly and efficiently; concepts enable heuristics to be robust and potent inference strategies.

This is in broad strokes how I envision heuristics to work. Some of the particulars still need
to be filled in, however. In the next section I will explain in a little more detail my account of
how heuristics work.
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How heuristics work: Informational relations and higherorder operations36

I assume that the nature and content of the cognitive task initially activate and prime37 a focused set of conceptualized concepts (i.e., specific conceptualizations of concepts, or what I am
calling here “conceptual content”). Suppose, for instance, one is presented with the following
task:

Estimate whether it is likely or unlikely that there will be a plane crash within the
month.

This would activate conceptual content concerning planes, crashes, likelihoods, estimation,
months, timeframes, and perhaps more. Since an individual likely possesses a vast number of
concepts concerning such content, the conceptual content that initially gets activated can be
overwhelming. There are parameters, however, that will provide constraints on what conceptual content gets activated. More specifically, there will be two kinds of parameters: parameters
with respect to the nature and content of the cognitive task (what I will call external parameters), and parameters with respect to the structure of one’s conceptual cognitive wherewithal
(what I will call internal parameters). In the example we are considering here, the external
parameters include those that are given by the language used (e.g., using “likely” and “unlikely” rather than “probability”; using “plane” rather than “jet”; using “month” rather than
“30 days”), as well as those that are suggested by the nature of the task (e.g., the task elicits
a course-grained subjective likelihood assignment to a future event as opposed to, say, a finegrained numerical subjective probability). The internal parameters will have to do with factors
36

The following account was inspired through conversations with Chris Viger. However, I recently came across
a paper by Andy Clark (2002) which advocates for a method to circumvent Fodor’s frame problem by borrowing
from the work of Jon Kleinberg (1999) on web search engine techniques. Though the central ideas of this subsection were arrived at independently of Clark (or Kleinberg), I roughly follow and adapt parts of Clark’s account,
not only because it corroborates my thesis, but because it fills in some of the details that I had not had a chance to
fill in myself. Nevertheless, two important differences between my view and Clark’s account are that Clark does
not offer the kind of cognitive architecture I give in this dissertation, and Clark is not concerned with providing
an account of how heuristics work in cognition.
37
For simplicity, I will use “active”/“activated” to refer to both active/activated and primed content.
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affecting long-term memory recall, such as which concepts an individual possesses, the relative strengths at which conceptual content is stored in long-term memory, the ease with which
conceptual content is activated (perhaps based on past activations), and the existence and relative strength of extant connections between concepts and conceptual content established by
past inferences. Both external and internal parameters will substantially constrain what conceptual content gets initially activated upon engaging a given cognitive task, and moreover,
limits on time and cognitive resources will restrict what and how many conceptualizations occur. Yet, even with these constraints, a considerable amount of conceptual content may still
get activated. Moreover, further activations can be made once the initial set of conceptualizations occur. For, according to the theory of concepts developed above, the inherent relations
between concepts will have it such that invoking some conceptualization will invoke others,
depending on the nature and strength of such relations. And so the set of activated concepts
and conceptual content will almost invariably be more than what the nature and content of the
cognitive task initially invokes (subject to the constraints just outlined).
We might distinguish here between two types of connections between conceptual content
with respect to the direction in which the connection is established and maintained. In this
sense, connections can be inward or outward. Inward connections of some conceptual content
CCi are those established and maintained by invoking other conceptual content CC j ; the direction of priming or activation is from CC j to CCi . On the other hand, outward connections to
some conceptual content CC j are those established and maintained by invoking CCi ; the direction of priming or activation is from CCi to CC j . For example, tokening a conceptualization of
a plane might token a conceptualization of people, but tokening a conceptualization of people
might not token a conceptualization of a plane. In this case, a plane bears an outward connection to people, and on the other side of the coin, people bears an inward connection from a
plane; but a plane does not bear an inward connection from people. We will get a clearer sense
of how this is supposed to work below when I discuss examples and present diagrams.
I suppose that these connections are established and exist in virtue of associations among

Chapter 4. Concepts, Heuristics, and Relevance

171

conceptual content. As claimed, a conceptualization of a plane can likely involve conceptualizations of its passengers, and ipso facto conceptualizations of people; but it is not as likely
that a conceptualization of people will involve conceptualizations of a plane. This is because
there is a much weaker association from people to planes than from planes to people. Such
associations can vary in degree of strength, as discussed above with respect to connections
between concepts generally. In other words, there will be varying thresholds of association between conceptual content. In short, then, what and the extent to which conceptual content gets
activated will depend in part on the types and strengths of connections borne by the concepts
and conceptualizations invoked by the nature and content of the cognitive task. Let us also
remind ourselves here that the connections between concepts and conceptual content are established by associations between perceptual symbols and simulations or via natural language, as
explained above.
It is important to understand that, on the present account, heuristics do not primarily attend
to the content of concepts. I say “primarily” since some conceptual content may figure into
some heuristic processes. But my point is that conceptual content is not what heuristics generally operate over.38 Conceptual content comes into play with the initial setup of the cognitive
task (as just described), and then with deeper conceptual processing (if it comes to that), but not
with respect to heuristic processing. The relations exhibited by a conceptual system embody
a rich source of implicit (putative) knowledge concerning which concepts and representations
are to be considered for given cognitive tasks. Heuristics utilize this implicit (putative) knowledge, not the content of the concepts concerned, by operating over the informational relations
between concepts and the relational structure of the conceptual system more generally. I will
describe here two types of relational structure that can arise from the conceptual information
that gets activated by the nature and content of a cognitive task, and I will then explain how
heuristics can exploit such structures.
One type of potential extant relational structure (or simply ER-structure) that can arise
38

By “operate over”, I mean something to the effect of doing inferential work with computations. This sort of
meaning will apply throughout the rest of this dissertation.
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with respect to a given cognitive task is one in which active conceptual contents bear outward
connections to the conceptual content of some single concept. The number and strength of
inward connections that the latter concept bears would indicate that its conceptual content is
putatively pertinent to the task at hand,39 since multiple inward connections in a sense serve as
corroboration that there is something important about the concept in question with respect to
the task at hand. This is similar to how a scholarly article with multiple citations is accredited
as (in some sense) more important to a given topic than articles with few citations. In this way,
inward connections, like citations, carry information about the pertinence or importance of a
given concept.
Let us call the type of ER-structure just described a thin ER-structure, since the property in
question—namely, the number of strong inward connections to a given concept—is thin insofar
as a concept can bear many strong inward connections while the concepts on the giving-end
of such connections (i.e., the concepts bearing outward connections to the first) may bear no
further outward connections to other potentially pertinent concepts. In other words, considering
only the multiple strong inward connections to a single concept may very well miss other
concepts that may be pertinent to the task at hand.
Richer informational relations between active conceptual content may give rise to a thick
ER-structure. Richer informational relations can arise from making available (i.e., priming or
activating) more conceptual content, which results in an informational structure that embodies richer connections, or more particularly, a richer informational ER-structure. Thick ERstructures exhibit not only one or a few concepts that bear many strong inward connections,
but many concepts that bear strong inward connections from sets of concepts. The assumption
behind this idea is that in a sufficiently rich structure of activated conceptual content, a pertinent concept will tend to have many sources of inward connections, and these sources will
39

I realize that by talking about “pertinent” representations I am really talking about relevant representations.
I use “pertinent” here not to skirt the issues concerning the relevance problems discussed in chapter 3, but to
temporarily hold the issues to one side as I develop the present account of how heuristics work. As promised, I will
address the epistemological relevance problem in chapter 6. Furthermore, I qualify “pertinent” with “putatively”
since we have not yet established how we are to determine normative relevance (pertinence). More on this in
chapter 6. In the mean time, however, I will omit “putatively” for the sake of simplicity.
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Figure 4.1: Simplified representation of thin and thick ER-structures. The nodes represent
richly structured activated and primed concepts, and the arrows represent inward/outward connections. The concepts bearing the inward connections are deemed pertinent to the task at
hand. With respect to the thick ER-structure represented, the concepts on the left constitute a
set of reference concepts that bear multiple outward connections to the pertinent concepts on
the right.

at the same time bear many outward connections to other pertinent concepts. For the sake of
simplicity, let us call the said sources of inward connections “reference concepts” (RCs). It is
assumed, in other words, that, since pertinent concepts (PCs) are supposed to have, in common,
pertinence to the task at hand, in a rich ER-structure there should be concepts, namely RCs,
that bear multiple outward connections to multiple PCs. The richer the structure, the more RCs
there should be. Furthermore, we would be able to group RCs into sets according to which
PCs they outwardly connect to. Each member of these sets bears multiple outward connections
to multiple PCs, and thus there can be considerable overlap between sets which can also be
used to pick out supersets. And, again since PCs are indeed supposed to have, in common,
pertinence to the task at hand, PCs should bear inward and outward connections to and from
each other as well. Returning to the article analogy, important articles will tend to have many
citations from a variety of other articles, the latter of which may be grouped according to the
articles (in addition to the “important article”) they cite; and moreover, the important articles
would tend to cite each other.
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Figure 4.1 graphically illustrates, in a grossly simplified way, the thin and thick ER-structures
I have described; in reality, the concepts would be more numerous and the connections messier.40
Given these types of ER-structure, my suggestion is that a heuristic can use the information embodied by either ER-structure to pick out pertinent concepts in order to bring to bear certain
representations to the task at hand, or to make predictions, or to make inferences, depending
on the nature of the task and the function of the heuristic. With respect to thin ER-structures,
strong connections that bear inwardly and in large numbers to given concepts would inform a
heuristic that the latter concepts are pertinent to the task at hand, and that they therefore have a
special role to play. There very well may be more than one concept that bears such numerous
and strong inward connections, and if so then each will be considered pertinent. But, by their
very nature, thin ER-structures typically do not exhibit rich structures, and so they generally
should not exhibit relations that pick out more than a few pertinent concepts. Thus, when a
heuristic has a thin ER-structure over which to operate, it is possible that more conceptual
content will be activated in order to do more processing, if some requisite goal is not met by
the thin structure alone. After more conceptual content is activated, the ER-structure might
get thicker with richer connections. It is important to remember that heuristics engage in satisficing processes, and how much conceptual content is surveyed will depend on the heuristic,
the nature of the task, the constraints on the agent, and the aspiration level to be met. And
so, again, conceptual information will continue to get activated until the goal is satificed (i.e.,
the set level of aspiration is met). In terms of the present discussion, this means that a thin
ER-structure may get thicker as a heuristic operates over it. Yet this will not necessarily be the
case. A solution may be found in a thin ER-structure, or a heuristic might simply be satisfied
with whatever answer is produced given a thin ER-structure, in which case no more content
will get activated, and the heuristic will thus deliver the solution based on the thin structure.
Heuristics will often have thick ER-structures to operate over, however. This is because,
as argued in the previous chapter, the cognitive tasks we face usually have a high cognitive
40

The figure is adapted from Kleinberg (1999).
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load, and as such, navigating these tasks invokes large amounts of informationally rich representations and conceptualizations. Heuristics that exploit the implicit knowledge embodied by
thick ER-structures thereby have a lot more information over which to operate; heuristics that
operate over thick ER-structures will be informed of which concepts are to be brought to bear
or have a special role to play in inference or prediction.
To illustrate, let us briefly consider the task presented above, viz. estimating whether it
is likely or unlikely that there will be a plane crash within the month. If, for example, the
connectional structure among conceptual content invoked by this task is such that there are a
number of inward connections to the conceptualizations concerning plane crashes, then this
will indicate that plane crashes are in some sense pertinent, and it will therefore have a significant role to play in the inference. A heuristic may thus bring to bear such conceptualizations of
plane crashes on the task at hand, and this might suggest to the individual that it is likely that a
plane crash will occur within the month. On the other hand, if one possesses more conceptual
information regarding plane crashes and their frequency, then the ER-structure invoked may be
thick. Some of the representations and conceptualizations may bear multiple outward connections to such concepts as planes, crashes, frequency, and perhaps others. Depending on the
conceptual content of these latter concepts, heuristics operating over such a thick ER-structure
may still suggest that it is likely that a plane crash will occur within the month. If one conceptualizes frequency in the appropriate ways, however, then one would be able to infer that
the frequency of plane crashes is low. A heuristic would therefore deliver a prediction that it
is unlikely that a plane crash will occur within the month. This is just a very brief illustration.
More detail on how this works with respect to concrete tasks and heuristics will be given in the
next chapter.
We might note, however, that one need not accept what a given heuristic offers. That is, one
need not make a decision based on whatever inferences or judgments are delivered by a given
heuristic. However, what a heuristic does offer is made available for the taking in a quick and
easy way. This is most likely why we are all so tempted to base our decisions on whatever our
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heuristics deliver without thinking the matter through. We might say that we are cognitively
lazy. Furthermore, by the same token, one’s judgments can be mitigated by further knowledge
or cogitation. Much like how one can train oneself to think more thoroughly through logical
problems to ensure that the correct logical rules are applied, one might train oneself to remember that recalled instances of plane crashes do not indicate whether an actual plane crash is
likely. But remember, according to the foregoing account, the representations and conceptualizations activated by a context and cognitive task, and the associations among them, serve as
a network of information that guides heuristic processes. Heuristic inference is also thereby
constrained because heuristics are satisficing procedures that operate on the information made
available throughout the process—deep conceptual processing would be nonheuristic. Thus, if
the conceptual content of one’s active concepts exhibit a certain ER-structure, a given heuristic
procedure will facilitate certain inferences in the absence of further conceptual cogitation.
Let us observe that the picture I am presenting here of heuristics operating over ERstructures is consistent with the characterization of cognitive heuristics offered in chapter 2.
I should make clear, however, that thick and thin ER-structures are not meant to be understood
as determining what heuristic is to be employed. An ER-structure will determine what information a given heuristic can operate over, but it is a different matter as to what a heuristic does
with the implicit knowledge embodied by the ER-structure. The latter will be determined by the
nature of the task and the function of the heuristic. Further, I do not intend to suggest that the
thick and thin properties I have described are in any way exhaustive of the structural properties
that heuristics exploit; my contention is that heuristics operate over structural relations between
concepts and their conceptual content, and that there are cases in which such structural relations
are thick as well as cases in which they are thin, as I have described these properties. The important point to stress is that heuristics are thereby understood to operate by generally ignoring
almost all of the actual content of the active concepts and their conceptual content. Rather, the
structures over which heuristics operate are the relational structures—structures that implicitly
embody higher-order information (or knowledge) about active concepts and their content. In
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this way, active conceptual contents work together as collections that point to a very small set
of pertinent or salient concepts (in some cases the set may consist of only one concept as a
member). Such pertinent or salient concepts will be those that bear numerous strong inward
connections from other active content. I argued in the previous chapter that heuristics exploit
the informational richness of concepts, but remain computationally cheap. It should be all the
more apparent now how this is so: Heuristics do not compute over conceptual content, for that
would be computationally taxing. Instead, the informational richness exploited by heuristics is
implicit in the ER-structures—the informational richness is the higher-order, metainformation
about conceptual content—which carry much of the computational load.41
At the same time, we should note that there will be instances when the relational structure
embodied by the conceptual content of concepts may not (or maybe cannot) guide heuristic
inference. These will be instances when the available ER-structures are very thick—when,
for instance, too much conceptual information is activated. Such very thick ER-structures
would not be conducive to heuristic processes since the extant informational relations would
not exhibit anything that a heuristic can exploit.42 Thus, some nonheuristic process may need
to be employed to aid in reasoning through these sorts of structures. On the other hand, we
may very well need a heuristic to navigate such a very thick structure, since sorting through all
the conceptual information may be computationally taxing.
Another case when an ER-structure will not be sufficient to guide heuristic inference is
when one’s relevant concepts are too impoverished, or maybe even do not exist at all. In the
previous chapter, I had claimed that impoverished k-systems can negatively affect the way
inferences are made. The same reasoning applies here. When one’s relevant concepts are
too impoverished, heuristics can still be deployed, but they might operate according to the
41

This idea is in some ways similar to Fodor’s (1975) thoughts about what heuristics do with respect to assigning
meaning to sentences. Rather than computing the grammatical relations exhibited by the sentence, Fodor believed
that heuristics can infer meaning from background knowledge considerations of the lexical content of the sentence.
See the brief discussion in chapter 2 above (section 2.2.1).
42
This is along the same lines as what Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) have in mind when they discuss the
“less-is-more effect” with respect to the Recognition heuristic: “The recognition heuristic leads to a paradoxical
situation in which those who know more exhibit lower inferential accuracy than those who know less” (p. 79).
See section 5.2.1 in the following chapter for further discussion.
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informational structure of the context and cognitive task as opposed to the conceptual content
of and relations between the concepts involved. On the other hand, cognition might turn to
default heuristics in such cases, or maybe no heuristics at all. Thus, we might say that an
ER-structure must be thick enough for a heuristic to operate over it to yield a certain solution
(though, as we saw, it cannot be too thick).
Instances in which one’s relevant concepts are impoverished may also lead to the “mistakes
of reason” emphasized and researched by the heuristics and biases tradition. Alternatively,
one’s concepts may be constructed such that the conceptual information that tends to get initially activated when confronted with a certain type of problem may embody certain information or bear certain informational relations such that mistakes and biases tend to ensue. This
may not mean that one’s concepts are impoverished, or that erroneous inferences result from
erroneous beliefs. Rather, one may simply need to conceptualize the relevant concepts in different ways, which would in turn activate different conceptual content, and this might facilitate
correct solutions. I will discuss some of these issues in more detail in the next chapter.
But heuristics do more than just operate over specific informational structures. Though
this is an important part of how heuristics work, what heuristics do with the information they
operate over is key to their function and usefulness. Heuristics are typically employed to aid
in prediction, decision, or problem-solving (or simply “inference”). There is, of course, a
computational cost in making inferences. We saw in chapter 2 that there may be GCO or
optimization procedures that would deliver guaranteed or correct inferences, but only if the
problem in question is well-defined. The other class of problems—the ill-defined problems—
do not have such GCO or optimization procedures, and so making an inference in such contexts
can be computationally expensive. For not only will there be too many factors to consider,
the problem-spaces for these sorts of problems cannot be adequately known, understood, or
characterized. (And even if the problem is well-defined, we saw that there are some cases
where, although there is a GCO or optimization procedure in principle, it is computationally
expensive to discover or execute in practice.) As indicated, heuristics offer a way to manage and

Chapter 4. Concepts, Heuristics, and Relevance

179

navigate these problems by effectively ignoring most of the conceptual content of the relevant
representations,43 and instead looking to the extant relations among activated concepts. These
extant relations will indicate what conceptual content to consider. But remember, heuristics
also mitigate the computational costs of inference by satisficing—seeking a “good enough”
solution (i.e., a solution that meets some level of aspiration). Therefore, how much of the
informational relations between activated concepts will be considered, how much conceptual
content will be considered, and what concepts actually get activated throughout the satisficing
process, will depend on the nature of the task and constraints on the agent, but most especially
on the set aspiration level.
A heuristic might thus be understood as partly operating as a metacognitive judgment on
how much effort will be invested in solving a problem (cf. Sperber, 2005). In this light, a
heuristic evaluates and estimates likely dividends by processing the informational relations exhibited by active conceptual content, rather than considering conceptual content; if it does not
meet the aspiration level further activations are made along with further evaluations. Thus,
sometimes a satisficing answer is arrived at with the initial activated ER-structure, but other
times more conceptual information will need to get activated to satisfice (meet the aspiration
level). But a heuristic will deliver a judgment on whether to continue computing, or to capitulate and let other (perhaps deeper conceptual) processes take over. If the aspiration level is
met, however, the heuristic is able to deliver an inference based on the given conceptual informational structure. More specifically, what will be brought to bear on the task will be the
conceptual content exhibited by the concepts that bear a sufficient number of strong inward
connections, and this is because it was determined that basing the inference on such information is good enough for the task. As we look at particular examples of heuristics in the next
chapter, we will get a clearer idea of all of this.

43

More on what makes representations relevant in chapter 6.
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Concluding remarks

Let us briefly review. Following Barsalou’s theory of concepts, concepts are conceived to
be simulators that embody perceptual symbols, where these symbols are understood to be
collections of neurons that are activated in the perceptual centres of the brain upon initial
perceptual processing of entities in the concept’s extension. I argued, however, that Barsalou’s
theory benefits from being augmented by including natural language. Specifically, I argued that
concepts (simulators) should be conceived to also include linguistic symbols (collections of
active neurons in the language centres of the brain), and moreover, following the file metaphor
of cognition, that concepts have specific flagged linguistic symbols that serve as a name or
label that expresses or refers to them. Natural language can thus operate over these names or
labels without necessarily invoking conceptual content. Drawing from the work of Spelke and
Viger, the productive and combinatorial properties of natural language enable us to establish
connections between concepts which may not have been otherwise possible.
Given this initial setup of the architecture of concepts and cognition, I suggested that heuristics are cognitive procedures that operate by exploiting the informational structures exhibited
by concepts and their conceptual content (conceptualizations and representations). Such informational structures also act as constraints that enable heuristics to satisfice, and require little
cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution. The account of how heuristics work
developed here involved describing thin extant relational structures (or ER-structures) that exhibit relatively simple relational properties among primed and active concepts, as well as thick
ER-structures that exhibit richer relational properties among primed and active concepts. As
recently stressed, the important point is that heuristic procedures do not operate over most of
the conceptual content, but over the higher-order information (or knowledge) about the concepts in question implicit in the ER-structure, which makes some content salient. This allows
heuristics to mitigate computational costs of inference, but heuristics also produce metacognitive judgments on how much effort will be invested in solving a problem. Hence, as argued
in previous chapters, heuristics exploit the informational richness of cognitive structures, and
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moreover, heuristics are good candidates to mitigate the computational burdens of cognition,
although it is really our conceptual wherewithal that shoulders such burdens.
In the next chapter I will review some of the empirical data on heuristic reasoning to illustrate the foregoing view of heuristics, concepts, and cognition. Specifically, I will illustrate
that some of the heuristics proposed and studied by Kahneman and Tversky, and Gigerenzer,
can be understood in terms of heuristic operations over thick or thin ER-structures.

Chapter 5
How Heuristics Work: Considering
Empirical Evidence
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Having explained the nature of the informational structures that heuristics exploit, I can now
corroborate my thesis by illustrating with concrete examples how heuristic reasoning is facilitated. The easiest way to do this is by considering empirical evidence with respect to individual
heuristics and showing how they can be understood as processes that exploit the informational
relational structure exhibited by active concepts and content. Thus, by working through the
present chapter we will get a better sense of how my thesis explains a some of the empirical
data on heuristic reasoning.
In this chapter I will discuss two of Kahneman and Tversky’s most developed heuristics—
Availability and Representativeness—and two of Gigerenzer’s most developed heuristics—the
Recognition heuristic and Take the Best—and show that they can be understood as procedures
that operate over such ER-structures. I will also illustrate some other aspects of the general
theory of concepts and cognition developed in this dissertation. Specifically, I will use Kahneman and Tversky’s cab problem (to be described below) to illustrate that one’s concepts and
conceptualizations play a crucial role in how problems are conceived and subsequently solved.
For the most part I have tried to be brief in my discussions. I should point out that the
analyses I give are by no means complete, and more work is necessary to fill in many of the
details. Furthermore, I pass over much of the empirical research regarding the heuristics I
analyze. However, I present enough to show that my view can account for several phenomena,
and is therefore a plausible theory of how heuristics work in cognition.

5.1

Heuristics and biases

In this section I will discuss two of the more popular heuristics researched by the heuristics
and biases program—Representativeness and Availability. Although a lot of research has been
conducted with respect to these heuristics since Kahneman and Tversky first began theorizing about them in the early 1970s, I will mainly be concerned with Kahneman and Tversky’s
original work and their original experiments and examples. This evidence remains valid, and
it provides the paradigmatic cases that are widely cited and discussed throughout the litera-
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ture.1 Before I begin, however, it would be instructive to make some brief observations about
Kahneman and Tversky’s general view of human cognition.
Kahneman and Tversky had at times analyzed people’s judgments under uncertainty within
the framework of mental models (e.g., Johnson-Liard, 1983). Although there are different
accounts of mental models and their role in reasoning, inference, and judgment, Kahneman
and Tversky (e.g., 1983) appear to subscribe to the idea that mental models are mentally represented prototypes or schemata that can be mentally manipulated according to one’s (perceptual)
knowledge (cf. Minsky, 1975). Judgments about a particular object or event are made relative
to the mental model one constructs of the class of objects or events in question. Kahneman and
Tversky’s purpose was not to advance any theories regarding mental models (or any alternative
hypothesis), so they never discuss such a view of cognition in any detail. Nevertheless, it is
clear that they believed that mental model theory underlies the operations of the Availability
heuristic and the Representativeness heuristic.
There is a similarity between mental models and Barsalou’s theory of concepts, and Barsa1

Kahneman has recently reviewed and offered new analyses of his and Tversky’s research (Kahneman, 2003;
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). According to Kahneman’s new analysis of heuristics and biases, a common process of attribute substitution explains how judgment heuristics work. Attribute substitution is a generic heuristic
process in which an “individual assesses a specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting a related
heuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 707). The idea is that a substituted
heuristic attribute will generally be more accessible (i.e., comes more easily to mind) than a target attribute, and
thus the heuristic attribute (rather than the target attribute) will be used to make a judgment. “For example, the
representativeness heuristic is the use of representativeness as a heuristic attribute to judge probability” (ibid.).
As we shall see presently, the account that I offer is consistent with Kahneman’s updated model of how heuristics
work, but we shall also see that my account provides more detail with respect to the cognitive structures that guide
heuristic inference and judgment. However, we should note that Kahneman admits two things. First, he admits
that his new model of heuristics by attribute substitution does not perfectly coincide with the original conception
of heuristics offered by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Second, he admits that his new model excludes anchoring effects, i.e., effects “in which judgment is influenced by temporarily raising the accessibility of a particular
value of the target attribute, relative to other values of the same attribute” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 707), which is an
instance of Anchoring and Adjustment (see (13) in chapter 2, p. 42). The reason why Kahneman’s new model
cannot explain anchoring effects is because there is no attribute substitution in anchoring, but rather an alteration
of perceived salience of the target attribute. Nevertheless, I believe that the account of how heuristics work that
I have developed in this dissertation enjoys an advantage of covering anchoring effects, although I do not show
this below. In fact, I believe that my account covers heuristic processes in general, but I lack the space here to
adequately show this. Here in brief is how I envision my theory accounts for anchoring effects: The concepts
and ER-structure that get activated upon being confronted with a given cognitive task can act as an anchor, as
Tversky and Kahneman describe, by being more accessible relative to other ER-structures (that may subsequently
get realized), and by pointing to certain conceptual content that is consequently perceived to be salient. Hence,
activated ER-structures can influence inferences and judgments in the way that anchors do, and adjustments can
be made to this anchor as one deliberates through the problem.
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lou recognized this. As he remarks, “mental models are roughly equivalent to . . . simulations
of specific entities and events” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 586). He continues, however, by noticing
a difference between his notion of simulators and the idea of mental models: “Mental models
tend not to address underlying generative mechanisms that produce a family of related simulations” (ibid.).
Given that the account of concepts developed in this dissertation is based on Barsalou’s
theory of concepts (or simulators), there is likewise a relation between the foregoing account
and mental models. There are important differences, however, including not least that linguistically coded information is available for simulation or manipulation in addition to perceptual
symbols. According to my account, a mental model might be conceived to consist of the active
conceptual content of a concept—i.e., active conceptual representations and conceptualizations. Nevertheless, simulations constructed from the active conceptual content of a concept
are unlike mental models insofar as mental models are usually understood to be constructions
of representations of objects or events generally, whereas my account applies more narrowly
to concepts and the information stored in their files. Another difference that will be exhibited
in the present chapter is that heuristics are supposed to operate over ER-structures according
to my account, whereas no such mechanisms or structures are indicated in the mental models
theory of cognition (as Barsalou observes).
However, let us not get caught up in the details of the similarities and differences between
mental models and the foregoing theory of concepts. Suffice it to say that my theory provides a
framework that is compatible with mental models and ipso facto with Kahneman and Tversky’s
view of cognition.
It is also interesting to note that the present account is consonant with and adds detail
to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) notion of “natural assessments”. Recall from chapter 2
(section 2.3.3) that Tversky and Kahneman envisioned that heuristics “rely on” natural assessments, that natural assessments “play a dominant role” in producing judgments and inferences,
although they failed to specify precisely what these assessments are and in what sense they
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are “natural”. Tversky and Kahneman did assert, however, that “natural assessments include
computations of similarity and representativeness, attributions of causality, and evaluations of
the availability of associations and exemplars” (p. 294). With the present account, we can understand natural assessments as the relations between active concepts and conceptual content
realized when presented with a problem. Thus, computations of similarity and representativeness, attributions of causality, and evaluations of the availability of associations and exemplars,
are all present upon the initial realization of the ER-structure invoked by the problem in question. And what makes these assessments “natural” is that they are entailed by the inherent
structures that exist within and between concepts and their conceptual content. Understood as
such, heuristics do not so much “rely on” natural assessments as they are, again, constrained
and guided by natural assessments.

5.1.1

Availability

Tversky and Kahneman write,
Life-long experience has taught us that instances of large classes are recalled better
and faster than instances of less frequent classes, that likely occurrences are easier
to imagine than unlikely ones, and that associative connections are strengthened
when two events frequently co-occur. Thus, a person could estimate the numerosity of a class, the likelihood of an event, or the frequency of co-occurrences by
assessing the ease with which the relevant mental operation of retrieval, construction, or association can be carried out. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973/1982a, pp.
163-164)
These observations are what support the Availability heuristic:
(12)

The frequency of a class or the probability of an event is assessed according to the
ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind.

According to Tversky and Kahneman, an assessment of availability, or the ease with which
instances or associations can be brought to mind, mediates probability judgments. For example, one may predict the rate of plane crashes by recalling recent plane crashes; or one may
estimate the probability that a struggling student will fail an exam by assessing the strength
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of association between students struggling in a class and failing exams. However, Tversky
and Kahneman assert that it is not necessary that one actually mentally perform retrievals or
constructions to assess availability. Rather, “It suffices to assess the ease with which these operations could be performed, much as the difficulty of a puzzle or mathematical problem can be
assessed without considering specific solutions” (ibid.).2 We can see here an indication of the
metacognitive judgments that heuristics offer on how much effort will be invested in solving a
problem.
The assumption is that frequent events are in general easier to recall or imagine than infrequent events, and so availability assessment will tend to covary with frequency or higher
probability. Yet, as Tversky and Kahneman emphasize, availability is influenced by various
factors other than actual frequency, and therefore the use of the Availability heuristic can lead
to systematic and predictable biases. For example, Tversky and Kahneman posed the following
problem to research participants:

Suppose one samples a word (of three letters or more) at random from an English
text. Is it more likely that the word starts with r or that r is the third letter?

They found that people tend to approach this task by trying to recall words that begin with r
(e.g., rational) and words that have r appear as the third letter (e.g., cart). Since it is easier to
recall words that begin with r than it is to recall words that have r as the third letter, people
judge that the former case is more likely than the latter, even though there are in fact more
words in the English language that have r as the third letter than there are words that begin
with r. This is a simple example involving little more than memory recall. However, the
Availability heuristic is supposed to influence more complex cognitive operations.
2

It is possible that what is doing the work is not the ease with which instances or associations can be brought
to mind, but the number of instances that has been brought to mind. The difference here is between assessments of relative ease in performing cognitive operations such as retrieval or construction, and actually carrying
out retrievals or constructions and thereafter surveying what has been retrieved or constructed. In Schwarz and
Vaughn’s (2002) terms, availability can consist in ease of recall or content of recall, each of which represents distinct sources of information. Schwarz and Vaughn show, however, that experimental evidence supports Kahneman
and Tversky’s original formulation of the Availability heuristic, viz. the frequency of a class or the probability of
an event is assessed according to the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind.
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According to the account proposed in this dissertation, availability, or the ease with which
instances or associations can be brought to mind, depends upon and is facilitated by the conceptual content of one’s concepts and the existence and relative strengths of the extant relations
between them. That is, the strength of association upon which availability relies is borne out by
the network of activated representations and conceptualizations of the concepts one is currently
entertaining.
Suppose one was given the following task.
Estimate whether it is likely or unlikely that a person with mental illness will exhibit violent behaviour.
People with mental illness are generally not violent (especially considering the various kinds of
mental illness). But one might assign a high likelihood if one’s concept-file for mental illness
contains beliefs about mentally ill people being violent—maybe from reading certain stories in
newspapers; or perhaps one had a personal experience with a violent person who happened to
be mentally ill, and this experience is vividly simulated upon mental illness being activated.
Alternatively, one’s mental illness concept might exhibit certain strong associations with other
concepts and conceptual content that imply violence. For example, one’s mental illness concept might be strongly associated with psychopath; and since psychopaths are often violent,
and one’s concept-file for psychopath may contain information having to do with psychopaths
being violent, one might estimate that a person with mental illness will very likely exhibit
violent behaviour.
The use of the Availability heuristic in making judgments regarding, for example, the likelihood that a person with mental illness will exhibit violent behaviour can be understood in
terms of the heuristic operating over a thin ER-structure, as described toward the end of the
previous chapter. I here mentioned two cases that can lead one, via the Availability heuristic,
to estimate that it is likely that a person with mental illness will exhibit violent behaviour—
namely, (a) if one’s concept-file for mental illness contains beliefs about mentally ill people
being violent, or (b) if one’s mental illness concept exhibits certain strong associations with
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other concepts and conceptual content that imply violence. If invoking mental illness simulations (or opening one’s mental illness file) results in priming or activating easily recalled
conceptual content, established and built up from news stories or personal experiences regarding violent mentally ill people, such conceptual content ex hypothesi outwardly connects to
one’s violent and mentally ill people concepts; by the same token, violent and mentally ill
people bear multiple inward connections. Assuming that these inward connections are relatively numerous and strong, the ER-structure would indicate that these concepts are pertinent,
and a heuristic operating over such a structure would estimate a relative likelihood according
to the extant connections borne by violent and mentally ill people. If, on the other hand,
one’s mental illness concept exhibits associations with other concepts and conceptual content
that imply violence, then violent alone may bear the requisite inward connections over which
a heuristic would operate, and in a similar fashion, the heuristic would estimate a likelihood
according to the extant connections. Thus, in either case, (a) or (b), one tends to judge that it
is likely that a person with mental illness will exhibit violent behaviour based on an estimation
delivered by a heuristic which operated over thin relational connections exhibited by the given
ER-structure.
I consider the Availability heuristic as operating over thin ER-structures (rather than thick
ER-structures) since it seems that what is “available”—what instances or associations are
brought to mind—bears sufficient inward connections to facilitate the heuristic.3 In addition,
the Availability heuristic does not seem to operate over thick connectional properties. With respect to the present example, for instance, there does not seem to be sets of concepts invoked,
the members of which bear multiple outward connections to multiple other concepts. This, of
course, is a claim that can stand or fall according to empirical evidence. But even if it is the
case that the Availability heuristic in fact operates over thick ER-structures, my general point
still applies, which is that the heuristic operates over the implicit information embodied by the
3

Recall the discussion at the end of chapter 4 where I explained that an aspiration level might not be met by a
given thin ER-structure, and more conceptual information would thereby get activated, increasing the thickness of
the ER-structure. I had also claimed, however, that this need not be the case—that no more conceptual information
would be activated—if aspiration level is met by the given thin ER-structure.
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relational structures existing between primed and activated concepts and conceptual content.
(And this same point applies to the rest of the claims that I make in this chapter regarding the
other heuristics I discuss.)
It is instructive to note that the account I am offering here is consistent with what Tversky
and Kahneman envisioned for the Availability heuristic, viz. “It suffices to assess the ease with
which these operations could be performed, much as the difficulty of a puzzle or mathematical problem can be assessed without considering specific solutions” (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973/1982a, pp. 163-164). Tversky and Kahneman appear here to be intimating that the Availability heuristic does not consider conceptual content, since their point is that the heuristic does
not actually perform constructions to assess availability. This is along the same lines as what I
had stressed in the previous chapter, namely that heuristics do not operate over the content of
concepts or conceptualizations, since this would involve computations in which heuristics are
not in the business to engage. Again, on my account heuristics operate over the higher-order,
metainformational relations between active content. This may very well be the sort of idea
that Tversky and Kahneman had in mind for the Availability heuristic, although they never
attempted to describe the mechanics of the heuristics they studied.

5.1.2

Representativeness

Let now turn to the Representativeness heuristic:
(11)

Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is
representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness
(resemblance) the higher the probability estimation.

The probabilities referred to are subjective probabilities one assigns to the event(s) concerning
a given inferential task.
Kahneman and Tversky never fully characterize “representativeness” (or “resemblance”),
claiming that it is like “similarity”, which is easier to assess than to characterize (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1972). Nevertheless, they offer a partial characterization, and rely on Tversky’s (1977)
account of the psychological principles of judgments of similarity. According to Tversky and
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Kahneman (1983), “Representativeness is an assessment of the degree of correspondence between a sample and a population, an instance and a category, an act and an actor or, more
generally, between an outcome and a model” (p. 295). More formally, one judges an instance
or a subset X of a class C as representative of C to the extent that X possesses features that
are believed to be essential to and shared by the members of C, and does not possess many
distinctive features that are not essential to or shared by members of C (Tversky & Kahneman,
1982b, p. 86).
The cases in which Tversky and Kahneman are most interested are those where representativeness affects people’s judgments of probability. Their interest in such cases is motivated
by the fact that probability theory presents a set of normative rules against which to evaluate
personal judgments, and hence, in certain circumstances there is a sharp “contrast between the
extensional logic of probability theory and the psychological principles of representativeness”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 296).4 As Tversky and Kahneman go on to explain, representativeness tends to covary with frequency, since frequent instances or events are generally more
representative of a class than unusual instances and rare events, but there are circumstances in
which this is not the case. This is because judgments of representativeness are not determined
by frequency (ibid.). It is generally in such circumstances that errors and biases occur, for this
tendency to covary often leads people to overestimate the actual correlation between frequency
and representativeness.
Tversky and Kahneman believe that people tend to rely on representativeness, despite the
fact that it can lead to systematic biases and judgment errors (with respect to probability), because representativeness is easy to evaluate and readily accessible. As they explain, “research
on categorization . . . suggests that conceptual knowledge is often organized and processed in
terms of prototypes or representative examples. Consequently, we find it easier to evaluate the
representativeness of an instance to a class than to assess its conditional probability” (p. 89).
4

There is an ongoing debate regarding the normativity of the probability calculus and heuristic reasoning (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1996). However, I do not want to enter into or address this debate
here. It will suffice for my purposes here to simply acknowledge that there is sometimes a disconnect between
probability theory and heuristic reasoning.
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This corroborates the account of how heuristics work and the role of concepts I have been developing throughout this dissertation. I will illustrate here that the Representativeness heuristic
can be understood to be a cognitive response to the relational structure exhibited by active
and primed conceptual content of one’s concepts. To see this more clearly, let us consider
some experiments conducted by Kahneman and Tversky which illustrate the Representativeness heuristic.
5.1.2.1 The Linda problem
Kahneman and Tversky presented a number of groups of undergraduate and graduate students
with the following problem:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and
social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Please rank the following statements by their probability, using 1 for the most
probable and 8 for the least probable.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

Linda is a teacher in elementary school.
Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.
Linda is active in the feminist movement.
Linda is a psychiatric social worker.
Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.
Linda is a bank teller.
Linda is an insurance salesperson.
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

As Tversky and Kahneman report, participants consistently ranked (h) higher than (f)—i.e.,
participants believed that it is more probable that Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement than that Linda is just a bank teller. According to Tversky and Kahneman,
participants relied on the Representativeness heuristic and judged the degree to which Linda
resembles the typical member of the class picked out by (h) to be greater than the degree to
which Linda resembles the typical member of the class picked out by (f). But such a judgment
of resemblance “is neither surprising nor objectionable . . . If, like similarity and prototypicality, representativeness depends on both common and distinctive features (Tversky, 1977), it
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should be enhanced by the addition of shared features. . . . [T]he addition of feminism to the
profession of bank teller improves the match of Linda’s current activities to her personality”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 297). Nevertheless, Tversky and Kahneman found “more surprising and less acceptable” that participants generally judged that (h) is more probable than
(f). The reason why this is problematic is that, according to basic probability theory, a conjunction cannot be more probable than any of its conjuncts alone. (Formally: for any two events A
and B, Pr(A&B) ≤ Pr(A) and Pr(A&B) ≤ Pr(B).) And since (h) is a conjunction of (c) and (f),
judging (h) to be more probable than (f) violates this rule. This result has since been referred
to as the conjunction fallacy.
Stephen Jay Gould is often quoted with respect to this problem:
I am particularly fond of [the Linda] example, because I know that the [conjunction] is least probable, yet a little homunculus in my head continues to jump up and
down, shouting at me—“but she can’t just be a bank teller: read the description.”
. . . Why do we consistently make this simple logical error? Tversky and Kahneman argue, correctly I think, that our minds are not built (for whatever reason) to
work by the rules of probability. (Gould, 1991, p. 469)
The claims that I will offer are (i) that the homunculi in our heads shout as they do because they
are guided by ER-structures (which is just another way of saying that the Representativeness
heuristic operates over ER-structures); and (ii) that it may not be so much that our minds are
not built to work by the rules of probability, but that people tend not to activate the appropriate
conceptual content with respect to their concepts of logic and probability, and thus they rely on
a heuristic rather than logical or probabilistic reasoning.
The description given of Linda provides various conceptual information. If participants
were asked to predict Linda’s occupation or her current activities based on the description
alone, without any options, any number of responses is possible, including but not limited to
(a)-(h). However, the statements given by (a)-(h) focus the cognitive task and provide content
for it. Each statement provides a different background against which to analyze and conceptualize the description of Linda, and the statements therefore act as constraints on the initial
setup of the task (cf. section 4.3 of the previous chapter). The statement “Linda is a teacher in
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elementary school” activates the concept elementary school teacher with various conceptual
content regarding things such as elementary school teachers’ general demeanor, level of intelligence, typical major in university, and so on, based on one’s past experiences and knowledge.
The description of Linda also activates various conceptual content, such as representations of
outspoken and philosophy major, and judgments of the extent to which Linda’s description
matches a given statement are made based on the associations between the respective conceptual representations and conceptualizations. We can thus see how internal and external
parameters effect the initial setup of the ER-structure. We can also see how the Representativeness heuristic is thereby constrained by active conceptual information as one makes a judgment
about the relative probability that Linda is in fact an elementary school teacher, given the description provided.
Similarly, the statement “Linda is active in the feminist movement” activates the concept
feminist with various conceptual content. With respect to this statement, however, it appears
that in the vast majority of cases one’s representations and conceptualizations of feminist are
highly associated with the description of Linda—that is, the description of Linda is representative of feminist. This is evinced by the fact that the majority of participants surveyed by
Kahneman and Tversky most often ranked (c) higher than all other statements (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982b, p. 92). Hence, people tend to believe that it is more probable that Linda is
active in the feminist movement than any other description provided.
On the theory I am advocating here, the concepts and representations activated by the presentation of the Linda problem will be many. This is because the problem provides lots of
information, including that given by Linda’s description plus the eight statements that are to
be ranked. This will, in turn, give rise to a complex ER-structure. The description of Linda
will activate conceptual information that forms an initial set of representations. As one conceptualizes each of the statements given, from (a) to (h), additional sets of representations and
conceptualizations will be activated. The Representativeness heuristic would then operate over
the number, type, and strength of connections that exist between the concepts activated by the
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description-set and each statement-set. The connections between the concepts activated by the
description-set and statement-sets will reveal an ER-structure with thick properties. Most relevant to our concerns about the Representativeness heuristic is that the concepts comprising the
description-set will bear multiple outward connections to multiple concepts invoked by “Linda
is active in the feminist movement”, and these connections will be the most strong and most
numerous among all the statement-sets. A heuristic that operates over these thick structural
properties—namely, the Representativeness heuristic—would thereby deem the concepts invoked by “Linda is active in the feminist movement” as more pertinent than the other concepts
constituting the other statement-sets. This would explain why people tend to rank (c) higher
than all other statements. This would also explain why (h) “Linda is a bank teller and is active
in the feminist movement” is consistently ranked higher than (f) “Linda is a bank teller”, and
indeed why one’s homunculus shouts, “but she can’t just be a bank teller: read the description”. For, given what has just been said, the concepts comprising the description-set will bear
multiple outward connections to multiple representations invoked by (h) in virtue of its “active
in the feminist movement” part. This ER-structure will not be exhibited when the concepts
invoked by (f) are set against the description-set, since we might expect that the conceptualizations of the concepts of (f) will bear less numerous and less strong inward connections from the
description-set concepts, or perhaps there will be negative or inhibitory connections between
the conceptual contents invoked by (f) and the description-set.
The issue that Kahneman and Tversky emphasize is the violation of probability theory that
occurs when people tend to judge (h) to be more probable than (f). This phenomenon is certainly problematic, so long as probability theory is taken to be normative (but see footnote 5;
also see below). But it is not entirely clear that participants are understanding probable or
probability univocally, or even coherently (cf. Gigerenzer, 1996, 2007; Gigerenzer, Hertwig,
van den Broek, Fasolo, & Katsikopoulos, 2005). The ongoing debate over the nature of probability shows that even the professionals are not clear on these concepts. “Probability” can mean
anything from degree of belief, to frequency, to propensity (von Plato, 1994), and it can also
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be interpreted vaguely or ambiguously, as many laypeople do, in terms of likely, or likelihood,
or chance. This is not to say that people believe probability is meaningless, and that people do
not understand at all what is being asked of them when they are asked to make probabilistic
predictions (pace Gigerenzer, 1991, 1993; cf. Samuels et al., 2002). Rather, the point is that
people’s ideas of what probability is, or what probabilities are, may not agree with one another,
or may not be robustly or wholly understood.
The naı̈ve and novices with respect to probability theory will likely not have a rich or robust
probability concept, and ipso facto such people would not activate the appropriate probability
conceptualizations when confronted with a cognitive task involving probabilities. Nevertheless, the use of the Representativeness heuristic in the Linda problem is robust across people
at all skill levels—even experts tend to rank (h) higher than (f) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).
Of course, once revealed, the experts immediately understand their fault. Yet something interesting must be going on if even the experts are fooled by their homunculi. Contrary to
Gould’s sentiment, I am not convinced that humans are lost when it comes to reasoning with
probabilities, for indeed many people know and understand very well how to carry out probabilistic calculations. My hypothesis is that people generally tend not to activate the appropriate
conceptualizations with respect to their probability concept. Instead, the thick ER-structure described above and the heuristic procedure that operates over it supersede, and in some ways repress, the activation of the appropriate conceptualizations that would allow people—especially
experts—to rank the statements given in the Linda problem in accordance with the basic axioms of probability theory. And I suspect that this is a consequence of how the information is
presented in the Linda problem. More specifically, the way the information is presented facilitates the establishment of the given ER-structure, but does not at all facilitate the activation
of many probability conceptualizations. As a result, the naı̈ve, novices, and experts alike tend
to rely on a heuristic procedure—the Representativeness heuristic—that operates over the ERstructural properties established in cognition when reasoning about the Linda problem, unless
one cogitates beyond this initial ER-structure.
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It is also of interest to note that the Linda problem phenomenon can be couched in terms of
relevance. Specifically, what seems to be going on is that the description of Linda is relevant
to our judgments about her occupation, beliefs, lifestyle, etc. The very fact that participants
are presented with a description of Linda indicates something about the relevance of the description, namely that it is of importance who Linda is, what Linda does, etc. (i.e., that it is
of importance to the task of ranking the statements provided). In this context, ranking (a)(h) in terms of the probability calculus simply appears to be the wrong norm, for participants
may view the task not in terms of probability assignments (notwithstanding the wording of the
task) but in terms of matching—matching the description to how (a)-(h) are conceptualized.
Although this and related matters deserve serious attention, I refrain from discussing them any
further with respect to the Linda problem in particular for a number of reasons. One reason is
that introducing issues about the norms of reason will take us too far afield (though in the next
chapter I discuss normative issues of a different sort). A second reason is that I return to the
topic of relevance in the next chapter, and a more general discussion will be saved until then
(see my comments below with respect to relevance and the Dick problem).
A third reason why I refrain from digressing into matters to do with relevance is that I have
already discussed the Linda problem at length, and the point of the present chapter is not to
explain the phenomenon in terms of relevance, but to show how the account of heuristics developed in this dissertation explains a range of phenomena (and as I have shown, it explains the
Linda problem). To continue, then, I will show that the hypothesis I have suggested also explains further phenomena exhibited by other problems discussed by Kahneman and Tversky as
they illustrate the Representativeness heuristic. I will briefly discuss two other such problems,
namely the Dick problem and what has become known as the cab problem.

5.1.2.2 The Dick problem
To investigate the extent to which people’s judgments were affected by prior probabilities, or
base-rates (i.e., the probability of an event unconditioned on evidence), Tversky and Kahneman
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(1974) presented participants with brief personality descriptions of several individuals, and
they were told that the descriptions were chosen at random from a group of 100 professionals
comprised of engineers and lawyers. For each description, the participants were asked to state
whether it was of an engineer or of a lawyer, and to assign a probability. There were two
experimental conditions, one in which participants were told that the group from which the
descriptions had been selected consisted of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers, and the other in
which participants were told that the group consisted of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers. Given
this information, the probability that any given description is of an engineer rather than of a
lawyer should be higher in the first condition where there is a majority of engineers, than in the
second condition where there is a minority of engineers.
However, Tversky and Kahneman found that the same probability judgments were made in
both experimental conditions, which is a violation of probability theory. As they report, “Apparently, subjects evaluated the likelihood that a particular description belonged to an engineer
rather than to a lawyer, by the degree to which this description was representative of the two
stereotypes, with little or no regard for the prior probabilities of the categories” (p. 1125). This
fallacy has become known as base-rate neglect, since the participants allegedly ignored the
base-rates (or prior probabilities) in the problem. On the other hand, when descriptions were
omitted, and participants were asked to give a probability that a person chosen at random would
be an engineer or a lawyer, they made their judgments according to the prior probabilities.
Here is a sample of one of the descriptions they gave participants:
Dick is a 30 year old man. He is married with no children. A man of high ability
and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is well
liked by his colleagues.
As Tversky and Kahneman report, the information given by the descriptions were supposed
to have presented uninformative information: “This description was intended to convey no
information relevant to the question of whether Dick is an engineer or a lawyer. Consequently,
the probability that Dick is an engineer should equal the proportion of engineers in the group,
as if no description had been given” (p. 1125). However, participants tended to assign a
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probability of 0.5 to the statement that Dick is an engineer. This, then, is an example in which
the Representativeness heuristic overrides consideration for base-rates.
According to my account the setup and content of the Dick problem naturally invokes a
certain ER-structure, and a heuristic procedure operates over this structure, assessing its connectional relations to decide the relative pertinence of representations. Given the empirical
results, it seems likely that the ER-structures exhibited by one’s engineer and lawyer concepts
were not decisive between whether Dick is an engineer or lawyer. As in the case of the Linda
problem, the ER-structure invoked by the nature and content of the task supersede consideration of the base-rates. More specifically, the conceptual content of the Dick problem is not
conducive to and interferes with activating the appropriate probability conceptualizations, and
thus the probability assigned to the statement that Dick is an engineer is made via a heuristic procedure rather than via probabilistic calculations. This hypothesis is consistent with the
fact that when descriptions were omitted participants made their judgments in accordance with
probability theory—a situation in which there was no information to interfere with exciting the
appropriate probability conceptualizations. In the absence of descriptions, one’s engineer and
lawyer concepts may be active, but the content that would influence one to ignore the base-rate
is not there.
In contrast to Tversky and Kahneman’s assertion that the descriptive information of Dick
is irrelevant to the problem, I believe that such information is in fact relevant. At the very least,
the active conceptual content, and the extant relations between such information, proves to be
informative insofar as ER-structures tend to reflect the way information is structured in the real
world—one’s concepts and conceptual content are, after all, heavily influenced by empirical
learning. Again, however, I will not pursue this matter any further at the moment. I mention
this point here only to intimate some of what I will be arguing in the next chapter.
5.1.2.3 The cab problem
Another example that exhibits base-rate neglect is the following cab problem.
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A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, the
Green and the Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data:
(a) 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue.
(b) A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the
witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident
and concluded that the witness correctly identified each one of the two colors
80% of the time and failed 20% of the time.
What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather than
Green knowing that this witness identified it as Blue?
This problem is unlike the Dick problem, since the latter illustrates how supposed irrelevant
information invites the use of the Representativeness heuristic, causing one to ignore prior
probabilities. The cab problem, on the other hand, is supposed to illustrate that the Representativeness heuristic can be triggered even while cogitating relevant information. Here, (a) and
(b) are both relevant to determining the probability that the cab involved in the accident was
Blue, and the correct answer is arrived at through Bayes’ theorem: the probability is 0.41.5
Thus, despite the witness’ report, the hit-and-run cab is more likely to have been Green, and
this is because the prior probability that the cab is Green is higher than the credibility of the
witness. However, Tversky and Kahneman (1980) report that participants who are presented
with this cab problem typically answer that the probability that the cab was Blue is about 0.80,
which happens to coincide with the credibility of the witness. Tversky and Kahneman interpret this result as participants employing the Representativeness heuristic, taking the witness’
credibility as representative of the probability that the hit-and-run cab was in fact Blue.
I am not convinced that Tversky and Kahneman have correctly described the processes
underlying people’s judgments on this problem. Rather, I believe that the cab problem simply reinforces my claim that most people—namely the naı̈ve and novices—do not know how
to solve probability problems involving base-rates. According to my account, the incorrect
responses are the result of an epistemic deficiency with respect to treating probabilistic information. However, I suspect that, unlike the Linda problem and the Dick problem, if the cab
5

Where H = the hypothesis that the cab was Blue, and E = the reliability of the witness’ testimony:
Pr(H|E) =

Pr(E|H)×Pr(H)
[Pr(E|H)×Pr(H)]+[Pr(E|¬H)×Pr(¬H)]

=

0.8×0.15
[0.8×0.15]+[0.2×0.85]

= 0.41
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problem was presented to knowledgable statisticians, or indeed if the problem was on a final
exam for a statistics class (with bright students), incorrect responses would not be the majority.
In the terms I have used above, the probability concepts possessed by the participants in Tversky and Kahneman’s study did not bring to bear the appropriate conceptual content to facilitate
the correct answer. On the other hand, statisticians or students in the context of an exam on
statistics will likely bring to bear the appropriate conceptualizations of (probabilistic) information presented in the cab problem. For not much other conceptual information is invoked by
the cab problem to enable the proposed interference effects observed in the Linda and Dick
problems.
Nevertheless, I bring up the cab problem for discussion because it can be used to illustrate a different point, namely that people’s responses to the cab problem can be manipulated
by the format in which probabilistic information is presented. Probabilistic information can
be presented in a number of ways: as percentages, as fractions, numerically, pictorially (e.g.,
in pie-charts), and so on. Notice that the manner in which probabilistic information is presented in the cab problem is as numerical percentages. According to Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
(1995, 1999), the human brain is not equipped to reason with numerical percentages, and I
tend to agree. More precisely, I believe that humans generally do not possess the conceptual
wherewithal to appropriately conceptualize probabilistic information in terms of percentages.
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage illustrate, on the other hand, how probabilistic reasoning can be facilitated when probabilistic information is presented in what they call “natural frequencies”, i.e.,
unnormalized frequencies observed by encountering instances in a population sequentially. As
they illustrate, natural frequencies carry information about base-rates, whereas normalized frequencies or probabilities do not. Thus, when one reasons with natural frequencies, one need
not bother with understanding how to appropriately integrate base-rate information in making
inferences or predictions, since such information is already built in.6
6

Despite Gigerenzer’s frequent accusations that Kahneman and Tversky focus too much on the mistakes and
biases that occur as a result of employing heuristics, Kahneman and Tversky have in fact investigated how reasoning is affected by the format in which probabilistic information is presented, and they have shown that probabilistic
reasoning can be thereby improved. See Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1973a); Tversky and Kahneman (1980,
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To express the probabilistic information in the cab problem in natural frequencies, (a) and
(b) would be replaced by the following:
(a0 ) 85 out of 100 are Green, 15 out of 100 are Blue.
(b0 ) A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the
witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident
and concluded that the witness correctly identified each cab 8 of every 10
times and failed 2 of every 10.

The question posed would then be:
The witness will identify

out of

cabs as Blue.

Reasoning would proceed as follows. Of the 15 cabs that are Blue, the witness would correctly
identify 12 (8 of every 10). Of the 85 cabs that are Green, the witness would incorrectly identify
17 (2 of every 10); this means that on these occasions the cab was actually Green. Thus, the
witness would identify 12 cabs as Blue of a possible 12 + 17 cases in which the cab is not
actually Blue. So the answer is

12
(12+17)

= 0.41, which is the correct answer. Gigerenzer and

Hoffrage (1995) performed experiments, the results of which show that people have an easier
time arriving at the correct answer to the cab problem when the probabilistic information is
presented as given here rather than as in the original (although not everyone arrives at the
correct answer).
The natural frequency information can be also be represented graphically, as presented in
Figure 5.1 (cf. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). When the information is represented in this way,
it is easily seen that the witness will have correctly identified 12 out of 12 + 17 cabs as Blue.
This illustrates that the manner in which information is (re)presented affects the way it is
cognized. In terms of the thesis of this dissertation, changing the format in which information
is presented will activate different conceptualizations; and the different conceptualizations will
facilitate different ways to reason about the information given. Specifically, when the same
information is represented in natural frequencies, one is able to conceptualize it in ways that
1983).
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Total number of cabs

100

Number of Blue cabs

Number of Green cabs

Number of Blue cabs
correctly identified by
witness (8 out of 10)

12

85

15

3

17

68
Number of Green cabs incorrectly
identified by witness (2 out of 10)

The witness will identify ______ out of ______ cabs as Blue.
12
= 0.41
12 + 17
Figure 5.1: A graphical representation of the cab problem expressed in terms of natural frequencies.

make it easier to cognize than when the same information is presented in percentages; and
when natural frequencies are represented graphically, the task may become even easier.
There are three things to note here. First, in addition to the fact that natural frequencies
embed base-rate information, when the cab problem is presented in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s
reformulation, the question that participants are expected to answer (viz. “The witness will
identify

out of

cabs as Blue”) is not equivalent to the question that participants

are expected to answer in the original problem (viz. “What is the probability that the cab
involved in the accident was Blue rather than Green knowing that this witness identified it as
Blue?”). Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s formulation asks participants to give a fraction with respect
to the number of cabs that the witness will identify as Blue, whereas Kahneman and Tversky’s
formulation asks participants to give their own probability that the cab involved in the accident
was indeed Blue. The actual problem is therefore different between the two formulations. This
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is an important point, for what is asked of the participants will affect the way in which the
problem itself is conceptualized; and different conceptualizations of information will be more
or less helpful to different conceptualizations of the problem. Here, the way Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage present the probabilistic information in the cab problem is conducive to the manner in
which they present the information to be predicted. I suspect, however, that their participants
would not have as easy a time arriving at the correct answer if the question posed was that of
the original (viz. “What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather
than Green knowing that this witness identified it as Blue?”) or something close (e.g., “What
is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue?”).
A second (and related) thing to note is that the manner in which the problem is conceptualized between the two formulations affects the cognitive task elicited from participants. Kahneman and Tversky’s formulation elicits a task of determining a probability based on numerical
information, whereas Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s formulation does not elicit such a task, but a
categorization task. In chapter 3, I cited Sterelny as claiming, “the practice of marking a trail
while walking in the bush converts a difficult memory problem into a simple perceptual problem” (Sterelny, 2006, p. 225). The same sort of thing is happening here between Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage’s formulation of the cab problem on the one hand, and Kahneman and Tversky’s
formulation on the other. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s formulation converts a difficult probability
problem into a simpler categorization problem. When probabilistic information is presented in
natural frequencies, the task is changed from predicting a probability to grouping together the
number of instances when the witness identified cabs as Blue, and comparing it to the number of instances when the witness was actually correct. This categorization task is made even
easier when represented graphically as in Figure 5.1. However, in Kahneman and Tversky’s
formulation, the task is much more difficult because none of these resources is available to
solving a probability problem as such. And, as I am claiming here that the conceptual content
of people’s probability concept tends to be impoverished, people will generally have a hard
time solving the problem in Kahneman and Tversky’s formulation.
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The third thing to note is that the way in which we solve the cab problem does not have
much to do with heuristic procedures as I have been understanding them here. For the way
in which the cab problem is solved—in either Kahneman and Tversky’s or Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage’s formulation—is not by exploiting any metainformational structures such as those
embodied by ER-structures. Rather, the cab problem is essentially a problem in formal probability which requires certain skills and knowledge to arrive at the correct answer. Thus, contrary to what Kahneman and Tversky claim, I claim that the cab problem does not exhibit the
use of the Representativeness heuristic, or any other heuristic. I discussed the cab problem
at length, however, to illustrate that conceptualizations of a problem and conceptualizations
of the information relevant to solving the problem or making predictions interact in specific
and important ways. The format in which information is presented, and the manner in which
questions or problems are posed, therefore affect one’s ability to reason about and solve the
problem. Moreover, to corroborate the general picture of concepts and cognition advanced in
this dissertation, I wanted to illustrate that one’s conceptual wherewithal plays a crucial role
in reasoning insofar as it is equipped to produce the kinds of conceptualizations to facilitate
certain ways of reasoning about the problem. I suspect that the account I am offering here with
respect to the cab problem can be applied more generally to framing effects,7 however I will
refrain from exploring this matter here.

5.2

Fast and frugal heuristics

Let us now turn to Gigerenzer’s fast and frugal heuristics. I will here comment on two further
heuristics: the Recognition heuristic and Take the Best. As it will presently become evident,
these heuristics can likewise be understood as procedures that exploit and are constrained by
extant, informationally rich structures between active concepts and content.
7

The framing effect is a phenomenon wherein the same information presented in different ways elicits different
and contradictory responses.
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The Recognition heuristic

The Recognition heuristic is perhaps the simplest of Gigerenzer’s heuristics. The way it basically works is one chooses the alternative she recognizes:8
(14)

(i) Search among alternatives; (ii) stop search when one alternative is recognized;
(iii) choose the recognized object.

However, this heuristic (like any other) is not successful and accurate in all environments. It
works only when just one alternative is recognized, while the others are completely unrecognized.9 Moreover, “The single most important factor for determining the usefulness of the
Recognition heuristic is the strength of the relationship between the contents of recognition
memory and the criterion [being predicted]” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 78). What is
being referred to here is the recognition validity, which is the proportion of instances when a
recognized object has a higher criterion value than an unrecognized object (in the same class
of objects). The Recognition heuristic is defined as successful when the recognition validity is
greater than 0.5 (i.e., when there is an above-chance correlation between recognition and the
criterion being predicted).
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002) hypothesize how the Recognition heuristic works.
They note that criteria that are being predicted are not always readily available or accessible,
and so a person has to make inferences about it. Inferences, of course, are based upon an
individual’s previous knowledge of the class of objects in question, some of which comes
8

The Recognition heuristic is really supposed to apply only when there are two alternatives, and no more. I
do think, however, that this heuristic can be generalized to apply to situations in which there are more than two
alternatives.
9
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) use the term “recognition” to “divide the world into the novel and the previously experienced” (p. 77). The way I use the term “completely unrecognized” coincides with their understanding
of being confronted with a novel object. To have previous experience with an object means that it is recognized,
and this experience can be vaguely remembered (a situation Goldstein and Gigerenzer call “mere recognition”) or
richly remembered (a situation where the object is recognized and additional information can be provided about
it). Though I do not want to enter into any kind of discussion on the matter here, I believe that when an object is
vaguely remembered, one possesses conceptual content about the object, some of which may even be primed upon
vague remembering, but such information does not make in into conscious thought. Thus, as far as possession of
knowledge about an object is concerned, I do not think that there is much of a difference between the object being
vaguely remembered and it being richly remembered.
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from “mediators”. Mediators, according to Goldstein and Gigerenzer, are third-party entities
that indirectly carry information about the criterion in question. As we shall soon see, being
mentioned in newspapers can serve as a surrogate for information about relative city size, and
in this way it is a mediator for the latter criterion. An individual can make accurate predictions
on some criterion provided that there is a correlation between the criterion and the information
carried by the mediator (what Goldstein and Gigerenzer call the “ecological correlation”), and
provided that there is a correlation between one’s recognition memory and the information
of the mediator (what they call the “surrogate correlation”). Recognition can therefore carry
information about a given criterion via a mediator.
Despite its simplicity and frugality, Gigerenzer and his colleagues have touted the Recognition heuristic to make more accurate predictions on a number of tasks than a variety of standard
rational and statistical methods of decision, such as multiple regression (for the most discussion, see Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Gigerenzer (2007) goes on to argue that the Recognition
heuristic can be used to explain a wide variety of phenomena, varying from which product a consumer is more likely to buy, to predicting which football team will win a game, to
which symphony will be favoured—the recognized brand will most likely be purchased by
a consumer, the recognized team will be predicted to win, the recognized symphony will be
favoured.
Let us consider Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) experiment which tested the use of the
Recognition heuristic. They presented a group of American undergraduates with pairs of names
of German cities. The task was to choose the larger city in each pair, and to indicate whether
they recognized the names of the cities. Goldstein and Gigerenzer found that in the vast majority of instances where one city was recognized but not the other, participants predicted that
the city they recognized was the larger of the two. Hence, Goldstein and Gigerenzer concluded
that the Recognition heuristic was being employed. In addition, they found that the Recognition heuristic produced, on the whole, accurate predictions. They explain such accuracy in
terms of mediators: as recently mentioned, being mentioned in newspapers is a good surrogate
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of information about the sizes of foreign cities, for as Goldstein and Gigerenzer show, there is
a correlation between city size and the number of times the city was mentioned in newspapers.
A more startling result that Goldstein and Gigerenzer discuss is that the American students
were better at predicting the relative sizes of German cities than predicting the relative sizes
of American cities. They call this phenomenon the “less-is-more effect”: “The Recognition
heuristic leads to a paradoxical situation in which those who know more exhibit lower inferential accuracy than those who know less” (p. 79). They explain this instance of the less-is-more
effect by claiming that the American students were unable to use the Recognition heuristic on
American cities, since both cities of many pairs were recognized, reducing their responses to
guesses if no other knowledge aided in their predictions. Of course, Goldstein and Gigerenzer
recognize that knowing less is not always going to produce better predictions. Knowing neither cities in a given pair is going to produce only chance guesses; and knowing lots about each
city may produce more accurate predictions, especially if one possesses a piece of knowledge
which directly indicates which of two cities is larger. Thus, the less-is-more effect really only
occurs when one relies on recognition to make an inference, but one’s knowledge does not
exceed recognition validity.10
However, a more general way to explain the use and success of the Recognition heuristic is
through the exploitation of the connectional structures among active conceptual information.
The recognized object will in most cases activate more concepts and conceptual information
than the unrecognized one, thereby imposing initial constraints on heuristic reasoning. For
example, suppose of Berlin and Augsburg, Berlin is the recognized city while Augsburg is
completely unrecognized. Upon reading or hearing “Berlin”, a number of conceptualizations
contained within or related to one’s Berlin-file may be activated, such as those having to do
with the Berlin Wall, or the fact that Berlin is the capital of Germany, or reading about Berlin
10

On the present account of heuristics, knowing too little or too much about objects (without specifically knowing the criterion) creates informational structures over which it is difficult for heuristic procedures to navigate. On
the one hand, if too little is known, the ER-structure would be impoverished, making heuristic operations over
its structural relations difficult. On the other hand, if one knows quite a lot (without specifically knowing the
criterion), then there may be too many connections over which a heuristic must operate; in this case, employing a
heuristic may not be an option. See the discussion at the end of chapter 4 (section 4.4).
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in the news quite a bit lately, and so on. However, Augsburg, by virtue of it being completely
unrecognized—by virtue of not possessing any knowledge of it—will invoke minimal conceptual information.11 Thus, there will be nothing in one’s (newly created) Augsburg-file to
suggest one way or the other whether it is a large or small city. On the other hand, there is
ample conceptual information in one’s Berlin-file that suggests that it is, or is likely to be, a
large city. For the representations and conceptualizations activated by entertaining Berlin is
saturated with information that can indicate that it is a large city: a famous wall that divided a
city post-World War II would probably not have been erected in a small city, but a large and
important one; capital cities of countries tend to be large; small cities usually do not make the
news frequently, but large cities do; and so on. All this information is embedded in or entailed
by one’s Berlin concept, and hence, large city would bear a number of inward connections
from the conceptual content activated by opening one’s Berlin-file. Again, these structural
relations will not be exhibited by the conceptual content activated by Augsburg (all of which
comes from the context within which Augsburg is mentioned; see footnote 11). A heuristic
procedure operating over such thin relational structures will therefore indicate that Berlin is a
large city, while no such metainformational structures indicate this for Augsburg. One would
thereby predict that Berlin is the larger of the two.
We can agree with Goldstein and Gigerenzer that mediators exist and carry information
about certain criteria. This is simply an empirical fact, uninteresting as it is. What is more
interesting, however, is what information is actually carried by mediators, how we cognitively
manage such information, and what we do with it. In the above example, the fact that Berlin
once had a famous wall dividing the city, the fact that Berlin is the capital of Germany, and the
fact that Berlin has been in the news lately, all served as mediators. But mediators themselves
assume a great deal of conceptual knowledge. Newspapers, for example, carry information
about relative sizes of cities, but this information is caught up in a web of knowledge con11

Of course, it will not be the case that no conceptual information will be invoked. For in the context of the
(thought) experiment, one would understand that Augsburg is a city, and that it is supposed to be a city in Germany.
Thus, even if one has not heard of Augsburg before, a file would be created for it from what one can gather from
the context.
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cerning why such cities would be in the news—it is no accident, for instance, that small towns
are rarely, if ever, mentioned in the New York Times. As should be obvious by now, I suggest
that such webs of knowledge play important roles in heuristic inference and reasoning insofar as they embody higher-order information about what concepts and conceptualizations are
pertinent and therefore useful in making predictions.
Suppose, for instance, that instead of Berlin and Augsburg, Alice was presented with Wittenberg and Augsburg, and was asked to predict which is larger. Let us further suppose that
Alice does not recognize Augsburg but recognizes Wittenberg only because she recalls Bob
once mentioning in passing that he had once visited that city. Basing her inference on recognition, Alice predicts that Wittenberg is the larger city. This prediction is incorrect, however—
Augsburg is in fact the larger of the two. Goldstein and Gigerenzer might blame Alice’s incorrect response on a poor ecological correlation between, on the one hand, the relative sizes
of Wittenberg and Augsburg, and on the other hand, Bob’s mentioning that he had visited
Wittenberg; or they might blame it on a poor recognition validity. But ecological correlation and recognition validity are simply factors that contribute to the description of why the
Recognition heuristic may or may not work in a given instance. In contrast, the theory I am
advancing here tells us what is actually doing the work when we rely on recognition in our
reasoning. With respect to Alice, if remembering that Bob had visited Wittenberg did not excite for her any information that bore specific relations to certain representations having to do
with the relative size of the city, then, since there would be little or no structural information
to guide heuristic inference, she would have simply guessed (wrongly) that Wittenberg was
larger based ex hypothesi on the mere fact that she recognized the name “Wittenberg”. On the
other hand, remembering that Bob visited Wittenberg might have actually invoked for Alice a
specific ER-structure among activated concepts and content. For example, she might have activated conceptualizations having to do with remembering that Bob detests visiting small cities,
or having to do with the fact that tourists tend to visit bigger cities. Such conceptualizations
might thereby bear outward connections to her large city concept with respect to her concep-

Chapter 5. How Heuristics Work: Considering Empirical Evidence

211

tualizing Wittenberg, few (and maybe weak) as these connections may be. In this case, Alice’s
prediction that Wittenberg is the larger city would have resulted from the Recognition heuristic
operating over the said thin connectional relations. And so contrary to what Gigerenzer would
assume, Alice’s prediction would have been based on more than just recognition.
Further phenomena can be explained by my theory that cannot be explained by the Recognition heuristic alone. Daniel Oppenheimer (2003) conducted studies similar to Goldstein and
Gigerenzer’s. In one study Oppenheimer asked a group from Stanford University to report
which of Chernobyl and Heingjing is larger, and in another he asked a different group to report
which of Milpitas and Heingjing is larger. Chernobyl is widely known for its nuclear disaster in
1986, though this information is supposed to be irrelevant to its size.12 Milpitas is a small city
of about 62,000 inhabitants,13 situated just north of San Jose, which was presumed to be known
to the participants. Heingjing, however, is a fictitious city; the name was made up by Oppenheimer for the purposes of his experiments. The results are interesting: Neither group, on the
average, relied on the Recognition heuristic. Instead, they predicted that Heingjing is larger
than Chernobyl, as well as Milpitas. Oppenheimer uses these results to challenge Gigerenzer’s
claim that usage of the Recognition heuristic is ubiquitous and widespread.
Gigerenzer (2007, 2008c), however, retorts by asserting that there are actually two steps to
employing heuristics. For the Recognition heuristic, the first step is recognition: whether one
alternative is recognized, and the others not. This first step determines whether the Recognition
heuristic is applicable. The second step is an evaluative one: an assessment of the ecological
rationality of the heuristic. If by this evaluation it is judged that the heuristic is not ecologically
rational, it will not be used, and a search for some other (perhaps heuristic) strategy commences. Hence, Gigerenzer explains Oppenheimer’s results by claiming that the participants
did not use the Recognition heuristic after its ecological validity was evaluated. Gigerenzer
asserts that the participants knew that the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl has nothing to do with
12

But see my remarks above regarding the Representativeness heuristic and the supposed irrelevance of information.
13
At the time of the experiment.
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population size, and that they also knew that Milpitas is a small city. He goes on to claim that
this knowledge overrode the Recognition heuristic: “In both cases, many participants did not
follow the Recognition heuristic and answered ‘Heingjing.’ They recognized a city for reasons
independent from population (which invalidated the heuristic in this situation) or because they
had direct knowledge about the criterion (population)” (Gigerenzer, 2008c, p. 25).
Nevertheless, the results of Oppenheimer’s studies are explained more naturally by my theory of how heuristics work. In both of Oppenheimer’s studies, being presented with the name
“Heingjing” not unlikely produced representations and conceptualizations having to do with
China and cities in China. Most people know that China is a densely populated country, containing the largest population on the planet. This knowledge would have excited conceptualizations that would almost certainly represent Heingjing as a large city. When this representational
information is compared to the representational information activated for Chernobyl (such as
information having to do with the nuclear disaster, and whatever else bears extant relations
to this) and Milpitas (such as information having to do with its being a relatively small city),
it suggests that Heingjing is likely larger than both Chernobyl and Milpitas. This of course
presumes that neither Chernobyl nor Milpitas induced conceptual content that exhibited structural relations that embody appropriate connections to one’s large city concept. If this were
the case, or if the suggested informational structure did not exist for Heingjing, then Heingjing
may not be predicted to be larger.
In this situation I am agreeing with Gigerenzer that those who predicted that Heingjing is
the larger city did not employ the Recognition heuristic. What I am suggesting, however, is
that Gigerenzer fails to recognize, or at least appreciate, the crucial role played by our concepts
and the extant relations between conceptual content in heuristic reasoning. Recognition carries
information (via mediators) about the thing recognized, but it is not recognition per se that
is doing the work when we employ the Recognition heuristic. Indeed, in such instances our
inferences are based on a lot more information than mere recognition,14 for it is the structure of
14

I am not here using “mere recognition” as Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) do. See footnote 9.
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relations between activated concepts and conceptual content that guides our heuristics. Again,
in this way activated concepts and conceptual content constrain heuristics. Thus, Gigerenzer
does not need to offer ad hoc revisions to the operations of the Recognition heuristic (viz.
claiming that there are two steps). Instead, if my account is accepted, the extant ER-structure
will indicate that some heuristic other than the Recognition heuristic will be applied.

5.2.2

Take the Best

As mentioned above, when more than one object in a group is recognized, the Recognition
heuristic cannot be applied. However, if additional information about the recognized objects
can be recalled, Gigerenzer (2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) claims that an individual
may rely on the Take the Best heuristic:
(15)

(i) Search among alternatives; (ii) stop search when one alternative scores higher
on some predetermined criterion; (iii) choose the object identified in step ii.

Take the Best assumes that an individual has a subjectively ranked order of beliefs about cues
which may discriminate between objects and which are considered sequentially when making
predictions.15 The highest ranked cue which discriminates is termed “the best”, and the objects
that have a positive value with respect to this best cue will be chosen or predicted to possess
some criterion. This idea behind Take the Best was briefly explained in chapter 2 (section
2.4.2.2) and in a little more detail in chapter 3 (section 3.4.2).
Gigerenzer’s examples and experiments that illustrate Take the Best are much like the ones
given for the Recognition heuristic.16 For example, suppose you had to choose which of a pair
of cities is larger. Both are recognized, but you believe that having a university is the best cue
that discriminates on the criterion of city size, and you know that one city has a university while
the other does not. You would thus use Take the Best, and infer that the city with the university
15

Like the Recognition heuristic, Take the Best is supposed to apply only when there are two alternatives. But,
again like the Recognition heuristic, I believe that Take the Best can be generalized to apply to situations in which
there are more than two alternatives.
16
In fact, the Recognition heuristic might be understood as a special case Take the Best, if recognition is taken
to be a cue.
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is the larger of the two.
Here again we can explain this heuristic in terms of my theory of concepts and heuristics, for Take the Best, too, exploits informationally rich conceptual structures. Indeed, as I
had indicated in chapter 2 (section 2.4.2.2), significant amounts of conceptual information is
typically entailed by the very belief that a cue discriminates. For instance, I had claimed that
certain beliefs are implied about the cue upon which the choice in question was made—at the
very least, we can infer that the said cue was believed to be the “best” to make the choice in
question, and that the cue is believed to be the “best” implies certain things about the conceptual content of the cue (as possessed by the chooser), as well as certain things about how the
cue fits within the chooser’s conceptual structure. In chapter 3 (section 3.4.2), we saw in a bit
more detail what we might infer about the conceptual content of the “best” cue as possessed by
the chooser. For example, if one believes that having a university is a good predictor of relative
city size, one must possess a concept university which is rich enough to support such a belief,
or at least to support the belief that having a university is a better predictor of relative city
size than some other cue. And the conceptual information built into one’s university concept
might include, in addition to various representations and conceptualizations that are required
to understand what a university is, information about a university’s function in society; how it
houses a number of faculty, staff, and students; perhaps the relative social classes of members
of a community typical of such faculty, staff, and students; maybe the ways in which having a
university relates to the economy of a city; and probably much more. Indeed, it is such information that generally makes one believe that having a university is a good predictor of relative
city size. (We see here again hints of Dretske: A cue will be treated as a discriminating cue
only if one possesses the appropriate conceptual wherewithal to do so.)
The process by which I understand Take the Best to operate is similar to the one outlined
for the Recognition heuristic. The nature and content of the cognitive task of predicting which
of two cities is larger, for example, will activate and prime various concepts and conceptual
content. If only one of the two cities happens to have a university, then conceptualizations
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pertaining to a university’s function in society, how it houses a number of people, etc., will be
among what is activated or primed. These latter representations will bear strong outward connections to one’s large city concept, which is just to say that large city will bear a number of
strong inward connections. Thus, a heuristic procedure operating over these thin ER-structural
connections will suggest that having a university is indicative of a large city, and as a result,
the city with the university will be predicted to be larger than the other.
On this view, we might thus understand one’s belief that having a university is a good
predictor of relative city size to be implicit in the metainformational ER-structure; that is, beliefs about discriminating cues need not be explicitly represented. Assuming that we explicitly
represent pre-ranked sets of cues is implausible, in any case. For we must not only have a preranked set of cues for predicting relative city size, but a set for any potential decision task that
we are faced with, or at least any potential decision task concerning objects that we have some
familiarity with. This must be the case if Take the Best is available for use for any such decision
task. If I am to predict which car would be faster, I must have pre-ranked cues for that task; if
I am to predict which student will score higher on the final exam, I must have pre-ranked cues
for that task; if I am to predict which apple will taste better, I must have pre-ranked cues for
that task; and so on. Yet carrying around all sorts of pre-ranked sets of cues in our heads is
cognitively demanding in terms of storage space—the human brain is far too limited to be able
to store all these pre-ranked sets of cues. To be sure, the number of sets of pre-ranked cues
would have to be unbounded, since there is an unbounded number of possible decision tasks.
This is an independent reason why we should doubt the framework Gigerenzer proposes for
Take the Best.17
Notice that on the view I am offering there is no need to presume that each of us has a preranked set of potentially discriminating cues, even if they are implicitly represented. We might
agree with Gigerenzer that we have sets of cues which we may rely upon to predict which object
17

As noted in footnote 32 in chapter 3, I suppose that one can produce cue rankings on the fly, as the situation arises. However, according to Gigerenzer, we must have predetermined cue rankings stored in memory
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 1999).
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scores highest on some criterion (based on rich conceptual information), but on my proposal
we do not have to assume that the cues are in any way ranked or otherwise ordered. Rather,
whatever concepts and conceptual content are activated and the ER-structure will determine
which, if any, cues are treated as discriminating cues. So, for example, suppose one must
predict which of Kitchener and Londono (Ontario) is larger. One’s Kitchener and Londono
concepts would be entertained, and their respective files searched to see if either possesses
information that discriminates with respect to relative size. Once it is found that Londono has a
university while Kitchener does not, the ER-structure just outlined would obtain; and if no other
discriminating information is revealed—if no further representations are invoked which would
alter the ER-structure to suggest otherwise—then one might predict that Londono is larger than
Kitchener. This does not require that one has already determined that having a university is a
good predictor of relative city size. Instead, if there is no other discriminating information that
comes to mind after consulting one’s Kitchener and Londono files, one can simply make an
inference on whatever the heuristic delivers according to the information available.
Notice furthermore that, whereas Gigerenzer’s account entails that one and only one cue
is used in making a heuristic inference (via Recognition or Take the Best), my account does
not entail this. Instead, a number of relevant cues may be considered, and a heuristic inference
may be made based on the conceptual information and ER-structure activated by them. Thus,
in addition to doing away with the presumption of pre-ranked sets of cues, we do not need to
suppose that cues are considered in a sequential manner. Suppose again that one had to predict
which of Kitchener and Londono is larger, that one believes that Londono has a university
while Kitchener does not, and that one (implicitly) believes that having a university is a good
predictor of city size. This time, however, suppose that one is told that Kitchener has a greater
number of residential zones than Londono .18 As before, no other discriminating information
is revealed. In this case, the way in which one predicts which city is larger would depend on
the conceptual content embedded in university and residential zones concepts. For example,
18

I am not sure if this is in fact true. I would assume that it is not. But the truth of the matter is irrelevant.
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one’s residential zones concept might invoke representations and conceptualizations that make
one (implicitly) believe more residential zones means more people, which means larger city,
and this belief may be weighed against one’s beliefs regarding universities and the implications
for relative city size. Indeed, one may come to believe that the number of residential zones is
a better predictor of relative city size, despite the fact that having a university is still believed
to be a good predictor. If this is the case, then one might infer that Kitchener is larger than
Londono based on the ER-structure that would be established by activating university and
residential zones and conceptualizations thereof.
Given the story that is being told here, I would assume that, in general, when the task is to
choose between recognized objects, one will almost always activate more conceptual content
than what Gigerenzer assumes. This is to say that it is unlikely that one will only invoke a
handful of cues to decide; instead one will, so to speak, search through the concept-files of
each concept activated by the nature and content of the cognitive task. I therefore believe that
the ER-structure in question will often be thick, since I assume that the conceptual content
invoked by the nature and content of the task can very well be substantial, especially if one
knows a good deal about each object in question. For instance, one might invoke conceptualizations concerning not only universities and residential zones, but also concerning whether a
major highway runs through one or both cities in question; whether one or both cities have a
professional sports team; whether one has heard one city in the news more often than the other;
whether there is a famous shopping centre in one or both cities; how many airports there are
in either city; whether one knows of a major river in either of the two cities; whether one has
any friends or relatives who live in or have been to either city; and much more. And all the
activated concepts and conceptualizations would bear various inward and outward connections
to one another.
I presume that a close analysis would reveal that a number of such active concepts could be
grouped according to whether and the extent to which they bear multiple outward connections
to specific concepts (these are included among the reference concepts, as described in the pre-

Chapter 5. How Heuristics Work: Considering Empirical Evidence

218

University
Economy
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Highway
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Figure 5.2: Representation of an ER-structure arising from Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (1999)
task of predicting which of two cities is larger. My claim is that Take the Best operates over a
structure like the one presented here.

vious chapter), and which concepts are bearing the inward connections (these are the pertinent
concepts, as described in the previous chapter). For instance, of the many concepts excited by
the task we are discussing, some may be grouped into sets according to whether and the extent
to which they bear outward connections to university, airport, highway, capital city, sports
team, and major river; and these concepts implicate individually, and corroborate together,
the concept large city. Potential sources for such outward connections are economy, infrastructure, industry, government, and crime. The representation in Figure 5.2 would suggest
that having a university, being a capital city, having one or more airports, and having a major
highway run through the city are implicitly believed to indicate relative city size. Take the Best
can thus be viewed as operating over the suggested ER-structure to deliver an inference that
the city in question is the larger of the two under consideration.
To gain a better appreciation of how my theory offers a richer and more plausible explanation of how we reason and how Take the Best really works, consider the following. Goldstein
and Gigerenzer (1999) report an experiment in which a group of American undergraduates
were presented a number of facts (cues) about a variety of German cities, and were coached in
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understanding which of them were good predictors of city size. The students were then asked
to choose which of two German cities were larger. Goldstein and Gigerenzer show that many
of the students ignored a good predictor cue—namely, having a major league soccer team—
and as a result they performed poorly on many of their predictions. Goldstein and Gigerenzer
claim that the participants were instead simply following the Recognition heuristic, despite the
availability of a good predictor cue. Nevertheless, I offer an alternative account here: Such
“ignored” predictor cues were simply not among the representations that were deemed pertinent by the students’ ER-structures invoked by the task. There are many reasons why this
might have been so. One possible explanation is that, although the students were coached in
understanding which cues were good predictors of city size, they were not sufficiently coached
in the pertinence of these cues. In order to play the role of a discriminating cue, a cue must
be conceptualized as a discriminating cue; and this requires that one’s conceptual information
for the cue is rich enough and bears the right kinds of relations to other concepts and information, as explained above with respect to university. Only with rich enough content can a
representation fulfill the role of a discriminating cue.
This is not to say that Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s coaching had no bearing on the American students’ predictions. Rather, it is to say that other conceptual information had greater
bearing on their reasoning, resulting in incorrect inferences. It is not certain exactly why having a major league soccer team did not bear in a significant enough way on these students’
reasoning. However, according to my theory, it likely had something to do with the students’
background knowledge of German cities and their major league soccer or major league soccer
team concept. I suspect, for instance, that since the participants were American students, the
fact that a certain city has a major league soccer team was not very pertinent because soccer
is not among the major American-centred sports, such as baseball and (American) football,19
and hence they have comparatively little conceptual knowledge having to with the pertinence
19

As of late, soccer has been gaining popularity as a sport in the USA. Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s experiment
was conducted before 1999. Nevertheless, I still do not think that soccer would be considered a major Americancentred sport.
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of having a major league soccer team to predicting relative city size. And even though the
students were instructed that having a major league soccer team is a good indicator of relative
city size, it is likely that their existing conceptual structures (like anyone’s conceptual structure) were so entrenched that they overwhelmed the pertinence of that information. In other
words, their major league soccer or major league soccer team concept were not rich enough to
bear the appropriate connectional structures that embody the implicit belief that a major league
soccer team is useful in predicting relative city size. As such, such concepts would not be rich
enough to support an ER-structure that exhibits the requisite connectional relations over which
Take the Best can operate to deliver a prediction involving the cue that a city has a major league
soccer team.
If the same experiment was conducted with European participants, I would predict that they
would utilize the fact that a city had a major league soccer team differently (it would probably
be used as a discriminating cue), since their conceptual understanding of major league soccer
and major league soccer team would likely be adequately rich. In general, I suspect that
if the conceptual content of one’s concepts were somehow elicited from someone, accurate
predictions can be made about what inferences she would make regarding some subject matter
concerning the concepts in question. With respect to Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s participants,
an initial assessment of the American students’ concepts would indicate something about their
implicit beliefs about the cues’ respective pertinence to the given problem. If the American
students were given a cue that is a good predictor of relative city size and that is congruent with
their background conceptual knowledge, the American students would likely implicitly believe
such a cue to be useful in predicting relative city size, and it would therefore bear significantly
on their reasoning and their resulting predictions. Such cues may, again, include a city being
the nation’s capital, or the number of airports a city has, or whether a city has a university. Each
concept—capital city, airport, university, respectively—would probably be rich enough for
the American students to implicitly understand and utilize the cue as a discriminating cue, and
thereby produce an ER-structure to facilitate correct answers via a heuristic like Take the Best.
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To repeat, this is not to say that a discriminating cue would be the only piece of information
these students would consider, for other information may very well have a bearing on their
reasoning. Rather, this is to say that such a cue will have greater pertinence for these students
(i.e., have an important place in their ER-structure) than a cue that is a good predictor of city
size but is not congruent with the background conceptual knowledge of the individual.

5.3

General remarks

Gigerenzer has complained on more than one occasion that Kahneman and Tversky’s proposed
heuristics are “vague labels”, and that a given cognitive process can appear to be one heuristic under one description, but appear to be a different heuristic under a different description
(e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Gigerenzer may very well be right. Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics certainly bear a certain level of vagueness insofar as there is
no determinate measure of representativeness or availability. Nevertheless, what I hope was
made clear in this chapter is that, notwithstanding that a given cognitive process can appear to
be one heuristic under one description but appear to be a different heuristic under a different
description, under any description a heuristic process operates over and is constrained by the
ER-structures borne by activated concepts and their conceptual content.
Although much more detail can be given as to the manner in which the proposed heuristics
discussed in this chapter operate, I believe that the analyses that I have provided is sufficient
to see that such heuristics are grounded in the heuristic procedures described at the end of the
previous chapter, and more generally in the account of concepts and cognition developed in
this dissertation. More work needs to be done to furnish a complete account of the empirical
evidence of the use of heuristics. Indeed, there are many other proposed heuristics in the
literature that this chapter did not even mention, including those that Simon discusses and a
wide variety of methodological heuristics (see chapter 2). However, what has been presented
here suggests that my theory of concepts and cognition, and how heuristics work, accounts for
enough phenomena to be considered plausible.
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It is also important to note that many of the claims made in this chapter are empirically
testable. In general, I suspect that with the appropriate experimental set-up, we may be able to
infer (to some extent) the conceptual content of one’s concepts and the relations between them
(perhaps based on association tasks); and if we were able to tease this out, we would be able
to make predictions about what ER-structures would get invoked with given inference tasks.
We would then be able to make predictions about what heuristics one would employ, and what
inferences one would thereby make, based on the account presented here.
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Throughout this dissertation I have advanced a theory that claims that heuristics work in cognition by operating over the organization of and connections between our concepts and their
conceptual content. However, one last important issue remains to be discussed, namely the
epistemological relevance problem, which was introduced in chapter 3. As promised, this concluding chapter is devoted to addressing this aspect of the frame problem. This matter will be
by no means fully detailed, but I will use my theory of concepts and cognition to sketch a way
that the epistemological relevance problem might be circumvented; and this will indicate what
role heuristics have, if any, in solving the problem.
In chapter 3 I discussed how heuristics are commonly invoked by various researchers as a
way to circumvent relevance problems in cognition. However, I argued that invoking heuristics
to avoid the computational relevance problem says nothing of whether heuristics can circumvent the epistemological relevance problem, which is the problem of knowing or determining
what is and is not relevant in our cognitive processing. Returning to this matter, I will begin
in section 1 by reminding us of the epistemological guise of the frame problem and why it is
a problem. I will then discuss in section 2 how to define relevance, for it seems that how and
whether information is determined to be relevant depends on what property relevance picks
out. I will briefly expound the influential account of relevance developed by Dan Sperber and
Deirdre Wilson (1986/1995), and then argue for a reinterpretation of their theory within the
framework of cognition I developed in this dissertation. This will allow me to assess the role
heuristics have in making determinations of relevance, as well as to explain the reasonable
levels of success exhibited by humans in judging what is and is not relevant in their cognitive
tasks.
In section 3 I conclude that our conceptual wherewithal predetermines what I call de facto
relevance (cf. Gabbay & Woods, 2003). Two important theses are entailed by this position.
One is that heuristics do not actually make determinations of relevance, and so they actually
have no role in circumventing the epistemological relevance problem. But this thesis is not
as severe as it may appear, for I will also argue—which is the other important thesis—that

Chapter 6. Relevance and the epistemological relevance problem

225

humans do not in any case solve the epistemological relevance problem; so heuristic solutions
ipso facto are empty. Contrary to what Fodor believes (see chapter 3), it really does not matter
much whether we solve the epistemological relevance problem.1 Nevertheless, it is important
to see the headway my theory makes in confronting the frame problem in general. I will
illustrate how my account can help us to better understand how humans solve a different aspect
of the frame problem, namely the representational frame problem (as described in chapter 3),
which enables us to exhibit our characteristic reasonable levels of success in determining what
to bring to bear on our cognitive tasks.
In chastising recent attempts to offer a heuristic solution to the frame problem, Fodor (2008)
has remarked that “The rule of thumb for reading the literature is: If someone thinks that he
has solved the frame problem, he doesn’t understand it; and if someone thinks that he does
understand the frame problem, he doesn’t; and if someone thinks that he doesn’t understand
the frame problem, he’s right” (pp. 120-121). This concluding chapter might be viewed as a
response in the following way. I claim that I think I understand the frame problem, but I do
not think to have solved it. At the same time, however, I believe that the account of concepts
and cognition offered in this dissertation helps us to understand how we determine what to
bring to bear on our cognitive tasks. And insofar as I am successful at this, I hope to show that
my account of concepts and cognition (which underwrites my theory of how heuristics work)
explains what we actually do in our reasoning.

6.1

The epistemological relevance problem

Let us begin by reviewing the epistemological relevance problem, and the role that is commonly
ascribed to heuristics in circumventing it. The cognitive systems that are paradigmatically responsible for general reasoning and decision-making—i.e., central systems—admittedly allow
for free exchange of information. A dream of a snake biting its own tail, for example, bore in
interesting and important ways on Kekulé’s theorizing of the benzene molecule. What is en1

In any event, Fodor’s understanding of the problem places unreasonable, unrealistic demands on what is
required of central cognition. See chapter 3, section 3.1.2.
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tailed by such a free exchange of information, however, is that, provided an appropriate set of
background beliefs, any representation held by an agent can in principle be relevant to a given
cognitive task in central cognition. Who won tonight’s football game is prima facie irrelevant
to whether there is beer in your friend’s fridge. But if you believe that your friend’s favourite
football team played tonight, and that your friend usually overindulges in beer consumption
whenever his favourite team wins, then your belief about who won tonight’s game actually is
relevant to your belief about beer in your friend’s fridge. Since relevance can be determined
only with respect to one’s background beliefs, there is no way a priori to circumscribe the subset of representations that are relevant in a given occasion of reasoning or inference. And this
is what gives rise to various aspects of the frame problem, as expounded in chapter 3 (section
3.1).
The computational relevance problem, it may be recalled, is one aspect of the frame problem. It is a problem of how a cognitive system tractably delimits (i.e., frames) what gets
computed in a cognitive task. On the other side of this coin, the epistemological relevance
problem is a problem of how a cognitive system not only ignores most of what it knows, but
ignores the right sorts of things in particular, namely what is irrelevant. In chapter 3 I expressed
this problem thus:
The epistemological relevance problem The problem of how a cognitive system
considers only what is (mostly) relevant, or equivalently, how a cognitive
system knows what is relevant.
Humans seem to determine what is relevant in their cognitive tasks quickly and rather
easily. This is not to say that we always know and consider what is relevant. For we often
fail to do so, especially when cognitive demands are high and/or when cognitive resources
are low (cf. Samuels, 2005, forthcoming). Nevertheless, humans characteristically exhibit
reasonable levels of success at identifying representations that are relevant to the task at hand.
Such reasonable levels of success cannot be ascribed to chance or luck. Therefore, we are
left to explain how humans (seem to) solve the epistemological relevance problem, short of
considering the totality of one’s beliefs (Fodor, 1987, 2000).

Chapter 6. Relevance and the epistemological relevance problem

227

As I had pointed out in chapter 3, heuristics are often invoked as a solution to relevance
problems, or at least to circumvent relevance problems. I argued that heuristics may very
well relieve the computational burden put on a system in delimiting the set of representations
to be considered for a given cognitive task—i.e., circumventing the computational relevance
problem—notwithstanding that the informational richness and extant relations between concepts are what heuristics owe their utility to. As interesting as this may be, however, this says
nothing of whether or the extent to which heuristics can circumvent the epistemological relevance problem. That is, thus delimiting the amount of representations that get considered does
not ensure that what does get considered will in fact be relevant to the task at hand. And as I had
indicated, the arguments often offered to alleviate the worries of relevance problems (e.g., Carruthers, 2006a, 2006c; Samuels, 2005, forthcoming) do not in fact address this epistemological
worry.
Nevertheless, the account of heuristics, concepts, and cognition that I have developed in this
dissertation does address the epistemological relevance problem, at least in a certain respect. To
fully appreciate this, however, we must first understand that the inquiry into how relevance is
determined is constrained by how relevance is defined. In more explicit terms, whether and the
extent to which relevant representations are picked out and brought to bear on a cognitive task
(by heuristics, for example) will depend on what property we are concerned with. Thus, after
relevance is defined we might understand how the present view offers a psychological/cognitive
account of the conditions under which heuristics manage to pick out relevant representations.
What I will do in the following section is provide a cursory overview, and somewhat of
a critical assessment, of what is arguably the most influential account of relevance—Sperber
and Wilson’s Relevance Theory. My aim is not to offer a full critique of Sperber and Wilson’s
theory, but to provide an assessment such that I am able to use the theory as a basis from
which to synthesize a working definition of relevance that conforms to my view of concepts
and cognition. The overarching goal for this working definition is to explain the phenomena of
how we determine relevance in reasoning, and this will have implications for the role heuristics
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have, if any, in bringing to bear relevant representations on the task at hand.

6.2
6.2.1

Relevance
Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory

Sperber and Wilson (1982, 1986/1995) developed their Relevance Theory in the context of
communication and pragmatics. Humans tend to have an easy time communicating with each
other, despite the fact that the meanings of utterances are enormously underdetermined. A simple example: Alice says to Bob, “Isn’t that cute?” while nodding toward a chipmunk scurrying
up a tree; Bob knows that by “that” Alice is referring to the chipmunk, and not to the birds in
the other branches, the tree itself, the landscape, the sound of a horse whinnying, or whatever
else was within his perceptual field at the time of her utterance. According to Sperber and
Wilson, Bob understands that Alice was referring to the chipmunk because the stimulus of the
chipmunk running up the tree was relevant (or at least more so than any other present stimulus).
Although Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory is mainly concerned with verbal/ostensive
communication and comprehension in particular, they claim that their theory can be extended
to the spontaneous, unconscious inference processes of ordinary thinking (1986/1995, p. 67;
p. 75). Sperber and Wilson are able to make this claim because they ground their account of
relevance in a fundamental and general view of human cognition.
Sperber and Wilson’s view of human cognition is a familiar one derived from general biological principles, and is very similar to some of the tenets on which Gigerenzer and his
colleagues base their fast and frugal heuristics research program, as well as to some of the
principles which guided Simon’s thinking (see chapter 2, section 2.3). Simply put, biological
organisms are limited entities with finite resources, and adaptive pressures along with other
evolutionary forces compel such organisms to carefully manage their resources. Typically this
means that a system is not wasteful in its resource consumption. But more specifically, this
means that the potential benefits of performing a task—whatever the goals are—must in some
sense be worth the resources invested and used in achieving them. In this sense, the benefits

Chapter 6. Relevance and the epistemological relevance problem

229

must exceed, or at least in some sense balance off, the resources expended in the pursuit and
attainment of the goal. Biological organisms must therefore allocate their resources in such
a way that positively contributes to performance and survival; or, what amounts to the same
thing, they must be efficient, operating with efficient mechanisms.
Sperber and Wilson understand cognition to be a biological function, and as such they
make a general claim that cognition always tends toward efficiency—maximizing gains and
minimizing costs. But Sperber and Wilson make a more particular claim, namely that human
cognition succeeds in increasing its efficiency by having a tendency toward maximizing relevance. Relevance, for Sperber and Wilson, is a technical term referring to a property of inputs
(assumptions) to cognitive processes. According to their Relevance Theory, the relevance of
an input is a function of cognitive effect on the one hand, and processing effort on the other.
Hence, maximizing relevance, according to Sperber and Wilson, is a matter of best managing
one’s cognitive resources to achieve cognitive effects without investing too much processing
effort.
Cognitive effects are best understood as contextual effects achieved by a cognitive system.
A context is simply just a set of assumptions within which informational input can be processed. Contextual effects are the results of processing input within a context that could not
have been effected by the input alone or by the context alone. These are characteristically implications (yielding inferences, and resulting in new assumptions), contradictions (compelling
the system to abandon one or more assumptions), or strengthenings (increasing the system’s
degree of belief in given assumptions).
Sperber and Wilson (1995) make the point that a cognitive system, or more specifically
an individual human, is not interested in contextual effects per se, but only insofar as such
contextual effects contribute to achieving the system’s (the individual’s) cognitive goals, or
otherwise fulfilling its functions. For indeed, there may be contextual effects that are not worth
having, or that contribute negatively to the individual’s cognitive functions or goals. Thus,
Sperber and Wilson define a positive cognitive effect as a contextual effect that contributes to
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the cognitive goals or functions of the individual in a positive way. This is typically achieved by
alterations in the individual’s beliefs. In short, positive cognitive effects are cognitive benefits;
they yield positive cognitive utility; they produce an “epistemic improvement” (Sperber &
Wilson, 1995, p. 266); they make a “worthwhile difference” (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 608)
to the cognitive functioning of the individual.
Processing effort, on the other hand, incurs a cost on the cognitive system in terms of
resources expended (time, energy, and other cognitive resources). Effort is required not only
to process inputs and achieve contextual effects—to draw inferences and acquire new beliefs,
revise old beliefs, add to and retrieve information from memory stores, and so on—but it is also
required to construct an appropriate context within which to process inputs. The expenditure of
resources bears negatively on a cognitive system, and therefore bears negatively on relevance.
It should be obvious that relevance, assessed in terms of cognitive effect and processing
effort, comes in degrees, and that this is a direct result of both effect and effort being matters of
degree. What is more, some input may yield greater cognitive effects on some occasions and
less effects on others. This may be due to varying limitations on accessing certain information
at certain times, and on constructing appropriate contexts within which to process the input.
Or, depending on circumstances related to fatigue or stress, the same input may be more or less
easy to process at different times. And, of course, such factors widely vary between individuals,
and so one individual may process some input with greater ease and with greater effects while
another may find it difficult to process the same input with the same effects. Or one individual
may process some input with little effort but with little effect, while another may process the
same input with great effort but with greater effect. And so on. What all this means, in short,
is that relevance is a relative property—relative to an individual (the cognitive system within
which the context is brought to bear on the input in question) and to a time. Hence, Sperber
and Wilson (1986/1995) provide the following two conditions for relevance:
(19) Ceteris paribus, the greater the cognitive effects achieved by an individual by
processing some input within a context, the more relevant that input is to that
individual at that time.
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(20) Ceteris paribus, the greater the effort expended by an individual by processing some input within a context, the less relevant that input is to that individual at that time.
To illustrate this notion of relevance, let us consider a toy example (Sperber & Wilson,
1996): You purchased a lottery ticket and you know there are three prizes: $100, $500, and
$1,000. After the lottery has been drawn, you receive a phone call informing you that you have
won a prize. The informant can tell you any of the following three things:
(i) You have won $500.
(ii) You have won $100, $500, or $1,000.
(iii) Either you have won $500 or, if I’m speaking right now then

√

2 = 7.

Of these three statements, all are relevant in the sense characterized by (19) and (20). However,
(i) is most relevant: (i) is more relevant than (ii) since the former entails the latter, and so (i)
yields all the cognitive effects of (ii), plus some more specific effects without greater processing
effort. (i) is also more relevant than (iii) since the cognitive effects yielded by both are the
same—for (i) and (iii) are logically equivalent—but such effects are easier to derive from (i)
than from (iii).
According to Sperber and Wilson, the tendency to allocate cognitive resources to processing available inputs—from the environment or from memory—so as to maximize expected
cognitive effects for the least expected effort is the consequence of a general principle which
governs cognition:
The Cognitive Principle of Relevance Human cognition tends to be geared to
the maximization of relevance.
Thus, when presented with competing inputs, cognition will tend to process what is relevant.2
2

Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory makes claims about human cognition in general, but an important
consequence of their Cognitive Principle, and one that is the basis for their work in pragmatics, is the Communicative Principle of Relevance: Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.
This principle is, of course, based on Paul Grice’s (1975) conversational maxim of relation (or relevance), which
really inspired and motivated Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory in the first place. The idea behind Sperber
and Wilson’s Communicative Principle is that a communicator will have a wide range of stimuli with which to
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It is instructive to note at this point the kind of cognitive architecture that Sperber and
Wilson envision. In the original edition of Relevance (1986), Sperber and Wilson subscribed to
a Fodorian cognitive architecture of the human mind, consisting of a variety of specialized input
modules individually dedicated to processing perceptual information of a specific domain (e.g.,
visual, auditory, linguistic, etc.), in addition to a central processing system (central cognition)
which makes inferences by integrating (transduced) information received from the perceptual
modules or retrieved from memory. Thus, following Fodor, Sperber and Wilson understood the
central processing system as nonmodular in nature, and as an inferential centre where many
kinds of information come together, get combined or otherwise manipulated.
By the second edition of Relevance (1995), Sperber and Wilson had disavowed such a
central systems architecture in favour of the massive modularity hypothesis. Though I note
this only in passing, I submit that I think certain complications arise for their Relevance Theory within a massively modular architecture. This is a matter to be discussed on some other
occasion. However, to avoid these complications, I will continue to refer to Sperber and Wilson’s views as if they still subscribed to a central systems architecture; this type of cognitive
architecture is closer to the architecture advanced in this dissertation, at any rate.
Against the background of their original cognitive architecture, Sperber and Wilson saw
cognitive efficiency largely as a matter of achieving “an optimal allocation of central processing resources” (1986, p. 48). At least this is what they saw as the way by which the mind
might achieve efficiency in its inferential processes. Of course, input modules do not face such
a challenge of achieving an optimal allocation of resources, for if Fodor (1983, 2000) is right
and they are informationally encapsulated computational mechanisms, then there is no challenge for them to appropriately allocate processing resources—a sufficiently small proprietary
communicate her informative intention. To ensure success of communication, it is in the best interests of the
communicator to choose a stimulus that will require the least processing effort on behalf of the addressee. This
Communicative Principle of Relevance is really the centerpiece of Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory, being a significant contribution and highly influential to studies in pragmatics. However, since communication and
pragmatics are not the focus of this dissertation, the Communicative Principle will not be discussed any further.
Instead, it is the Cognitive Principle that bears significance here, since this principle is supposed to govern general
reasoning and cognition.
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database guarantees that the system will not have to search for relevant information or need to
make computations of relevance (see chapter 3, section 3.1.2).
Sperber (2005) has recently suggested that cognitive efficiency, in terms of maximizing relevance, is achieved biologically—specifically, by optimally allocating energy in the brain. His
proposal is to think of maximizing cognitive effects and minimizing effort in terms of noncognitive physiological processes. Sperber asks us to consider the way in which we manage energy
consumption in our muscular movements. The use of our muscles depend on chemical reactions involving oxygen, nutrients, and the removal of lactate. Efficiency in muscle movements
depends on converting the energy produced by these chemical reactions to work, and letting as
little of it as possible degrade into heat. Thus, the way in which muscle efficiency is achieved is
not by cognitively representing effort,3 but by regulating effort noncognitively by physiological
processes (e.g., producing the right amount of energy in the right tissues, appropriately adjusting blood flow, removing sufficient lactate, etc.). Sperber believes that cognitive efficiency is
achieved by analogous physiological means. He writes,
There may be physiological indicators of the size of cognitive effects in the form of
patterns of chemical or electrical activity at specific locations in the brain. . . . Suppose that these physiological indicators locally determine the ongoing allocation of
brain energy to the processing of specific inputs. These indicators may be coarse.
Nevertheless, they may be sufficient to cause energy to flow toward those processes
that are likely to generate relatively greater cognitive effects at a given time. (p.
65)
At the very least, this seems to be a biologically plausible way that the brain might manage
cognitive efficiency. Sperber developed this idea within the purview of a massively modular
cognitive architecture, but I believe it can equally apply in a central systems architecture.

6.2.2

Relevance in light of the foregoing theory of concepts and cognition

Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory seems consistent with the account of cognition and
how heuristics work developed in this dissertation. Nevertheless, there are a number of ways
3

Of course, muscular effort is cognitively represented when the muscle is fatigued. But, as Sperber points out,
it is only above this fatigue threshold that muscular effort is cognitively represented, and even then it is in a very
coarse manner (Sperber, 2005, p. 64).
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in which Relevance Theory is inadequate. For instance, relevance is a property of cognitive
inputs according to the theory, but more specifically it is a property of assumptions. Assumptions, for Sperber and Wilson, are what get processed within contexts, and assumptions also
comprise contexts themselves. According to Sperber and Wilson, assumptions are conceptual
representations that are treated as true by the individual (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995, p. 2).
This would be fine as it is, except that the theory of concepts that Sperber and Wilson adopt is
along the lines of the language of thought hypothesis. That is, they believe that assumptions
are composed of amodal, atomic conceptual representations over which computations sensitive
to their formal semantic and syntactic properties are defined (see pp. 83-93). This runs counter
to the foregoing view of concepts which, borrowing from Barsalou’s work, envisions concepts
as partly comprised of multimodal perceptual information (i.e., perceptual symbols).
It is interesting to note, however, that Sperber and Wilson subscribe to an account of concepts that appears to be just the file model presented above. More specifically, Sperber and
Wilson
assume that each concept consists of a label, or address, which performs two different and complementary functions. First, it appears as an address in memory,
a heading under which various types of information can be stored and retrieved.
Second, it may appear as a constituent of a logical form, to whose presence . . . deductive rules may be sensitive. . . . [W]hen the address of a certain concept appears
in a logical form being processed, access is given to the various types of information stored in memory at that address. (p. 86)
According to Sperber and Wilson, the types of information that can be stored “under” a concept’s address are logical (a set of deductive rules that apply to the logical form of the concept),
encyclopedic (information about the extension of the concept), and lexical (information about
the natural language counterpart that expresses the concept). As Sperber and Wilson have it,
encyclopedic entries of concepts consist of further assumptions subject to the rules set out by
the corresponding logical entries. This picture can be made compatible with the present account of concepts if perceptual symbols are allowed in. Indeed, Sperber and Wilson’s account
of concepts appears to especially lend itself to the view I developed in chapter 4. For the labels
or addresses that Sperber and Wilson refer to function in a way compatible with that which I
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proposed for file labels. As opposed to being forms subject to deductive rules, however, I envisioned labels as lexical items over which natural language can operate to connect, combine,
and inform our concepts. The lexical items stored under a concept’s address on Sperber and
Wilson’s account can also be understood as analogous to the linguistic symbols I described.
But even if multimodal perceptual information is allowed to be stored under concepts’ addresses, and their account of concepts made compatible with mine, Sperber and Wilson’s view
of computational cognition would need to be modified, for they understand computational
cognition strictly in terms of deduction—processes performed by a “deductive device” that is
supposed to “model the system used by human beings in spontaneous inference” (p. 94). Perceptual symbols will not fall under the scope of a concept’s logical entries, and more generally,
will not be subject to the operations of a so-called deductive device.
This brings us back to the point I initially made, which was that, according to Relevance
Theory, relevance is a property of assumptions. We can now see why their view requires this,
namely because assumptions are the type of thing that can serve as input to the deductive device
they believe to be constitutive of central cognition. And moreover, the deductive device is just
the type of thing that can process an assumption within a context to produce contextual effects.
Yet, if the foregoing account of concepts and cognition is accepted, Sperber and Wilson’s
view needs to be adjusted in more than one respect. For there would have to be a way to
define relevance as a property of multimodal perceptual information inasmuch as a property of
assumptions, but in the absence of a language of thought hypothesis.
Nevertheless, there is something intuitively right about the idea that relevance has something to do with positive cognitive effects. For indeed, it seems as if processing irrelevant
information would not generally yield positive cognitive effects. By positive cognitive effects,
however, I am not referring to Sperber and Wilson’s understanding of it as contextual effects
occurring in cognitive systems. Rather, I mean it in their broader and looser sense, generally as
cognitive benefits, positive cognitive utility, “epistemic improvement”, or a “worthwhile difference” to the cognitive functioning of the individual. But is there a more precise understanding
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of positive cognitive effect without invoking contextual effects or deductive inference, but that
is somehow tied to relevance? Or, what would be better, does the foregoing account of concepts
and cognition provide a more precise understanding of positive cognitive effect that is tied to
relevance? I think it does.
To see this, let us recall once again the Dretskean theme that has played a role in the
present account. As I had argued above (chapter 4, section 4.3), in a Dretskean sense, our
concepts are cognitive structures that enable us to extract and exploit certain information in the
environment. Learning or enriching a concept provides us with the ability to decode certain
aspects of our sensory experience in such a way that we are able to cognitively respond in
certain ways which we would not have been able to otherwise. Having the concept daffodil
enables one to see a daffodil as a daffodil, and thus allows one to have daffodil-thoughts and to
cognize daffodil-stimuli in certain ways. Importantly, then, what information one can decode
from stimuli crucially depends on what one already knows about the stimuli, or in the terms of
the present account, on what and the way in which information is coded in one’s concepts and
thus conceptualized.
A natural account of relevance follows from this picture in terms of the amount of information received from a source (such as a stimulus). More specifically, the greater the amount
of information received, the greater the relevance of that information. For example, suppose
that Alice and Bob are on a nature walk. Alice is a botanist, whereas Bob never cared for plant
science. As Alice and Bob gaze upon the flora of the forest floor, they both cognitively extract a
vast amount of information from their respective perceptual scenes. However, Alice’s conceptual knowledge is so rich that she is able to extract more specialized information than Bob does
or even can, having to do with the various kinds of plants that they come across. In this way,
the perceptual scene carries more information for Alice than for Bob. Of course, they both
process the same information, but Alice can cognitively extract more information. Whereas
Bob simply sees a plant, Alice sees Blindwood ivy; whereas Bob simply sees flowers, Alice
sees daffodils. Importantly, certain information in Alice’s and Bob’s perceptual scene is very
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relevant to Alice but not so relevant to Bob. And the information from the perceptual scene that
Alice finds relevant is just that information she is able to extract via her conceptual knowledge.
On the other hand, such information is not as relevant to Bob because he cannot represent the
information in the same ways, since he lacks the conceptual wherewithal to do so.4
Therefore, I suggest that the relevance of a stimulus to a given cognitive system (or agent)
depends on the amount of information received from that stimulus. Since the amount of information received depends on one’s conceptual wherewithal to attend to and code specific
information in certain ways, whether and the extent to which something is relevant is dependent on the conceptual content of one’s concepts. But this is not the entire story, since relevance
will also depend on the context and cognitive task. Suppose, for instance, that both Alice and
Bob are botanists, but Alice is interested in finding a rare flower while Bob is interested in
seeing a specific species of ivy. Both Alice and Bob can code the same information in the same
ways, but because of their different goals and cognitive tasks, Alice will find flower information
more relevant than Bob, and Bob will find ivy information more relevant than Alice.
This can be easily accounted for, however, once it is understood that, in setting up one’s
goals and preparing for one’s cognitive task, one requisitely activates a number of concepts with
specific conceptualizations and representations. This will in a sense serve as a filtering mechanism for focusing attention. Alice will thus be (cognitively/conceptually) geared to attend to
specific information related to a specific flower whereas Bob will be (cognitively/conceptually)
geared to attend to specific information related to ivies, as each will have prepared a set of concepts, conceptualizations, and representations (conceptual content) upon embarking on their
4

In the limit, information is irrelevant if the amount of information received is equal to 0. For this to happen,
however, one would have to be unable to extract and conceptualize any information from the source in question
(cf. Gabbay & Woods, 2003). Unlike Dretske, however, I do not suppose that a signal carries 0 information
if one already knows the message the signal carries. Dretske’s example is of a neurotic person who constantly
has to check to see if his door is locked. According to Dretske, this neurotic person is receiving no information
by checking to see if his door is locked after the first instance. I disagree. Upon checking to see if the door is
locked, the neurotic person still receives the information that the door is still locked, or that the door has not come
unlocked. Processing information one already knows may be redundant, but it may also be useful to strengthen or
reaffirm one’s beliefs. Thus, when I say here that information is irrelevant if the amount of information received
is equal to 0, I am not claiming that one is processing irrelevant information when the information is what one
already knows.
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respective cognitive tasks.5 The conceptual content that gets activated when one prepares for a
given cognitive task will tend to be relevant, although this may not always be the case. What
gets activated will depend on previous experience, past activations, and the extant relations and
connections among the activated conceptual content. Since experience would indicate what
was and was not useful in the past, one would tend to bring to bear similar conceptual content
to bear on similar problems. And since usefulness is an indicator of relevance, such conceptual content will tend to be relevant, although what gets activated is essentially based on (what
might be thought of as) guesses. Nevertheless, this will set up certain relations among the activated concepts and conceptualizations, and these relations will constrain and guide inference,
as explained in chapters 4 and 5 (especially with respect to heuristic inference). The relations
among activated information can be understood as a context in which information-processing
occurs, in a sense similar to Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory. But on the view I am
suggesting here, the degree to which information is relevant is a matter of the informativeness
of such information within such a context. Understood this way, relevance is not just a property
of information (or assumptions or inputs) per se—not just a matter of what information gets
processed—but a matter of how information gets processed.
If this is right, then positive cognitive effect can be understood in terms of the informativeness of information that is processed—processing information yields positive cognitive effects
insofar as the results are informative. But this is just to refer to the degree of relevance of the information in question, or so I am claiming. This means that positive cognitive effect is yielded
by processing relevant information. We therefore have our intuitive connection between positive cognitive effect and relevance borne out by the present account: Processed information has
positive cognitive effect because it is informative; and the degree to which it is informative is
the degree to which the information is relevant.
Consider, as a final example, riddles. Riddles present an audience with all of the relevant
5

This is not to rule out, however, a potential role for perceptual mechanisms. It might be the case, for instance,
that nonconceptual creatures can focus attention based on simple perceptual pattern-matching. But I suspect that,
at least for the human case, one’s conceptual wherewithal will have a very big role to play.
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information needed to solve them. But what makes riddles hard to solve is that people do
not process the information in the right sorts of ways. A person can very well process the
information (or assumptions) presented in a riddle with lots of cognitive effort but to little
effect. On Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory, this would mean that the information is
not relevant. But this is clearly not the case. Instead, the person who tries but fails to solve a
riddle is not conceptualizing the information in a way that facilitates the correct inference—
the person is not bringing to bear on her inferences the right sorts of conceptual information
(in terms of perceptual symbol simulations or linguistically coded representations). Hence,
what should be relevant is not conceptualized as relevant, and she therefore fails to solve the
riddle. This is precisely what the present account claims. And, indeed, once one finally comes
around to conceptualizing the information in the right ways, the solution to the riddle appears
obvious (cf. my remarks in the previous chapter (sections 5.1.2.3 and 5.1.2.4) regarding having
to conceptualize probabilistic information in the right ways in order to facilitate probabilistic
inferences and judgments).
Thus, on the foregoing view, it is not that information is relevant because it produces many
cognitive effects with little effort, but the other way around—information produces many cognitive effects with little effort because it is relevant (as a function of its informativeness). Cognitive effects and effort therefore do not define relevance. Rather, concepts and the extant
relations within and among their conceptual content—i.e., the ER-structure—will facilitate
cognitive effects and effort in processing information. Hence, it is structured concepts that
deliver relevance, which in turn assists in producing cognitive effects with little effort.

6.3

Do heuristics determine relevance?

As I have been arguing, relevance depends on the conceptual content of and extant relations
within and between concepts. But it is a further matter as to how cognition knows what information to code up and integrate in—i.e., what information is relevant to—a concept’s simulator
or file. In constructing a cat concept, how does the brain know to code up and integrate the
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general shape, size, and furriness of cats rather than the way they cast shadows, the range of
motion of their left hind legs, or indeed, the position of the moon relative to the earth? That is,
how does cognition know what is and is not relevant in building our concepts? To this the foregoing account has no answer, nor pretends to; but this is the hard problem of epistemological
relevance.
Evolutionary stories certainly can be told in which the brain evolved to pick out and integrate relevant information. Witness, for instance, Sperber and Wilson:
As a result of constant selection pressures toward increasing efficiency, the human
cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend
automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our
inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive
way. (Wilson & Sperber, 2006, p. 610)
Nevertheless, such evolutionary stories come cheap, and are generally unsatisfactory for informing us on how cognition determines relevance.
Yet the epistemological relevance problem expounded in chapter 3 with respect to the frame
problem—namely, the problem of how we know what is relevant to the task at hand—may be
a little easier to tackle. In this regard, let us ask: Can heuristics help in solving this problem
in ways that certain other philosophers (e.g. Carruthers, 2006a, 2006c; Samuels, 2005, forthcoming) have failed to consider? More specifically, can the theory of how heuristics work,
as developed in this dissertation, solve the epistemological relevance problem? The answer,
unfortunately, is “No”. In fact, I believe that heuristic solutions fail generally for two reasons.
First, of all our epistemic commitments, we in fact almost never know the bearing that a given
commitment may have to a given cognitive task, at least not a priori. This is just to repeat why
the epistemological relevance problem is indeed a problem. It is possible that something that
presently appears to be relevant to a given task will turn out to be relevant only after the appropriate research is conducted, and once we have sufficiently built up our background knowledge.
Louise Antony (2003) provides a neat example:6 In the 1930s, an archeological dig in New
6

Thanks to Rob Stainton for informing me of this example.
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Mexico revealed a ceramic piece that graphically represented a supernova that occurred in the
11th century. According to Chinese and Japanese astrological records, the supernova in question produced a light visible in Earth’s sky which lasted twenty-three days. The representation
on the ceramic artifact is of a small circle with twenty-three lines radiating from it. Carbon
dating indicates that the artifact originated around the time when the said supernova was to
have occurred. According to some experts, this ceramic piece serves as the most certain record
of the supernova discovered outside of China and Japan. In this way, then, the artwork on that
particular ceramic artifact is actually relevant to astronomy, specifically to constraining astronomical theory. Yet, I believe that this serves to illustrate a broader point that we almost never
can know a priori what is relevant to our cognitive tasks. The times when we do or can know
what is relevant will likely be confined to those instances when the problem is specially circumscribed, or more particularly when the problem is well-defined (see chapter 2, section 2.2).
This, it seems, is why science—the paradigmatic example of a holistic enterprise—requires
teams of people doing lots of work over long periods of time; and even then, science does not
always get everything right. In this sense, I agree with Fodor (2000) that solving the frame
problem (or at least the epistemological aspect of concern here) is tantamount to considering
the whole background of one’s epistemic commitments, for this is the only way to guarantee
that one has not missed anything relevant.
The second reason why I think heuristic solutions to the epistemological relevance problem
fail is that there is nothing to suggest that heuristics, or cognition generally, is in the business
of guaranteeing that nothing relevant has been missed (cf. Samuels, 2005, forthcoming). In
other words, there is nothing to suggest that cognition attempts to solve the epistemological
relevance problem in the first place. In which case, it is not really a problem; we already
know how to solve it, namely the hard way indicated above, notwithstanding that this is not
practical in most cases. At the same time, it seems that most of human cognition is content
with, and seems to get by on, satisficing judgments of relevance. And judgments that are in
some sense good enough should not be confused with solving the epistemological relevance
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problem. Ensuring certainty in our relevance determinations is severely cognitively taxing,
requiring time and resources that we simply do not have in managing all of our day-to-day
cognitive tasks. Consequently, it does not seem as if complete or holistic relevance is even
an issue that deserves serious attention in our cognitive lives unless we are doing high-stake
reasoning, such as in science or philosophy. I therefore believe that any heuristic solution to
the epistemological relevance problem is empty in virtue of the problem being, by all practical
considerations, unsolvable (at least for the majority of interesting tasks), as well as being a
problem that we are typically not in the business of solving in the first place. Hence, I disagree
with Fodor (2000) that our inability to understand how we solve the frame problem (or at least
the epistemological aspect of concern here) is detrimental to computational cognitive science;
for indeed, we do not solve the problem, and so Fodor’s worries are moot.
But now the question arises: If we do not solve the epistemological relevance problem,
then how do we manage our day-to-day tasks and make reasonable decisions? How do we tend
to bring to bear what is relevant if we do not know what is in fact relevant? This is just the
issue that I had accused Carruthers (2006a, 2006c) and Samuels (2005, forthcoming) to have
skirted in their appeal to heuristics to circumscribe what gets considered in our cognitive tasks
(chapter 3, section 3.2). But I will not likewise skirt the issue here. For indeed, we humans
enjoy reasonable levels of success in our reasoning—as Fodor (2008) states, “witness our not
all being dead” (p. 116)—and we must explain this.
We might begin to see how the foregoing account of concepts and cognition can help to
explain our characteristic levels of success in our reasoning. We may not be in the business
of solving the epistemological relevance problem, but, given the present account, we have
more constraints on our reasoning than we know. Specifically, a certain kind of relevance is
determined by the extant relations among the information embodied by our concepts, or more
particularly the ER-structures described in chapter 4. The kind of relevance I have in mind is
a sort of de facto relevance (cf. Gabbay & Woods, 2003), in which information appears to be
relevant due to the architectural characteristics of cognition. More specifically, and to continue
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the line of reasoning in the previous section, I propose that something is de facto relevant if it
is (more or less) informative when processed against a given set of activated concepts (along
with their attending conceptualizations and representations). In this way, de facto relevance
cannot be determined a priori, as should be expected. Instead, it simply arises out of the nature
and structures of our concepts.
The de facto relevance established by the extant relations within and between activated
concepts and conceptual content appears to be enough for humans to get by on. Indeed, a theme
that has been running throughout this dissertation is that this is precisely what is needed to
ensure tractable cognition and, more importantly, to facilitate heuristics. The kind of relevance
that matters to the epistemological relevance problem, on the other hand, is an ontologically
prior relevance. For lack of a better term, let us call this objective relevance. There will
certainly be times when we fail to process objectively relevant information, or that we process
information that is not very objectively relevant at all. In some cases we may end up processing
some objectively irrelevant information. Moreover, there will inevitably be cases in which we
fail to process de facto relevant information, due to cognitive limitations, fatigue, stress, or
some other extraneous factor. Under satisfactory conditions, however, our activated concepts,
with their conceptual content and extant relations, provide a network that informs cognition of
what is de facto relevant, and constrains and guides its processing accordingly (sometimes via
heuristics). The situation may not be ideal, but it is good enough for us to get by on—indeed,
such is to be expected from satisficing organisms. On the other hand, when we enter into
certain high-stake arenas, such as science or philosophy, we alter our standards, and de facto
relevance is no longer good enough. In such circumstances, objective relevance is sought, and
again, this is why progress and getting things right are much more difficult to achieve in these
endeavours.
At the same time, however, we might understand the foregoing account of concepts and
cognition as contributing to how humans manage to solve, not the epistemological relevance
problem, but a different guise of the frame problem. This is something I alluded to toward
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the end of chapter 3 (section 3.4). To see what I mean, let us revisit an issue that I mentioned
there. Recall that in discussing the frame problem, Dennett (1984) had presented an example
of fixing a midnight snack. He noticed that such a mundane task requires copious amounts of
knowledge: “We know trillions of things; we know that mayonnaise doesn’t dissolve knives on
contact, that a slice of bread is smaller than Mount Everest, that opening the refrigerator doesn’t
cause a nuclear holocaust in the kitchen” (p. 136). Dennett also noticed that it is implausible
to think that such knowledge is stored in a human as separate declarative statements. We must
therefore possess a system of representing this knowledge in such a way that it is accessible on
demand. Dennett therefore believed that the frame problem for AI researchers is to design a
system that is organized in such a way that achieves the efficient representation and access we
observe in humans. In his own words: “A walking encyclopedia will walk over a cliff, for all
its knowledge of cliffs and the effects of gravity, unless it is designed in such a fashion that it
can find the right bits of knowledge at the right times, so it can plan its engagements with the
real world” (pp. 140-141); thus,“[the frame] problem concerns how to represent (so it can be
used) all that hard-won empirical information . . . . Even if you have excellent knowledge (and
not mere belief) about the changing world, how can this knowledge be represented so that it
can be efficaciously brought to bear?” (p. 140). Given Dennett’s analysis, I suggested that an
aspect of the frame problem can be understood as the representational frame problem:

The representational frame problem The problem of how a cognitive system
embodies the informational organization, and enables access to the relevant
information, that seems to be required for human-like cognitive performance.

I believe that the present account of concepts and cognition is precisely what enables humans to solve the representational frame problem. For as I have been at pains to illustrate,
concepts are organized in such a way that the extant relations between their conceptual content
facilitates access to de facto relevant information. Such information may not be objectively relevant, but it will almost certainly be the kind of information that is needed to guide successful
action, and this is all that is needed for human-like performance.
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It is interesting to note, however, that it seems that much of the information that is de facto
relevant turns out to be objectively relevant a lot of the time. This is evident from how humans
get on in the world, and the success rate of many human inferential endeavours. Again, this is
certainly not a result of chance, but likely an outcome of some evolutionary story. Nevertheless,
this is what explains our reasonable levels of success in bringing to bear objectively relevant
information on our cognitive tasks. I admit that this is not much of an explanation. However,
if we conceive of our conceptual system to have evolved to track things in the world, then
it should not be much of a mystery why our conceptual wherewithal reflects the organized
structure of information in the world, including objective relevance relations. In this way,
then, de facto relevance is built up by systems that track objective relevance. And, just like
any cognitive system that tracks stuff in the world, sometimes things work out and sometimes
things go awry; and sometimes cognitive systems track truths but not all the time (such as the
perceptual systems; cf. Viger, 2006b). It seems, however, that in the main cognition tracks
truths in the world, and is quite good at it. Thus, the de facto relevance embodied by the
relations within and between concepts and conceptual content by and large reflects objective
relevance in the world. This, I propose, is what allows us to get by in the world, or in other
words, what enables de facto relevance to be good enough for our purposes.

Assuming that all of this is right, what, then, is the role for heuristics? Heuristics make no
determinations of what information is relevant to given cognitive tasks. Rather, relevance is
already established in the de facto sense. Since heuristics are constrained and guided by what
concepts and other attending information is activated, as argued above, and since these things
are what determine de facto relevance, heuristics are in fact constrained and guided by what is
de facto relevant. More precisely, heuristics operate over ER-structures which embody implicit
information (knowledge) about what is de facto relevant. Thus, the proper role of heuristics
is to draw inferences based on such structures that determine de facto relevance, and I do not
think that we should expect (or even desire) more than that.
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Concluding remarks

This concludes this dissertation. Let us briefly summarize: There are many different (and
sometimes incompatible) ways that “heuristic” is employed in the philosophical and cognitive science literatures. I suggested that we understand heuristics as cognitive procedures that
operate by exploiting (mental) informational structures. The informational structures heuristics exploit are active and primed concepts and their attending information (conceptualizations
and representations). Heuristic reasoning is thereby constrained by concepts and their attending information. More specifically, heuristics operate over extant relational structures between
concepts and conceptual content that embody implicit, higher-order, metainformational knowledge about the concepts in question vis-à-vis the cognitive task at hand. By operating over such
structures, heuristics are enabled to satisfice, and require little cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution. Heuristics are thereby good candidates to mitigate the computational
worries arising from the frame problem (i.e., the computational relevance problem), although
it is really our conceptual wherewithal that is shouldering the informational burden. Our conceptual wherewithal is also what determines de facto relevance, and insofar as it does this, our
conceptual wherewithal is what helps us to achieve our characteristic levels of success in making determinations of relevance. The structures that determine de facto relevance are those very
structures that heuristics operate over. However, notwithstanding certain claims to the contrary,
heuristics do not circumvent a different aspect of the frame problem, namely the problem of
how a cognitive system knows what is (objectively) relevant (i.e., the epistemological relevance
problem). Rather, the latter problem is generally not solved, and moreover, human cognition
is not in the business of solving it in the first place. But it appears that depending on de facto
relevance is good enough for human performance.
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